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Abstract  -  Asperger  Syndrome  (AS)  is  currently  understood  as  a 
neurodevelopmental condition associated with difficulties in social communication, 
social  interaction,  and  social  imagination.  Many  AS  people  also  experience 
differences in sensory sensitivities and perceptions of the surrounding world. Most 
diagnoses are now made in childhood; however, there remain a number of people 
who are diagnosed in adulthood. Within this group, there are also a number who, 
born before 1980, grew up in an era before the condition had been identified and 
diagnosed, and therefore spent a substantial part of their lives living either without 
a diagnosis or with an incorrect diagnosis. This is an under-researched group, whose 
pre-diagnostic experiences have thus far not been subject to detailed investigation, 3 
 
 
and as such are often poorly or inconsistently understood both academically and by 
service providers.   The primary aim of the thesis is to explore their experiences by 
addressing the following three questions: 
1.  How  do  AS  people  understand  their  dispositional  selves  in  the  pre-
diagnostic phase of life?   
2.  How do self-other relations affect pre-diagnostic understandings of self? 
3.  How does management of everyday insecurities relate to formations of the 
pre-diagnostic self? 
These  questions  will  be  explored  through  comparative  analysis  of  seven 
autobiographies, authored by AS people who were diagnosed in adulthood.  The 
analysis is informed by a neo-Bourdieusian approach to identity through which I 
develop an account of relations between authenticity (one’s ability to experience 
dispositionally appropriate ways of being), accountability (referring to the social and 
cultural conditions of exchange with others) and legitimacy (the experience of one’s 
ways of being as valid) as a way of framing some of the issues faced by AS adults in 
pre-diagnostic life in relation to the themes above.  I suggest that this framework 
can offer a useful perspective on pre-diagnostic issues by drawing attention to the 
interrelation  of  dispositional  and  social  circumstances  in  shaping  individual  life 
experiences. 
Word Count – 74, 847 (excluding references and bibliography) 4 
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Introduction. 
 
In this thesis I explore pre-diagnostic identity formation among people diagnosed 
with Asperger Syndrome (AS) in adulthood.  AS is a condition that is associated with 
difficulties  in  social  communication,  social  interaction,  and  social  imagination 
(Baron-Cohen, 2008a, 1; NAS, 2011a).  Social communication difficulties can include 
problems with facial expressions and body language, or implicit meaning in written 
or spoken language (Baron-Cohen, 2008a, 58).  Many AS people also experience the 
world differently in terms of their sensory and perceptual experiences in relation to, 
for example, light levels or patterns, sounds, particular smells, colours, textures or 
tastes (Bogdashina, 2003, 44-83).  This can affect the quality and/or intensity  of 
what is experienced, resulting in hyper/hyposensitivities (i.e. a more or less intense 
experience  of  stimuli  than  the  typical  range  in  non-AS  people)  that  tend  to  be 
multimodal (i.e. taking different experiential forms and occurring in different sense 
domains) and pervasive (Kern et al., 2006; Leekam et al., 2007; Tomchek and Dunn, 
2007; Klintwall et al., 2011; Samson et al., 2011).   
 
AS-related differences can vary significantly between individuals, and can also be 
affected by changes in the environment and social context, or emotional state of 
the  person  (Attwood,  2007,  279-291).    For  example,  a  person  may  be  able  to 14 
 
 
function comfortably in a setting where an annoying sound is present, if the social 
environment is suitable and/or their awareness is directed significantly away from 
the  noise  (Bogdashina,  2001,  4-7).    However,  if  the  social  context  and/or 
environment presents other issues, perhaps sensory (for example, too many sounds 
or lights) or social (for example, anxiety in the presence of unfamiliar company) 
then  this  can  affect  a  person’s  threshold  of  tolerance  (Bogdashina,  2001,  4-7).  
While problems with social and environmental aspects of everyday life are common 
features of life for AS people, one should not assume that ‘being AS‘ is necessarily  a 
negative or harmful phenomenon (Clarke and van Amerom, 2007; Baron-Cohen et 
al.,  2009).    For  many  in  this  group,  AS-specific  experiences  are  central  to  their 
wellbeing and sense of self and, as we shall see, whether or not one can freely 
experience these ways of being is constrained by social and cultural constraints 
(Gernsbacher et al., 2006; Milton, 2012; Milton and Moon, 2012).  This is not to 
state that AS-related differences are reducible to either social or cultural factors, 
but rather that individual experiences of ‘being AS’ are inextricably linked to the 
conditions in which lives are lived (Molloy and Vasil, 2004). 
 
AS is currently classified as part of the Autism spectrum of neurodevelopmental 
conditions  (ASCs);  the  word  'spectrum'  is  used  because,  while  these  areas  of 
difficulty are common to all people with an ASC, individual experiences can vary 15 
 
 
significantly  (Baron-Cohen,  2008a,  1;  NAS,  2011a).  While  those  diagnosed  with 
‘classic autism’ will also have difficulties in learning and cognition, as well as partial 
or complete absence of speech, people diagnosed with AS will not (Baron-Cohen, 
2008a, 29-34).  People in the ‘classic autism’ range often require lifetime care and 
support, while many AS people have average or above average abilities in a range of 
areas but may benefit from support in dealing with problematic interactions and 
environments  (Rosenblatt,  2008,  30).    Most  AS  diagnoses  are  now  made  in 
childhood, and awareness of AS has increased substantially since the condition was 
first introduced into the DSM and ICD in the early 1990s (Baron-Cohen et al., 2007).  
However,  some  will  not  be  diagnosed  until  adulthood,  and  for  them  the  pre-
diagnostic phase of life may be especially challenging, as they meet with difficulties 
in everyday life that often have no obvious causes (Attwood, 2007; Newport, 2001). 
Existing research indicates that having a diagnosis often has significant implications 
for how one understands and presents oneself to others, although the quality of 
this  experience  can  vary  significantly  both  within  and  between  individual 
biographies (Molloy and Vasil, 2004; Bagatell, 2007; Huws and Jones, 2008; Singh, 
2011).  AS people often understand and engage with the social and environmental 
aspects of the world in ways that are different from many non-AS others (Milton, 
2012; Ryan and Räisänen, 2008), and diagnosis can help a person to understand 
these  differences  and  their  implications  for  everyday  life  (Baron-Cohen,  2009; 
Moloney,  2010;  Singh,  2011).    Conversely,  not  having  a  diagnosis  can  involve 16 
 
 
confusion  over  the  reasons  for  these  difficulties,  with  implications  for  how  one 
understands and presents themselves to others (Huws and Jones, 2008; Molloy and 
Vasil, 2004; Rosqvist, 2012; Singh, 2011).  Furthermore, those born before 1980 
may be at particular risk of having grown up without a diagnosis, due to the lack of 
awareness of the diagnosis prior to its entrance into the aforementioned diagnostic 
manuals, and it is to this group that the present investigation is directed (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2007). 
 
The main body of the thesis is divided into two sections.  In part one (chapters 1-5) I 
will frame the intellectual and ethical context of the project, introduce key themes 
and  research  questions,  and  establish  my  theoretical  and  methodological 
approaches to them.  The first step (in chapter one) will be to explore the historical 
development of AS both as a diagnostic category and an aspect of personal and 
collective  identity.    Here,  I  will  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  AS  remains  a 
condition  that  is  only  partially  understood,  with  no  specific  biomarkers  or 
aetiological explanations.  As such AS can usefully be understood through Hacking’s 
(1999) concept of the ‘interactive kind’ involving interplay between biology, culture 
and social processes and cannot be reduced to any one domain.  This is significant 
because it points to the value of social scientific investigations for exploring how 
experiences of AS-related differences may be shaped by the conditions of the ‘live’ 17 
 
 
social world.  In chapter two I will set out the research case for the general focus 
and specific research questions that frame my investigation, firstly by justifying the 
focus  on  the  pre-diagnostic  experiences  of  AS  adults  born  before  1980,  and 
secondly by identifying three specific areas for investigation: 
1.  How  do  AS  people  understand  their  dispositional  selves  in  the  pre-
diagnostic phase of life?   
2.  How might living without a diagnosis affect self-other relations? 
3.  How  are  everyday  insecurities  understood  and  managed  in  the  pre-
diagnostic phase of life? 
 
In chapter three I set out my conceptual approach to framing and exploring these 
questions.  Firstly, I will argue that Bourdieu’s interrelated concepts of practice, 
habitus,  field  and  capital  can  provide  a  useful  and  appropriate  framework  for 
framing  and  exploring  the  relationship  between  perceptual  differences, 
dispositionality  and  social  agency.    However,  this  will  require  a  return  to  the 
phenomenological  underpinnings  of  his  work  in  order  to  re-frame  some  of  the 
perceptual  assumptions  which  underpin  his  normative  concepts,  as  well  as 
attention  to  Bottero’s  developmental  critiques.    This  provides  the  basis  for  my 
approach to identity, drawn from the work of Bottero, who utilises a Bourdieusian 
approach to frame identity in terms of links between dispositional, reflexive and 18 
 
 
collective aspects of self, as a way of overcoming some of the limitations associated 
with  purely  reflexive  or  social  constructionist  approaches  (which  comprise  the 
majority of those used to explore AS people’s identities) (Bagatell, 2007; Brownlow 
et al., 2006; Molloy and Vasil, 2004; Sterponi, 2004).  Finally, I will introduce the 
interrelated  concepts  of  authenticity,  accountability  and  legitimacy  as  ‘thinking 
tools’ (Bourdieu, 1990b) for exploring formations of pre-diagnostic self. 
 
Chapter four sets out my methodological approach involving a life story approach, 
drawing on autobiographies written by AS authors.  Here, I discuss the ethical and 
epistemological advantages and limitations of this approach, and how interpretive 
and positional issues were managed in reflexive practice during the research.  The 
process of selection and analytical approach will be set out and discussed in relation 
to the  structure  of the  analysis  in  part two.   Finally,  I  will  give  an  introductory 
summary of each autobiography, and indicate its position within the analysis in part 
two. 
 
Chapter  five  marks  the  beginning  of  part two,  where  I discuss  how  four  of the 
autobiographers (Gunilla Gerland, Wendy Lawson, Lianne Holliday Willey and Will 
Hadcroft) came to understand their dispositional selves in the pre-diagnostic phase 
of  life.    I  will  highlight  several  themes  emerging  from  the  autobiographies:  the 19 
 
 
development  of  dispositional  self  in  relation  to  strengths  and  limitations, 
configuration of these understandings as differences, importance of variations in 
intersubjective and wider cultural conditions for shaping the dispositional self, and 
the implications of this for a person’s ability to experience authentic ways of being.  
In  chapter  six,  I  explore  how  dispositionality  relates  to  reflexive  and  collective 
aspects of identity in negotiation of self-other relations, in the lives of the three 
other autobiographers (Jeanette Purkis, Jen Birch and John Elder Robison).  This 
discussion here will also demonstrate how, in addition to dispositional aspects of 
self  mediating  opportunities  for  connecting  with  different  social  groups, 
understandings of dispositions may themselves be configured by social participation 
within  the  ‘cultural  horizon’  of  different  fields,  and  also  how  pre-diagnostic 
understandings  of  the  self  in  relation  to  others  can  be  shaped  by  reflexive 
understandings of dispositional differences. The discussion here will also show how 
dispositional aspects of self may combine with reflexive and collective elements in 
formations of pre-diagnostic identities. 
Chapter seven explores how management of everyday insecurities is implicated in 
pre-diagnostic formations of self.  The structure of discussion in this chapter will 
differ from the two previous chapters, as I will explore five of the autobiographies in 
relation to two themes (i.e. parenthood and the workplace).  In 7.1.1, I will explore 
insecurities relating to parenthood, firstly by comparing how Will Hadcroft and John 
Elder Robison’s dispositional identities shaped their orientations to fatherhood, and 20 
 
 
secondly by exploring Wendy Lawson’s experience of being a new mother labelled 
as  schizophrenic.    In  7.1.2  I  will  discuss  management  of  social  and  sensory 
insecurities  in  the  workplace,  and  their  relationship  to  pre-diagnostic  identities.  
Here,  the  importance  of  social  resources  in  the  form  of  supportive  collegial 
relationships will be explored through Jen Birch’s writing, before I turn to Gunilla 
Gerland’s  account  of  dealing  with  sensorily  challenging  environments  as  a  day 
nursery worker.  Gerland’s narrative will serve as an illustration of how the stress of 
dealing with everyday insecurities, as well as not understanding the reasons for 
them, can leave AS people particularly vulnerable to destabilisation by unforeseen 
events (in this case, her mother’s mental health crisis).  In conclusion (chapter eight), 
I  will  summarise  the  discussion  in  the  individual  chapters,  as  well  as  the  more 
general  points  raised  by  the  investigation,  in  relation  to  how  they  help  us  to 
understand pre-diagnostic formations of self.  Implications for further research will 
also be discussed, as well as potential future research directions. 
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Part One – Towards an investigation of pre-diagnostic identities 
– rationale and approach. 
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1 – Framing AS as an object of study. 
 
As indicated in the introduction, the main aim of this thesis is to explore the pre-
diagnostic experiences of people born before 1980 who were diagnosed with AS in 
in adulthood.  However, the status of AS as a diagnostic category, as well as an 
aspect of individual and collective identity, continues to be debated in both clinical 
and  social  sciences,  and  therefore  it  is  necessary  to  begin  by  exploring  these 
debates.  In this chapter, I explore the development of AS as a way of understanding 
and categorising particular people, their differences and experiences.  I will discuss 
the history of the concept, both as a diagnostic category and as a locus of identity 
for new communities (in particular, those online), and investigate how these have 
shaped contemporary understandings of AS.  From here, I examine different ways 
of framing AS in terms of disability and/or difference, especially given current gaps 
in knowledge.  I will discuss my use of language, and the decision to frame AS in 
categorical terms through Hacking’s concept of the ‘interactive kind’, as something 
that is subject to variation in terms of application and definition, involving different 
combinations of social, environmental and biological factors that are only partially 
understood.  The purpose of this chapter will be to situate and justify the ways of 
understanding and discussing AS that I have adopted in this thesis, in preparation 
for  the  next  chapter,  where  I  establish  the  focus  and  specific  questions  of  this 23 
 
 
project, and situate them within the existing body of literature on the experiences 
of AS people. 
 
1.1 – AS as a diagnostic category. 
 
AS is a diagnostic category that has undergone considerable change throughout its 
history and into the present day, resulting from a variety of debates within clinical, 
self-advocacy, practitioner and wider public arenas (Silverman, 2008).  For example, 
current  diagnostic  criteria  for  AS  have  focused  hitherto  on  social  and 
communicative  differences,  with  sensory  and  perceptual  factors  classified  
‘associated’ rather than ‘core’ features of a diagnosis (i.e. they are not currently 
classed as necessary conditions for diagnostic recognition) (NAS, 2010, 2).  However, 
in the upcoming Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) fifth 
edition of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), they will likely be included as 
core features of the diagnosis (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009, 1380-1382; NAS, 2010, 1-
2).  This also reflects an increase in research attention, as well arguments made by 
practitioners and self-advocates, around the importance of sensory and perceptual 
issues (Kern et al., 2006; Tomchek and Dunn, 2007; Baron-Cohen, 2008b; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2009; Schroeder et al., 2010; Elwin et al., 2012).   
 24 
 
 
The status of the category has also been questioned in recent clinical debates; the 
current  edition  of  the  World  Health  Organisation  (WHO)  International 
Classifications of Disease (ICD-10) lists AS as a diagnosis of ‘uncertain nosological 
validity’, a statement indicative of the indeterminacy around the category (WHO, 
2010).  Despite this, current research suggests strongly that AS-related differences 
in social, communicative and sensory experiences develop as a result of differences 
in neurological development; however, no specific biomarkers or clear aetiological 
explanations  have  yet  been  provided  (Baron-Cohen,  2008a,  85;  Tantam,  2012).  
Thus  while  no  complete  neurobiological  account  of  AS  exists,  differences  in 
neurodevelopment are implicated strongly in AS, albeit with the reservation that 
there may not be a singular or unitary ‘cause’ (Happe et al., 2006a; Baron-Cohen, 
2008a, 85; Schroeder et al., 2010).  Diagnostic criteria are also undergoing change, 
for example, it is highly likely that AS will be subsumed into the category of ‘Autism 
Spectrum Disorder’ in the upcoming DSM-V, while at the time of writing there are 
no such plans for the next revision (11
th edition) of the ICD (NAS, 2010; Singh, 2011; 
NAS, 2012b).  Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that we are dealing with a 
category  that  continues  to  change,  and  has  been  shaped  by  particular  socio-
historical conditions. 
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1.1.1 - Historical context 
 
The emergence of AS as a diagnostic category is bound up with developments in the 
scientific framing of behaviours and traits associated with the condition, embedded 
within wider processes of cultural and technological change.  As Nadesan argues, AS 
emerged: 
…out  of  a  constellation  of  institutions  and  practices  specific  to  the  early 
twentieth century that include (1) the emergence of the child as a research 
focus (2) the emergence of personality [as opposed to exclusive focus on 
intellectual  capability]  as  a  research  focus  and  clinical  locus,  and  (3)  the 
emergence of interpersonal dynamics as a research focus and clinical locus 
as a source point for individual pathologies (Nadesan, 2005, 26). 
The ‘discovery’ of AS is thus tied to the framing of children as legitimate objects of 
psychiatric enquiry, and to their availability for clinical inspection.  Grinker notes 
that, prior to the twentieth century, children were not usually admitted to asylums, 
and most did not attend school until the mid-nineteenth century (2008, 63).  In 
addition, ‘eccentric children’ were often accepted and even indulged in Europe and 
America,  particularly  if  they  filled  a  social  or  economic  position  within  their 
community (Grinker, 2008, 63).  The emergence of AS therefore required a shift in 
the  boundaries  of  clinical  interest  and  changes  in  perceptions  of  childhood  and 
normality (Grinker, 2008; Nadesan, 2009; Feinstein, 2010). 26 
 
 
 
AS as a diagnostic category is rooted in Hans Asperger’s descriptions of six children 
who displayed what he described as ‘Autistic Psychopathy’, involving above average 
abilities  with  language,  but  problems  with  intuitive  aspects  of  social  interaction 
(Baron-Cohen and Klin, 2006).  Asperger was aware of the historical backdrop to his 
work,  and  in  particular  how  the  limitations  of  psychiatric  practice  at  the  time 
shaped his interpretation of the children’s behaviour.  Reflecting on this ‘discovery’, 
he situates his work within a wider paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962) in child psychiatry: 
Let us remember the early thirties.  At that time psychological problems in 
children had become fashionable…Tests were coming into use for getting to 
understand  anomalies  of  intelligence.    But  none  of  this  helped  with  the 
children I am about to describe.  The disturbance was elsewhere and made 
one think of personality traits which the then current psychiatric circles did 
not describe or clarify.  The disturbance was not so much intellectual, but lay 
more  in  the  child’s  relationship  with  other  human  beings;  in  his  lack  of 
contact.  But at that time this lack of contact was not recognised and it had 
no  name.    So  how  was  a  doctor  trained  to  observe  and  categorise,  to 
describe the peculiarities of these children? (Asperger, 1979, 46). 
As Nadesan notes, Asperger’s work was part of a wider shift in psychiatric practice 
from  measuring  ‘intellectual’  deficits  to  describing  ‘abnormalities’  in  the  child’s 27 
 
 
personality (Nadesan, 2005).  It is perhaps unsurprising, given his description of 
medical  training,  that  when  presented  with  children  that  defied  existing 
categorisation,  he  felt  compelled  to  invent  one.    Asperger’s  observations  were 
bought to the attention of English-speaking audiences through the works of Lorna 
Wing and Uta Frith, leading to the establishment of AS as a formal diagnosis in the 
early 1990s (1992 in the ICD, and 1994 in the DSM) (Baron-Cohen and Klin, 2006, 1).  
In  the  intervening  period, the  technological  and  institutional focus on  ASCs  had 
shifted from psychoanalysis to the neurodevelopmental paradigm (Feinstein, 2010).  
The explanatory focus was no longer on disturbances of early childhood relations 
with the mother, but how factors in the development of the brain and nervous 
system might account for behavioural and experiential differences (Feinstein, 2010).  
This  neurodevelopmental  perspective  remains  the  dominant  scientific  paradigm 
(Kuhn,  1962)  in  contemporary  research  on  ASCs  (Attwood,  2007;  Baron-Cohen, 
2008a; Feinstein, 2010); however, contemporary understandings of AS, as well as 
aspects of diagnostic criteria, continue to be debated.  So what does this mean for 
understanding AS as a diagnostic category?   
 
1.1.2 – AS as a diagnostic category 
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Hacking  (1999)  has  described  Autism  Spectrum  Conditions  as  examples  of  an 
interface between biology and culture, where factors relating to each domain are 
necessary  but  not  sufficient  to  explain  or  even  define  observed  differences.  
Furthermore, Hacking argues that in ASCs, biological factors appear to interact with 
classifications through social processes, giving rise to what he terms an ‘interactive 
kind’ of phenomenon (Hacking, 1999).  Classifying something as a brick or a table 
does not change anything about its material properties (Hacking refers to this as a 
‘flat effect’ that is unchanging); however, classifying human beings can alter both 
the conceptual and material conditions of what is observed, and this can then affect 
classifications (what he terms a ‘looping effect’) (Hacking, 1999).  In autism more 
generally, Hacking observes that variations in institutional and interactive responses 
to those classified as ‘autistic’ can change the context in which features identified 
with autism may arise (Hacking, 1999).  Setting up AS as a generalised deficit in 
sociality, for example, may frame social encounters with people categorised in this 
way  such  that breaches  in  interactions  become  more  visible or  more  likely  (for 
example, in programs of therapy, support services, or changes to educational, study 
and workplace environments). 
 
This ‘looping’ effect is indicated in the work of Clark and van Amerom (2007), who 
compared institutional understandings of AS with those diagnosed through analysis 29 
 
 
of internet blogs (Clarke and van Amerom, 2007, 763-764).  Contributors identifying 
as AS pointed to the negative effects of framing the condition exclusively in terms of 
social  deficit,  such  as  leading  others  to  encourage  them  to  mimic  ‘normal’ 
behaviours (Clarke and van Amerom, 2007, 771-773).  This created what the AS 
bloggers referred to as ‘surplus suffering’, both by directing attention away from 
accommodating their differences, and by compelling them to act in situations that 
were difficult or confusing (Clarke and van Amerom, 2007, 771-773).  Furthermore, 
problems encountered as a result of these impositions were then interpreted as 
confirmation of globalised deficits, thus producing the ‘looping effect’ (Clarke and 
van  Amerom,  2007,  771-773).    This  is  not  to  state  that  participants  did  not 
encounter  difficulties  in  everyday  life,  but  rather,  that  in  the  view  of  many 
contributors, a great deal of additional stress and suffering emerged from overly 
general understandings of the social capabilities of AS people. 
 
Hacking’s  definition of an  ‘interactive  kind’  is useful  in understanding  the  social 
implications  of  AS  as  a  form  of  diagnostic  categorisation.    It  is  important  to 
emphasise that this is not a rejection of biological factors, but rather an attempt to 
understand their interplay with cultural, environmental and historical factors, and 
serves to inject a note of caution as to how far we should draw inferences about the 
capabilities of specific people from diagnostic criteria.  Understandings of AS are not 30 
 
 
confined  to  these  ‘official’  criteria,  but  have  also  developed  in  relation  to  the 
collective identities of people who associate themselves with the category.  For 
some, while the diagnosis may provide a starting point for understanding difference, 
it may not be reified as a complete account of the self (in many cases it is criticised), 
but  rather  provides  a  basis  for  further  exploration  of  one’s  identity.    This  is 
particularly significant given the emergence of AS-majority communities and their 
significance for personal and collective identities, as well as the notion that AS may 
involve different dispositions towards social interaction, rather than simply deficit. 
 
1.2 – AS communities, identity and sociality. 
 
 
From the time of its entry into the ICD and DSM, the idea that AS only involves 
impairment has been challenged, notably through the concept of ‘neurodiversity’ 
(Sinclair, 1993; Sinclair, 2007).  Neurodiversity originated with the sociologist Judy 
Singer, who argued that AS did not simply involve a ‘deficit’ in social interaction, but 
pointed to different ways of seeing the world, which should be celebrated alongside 
other forms of human diversity: 
 31 
 
 
For  me,  the  significance  of  the  Autistic  Spectrum  lies  in  its  call  for  and 
anticipation  of  a  Politics  of  Neurodiversity.  The  Neurologically  Different 
represent a new addition to the familiar political categories of class/ gender/ 
race and will augment the insights of the Social Model of Disability.  The rise 
of Neurodiversity takes postmodern fragmentation one step further. Just as 
the postmodern era sees every once too solid belief melt into air, even our 
most taken-for granted assumptions: that we all more or less see, feel, touch, 
hear, smell, and sort information, in more or less the same way, (unless 
visibly disabled) are being dissolved (1999, 12-13). 
 
Neurodiversity has been a key concept for those (both AS and non-AS) who have 
sought to challenge purely negative or pathological understandings of the condition, 
and  these  developments  are  linked  to  the  practical  possibilities  for  social 
connection afforded by the internet (Davidson, 2008; Brownlow, 2010a; Bagatell, 
2010;  Jaarsma  and  Welin,  2012).  Online  communications  offer  opportunities  for 
social  exchange  that  can  help  mediate  difficulties  associated  with  co-present 
interactions;  for  example,  as  Davidson  (2008)  and  Brownlow  (2006,  2010)  note, 
textual  communication  in  particular  is  well-suited  for  this  purpose,  providing  a 
measure of control over the quality and rhythm of exchanges as well as the physical 
environment in which interactions occur  (Brownlow et al., 2006, 315; Davidson, 32 
 
 
2008,  791,  796).    AS-majority  communities  have  emerged  through  internet 
discussion groups, chat rooms, and autism-specific virtual places such as the island 
of Brigadoon in the online avatar-based world of Second Life (Brownlow et al., 2006, 
315-316; Brownlow, 2010a, 16).  Internet spaces have also offered arenas within 
which  to  develop  practical  strategies  for  addressing  common  types  of  difficulty 
(Davidson,  2008,  802),  and  to  contest  deficit-focused  narratives  of  AS  people’s 
experiences (Brownlow, 2010a, 17-20).  These discussions are often attended by 
social  and  political  claims  around  the  individual  and  collective  legitimacy  of  AS-
related experiences, culture and practices (Clarke and van Amerom, 2007). 
 
It is difficult to overstate the impact of internet communications on the lives of AS 
participants.  In 1997, Harvey Blume observed: 
 
It is not only that for many autistics the World Wide Web provides a rich 
store of metaphors  for  their  mental  processes  -- or that,  in  reverse, the 
mental  processes  of  autistics  can  stand  in  as  symbols  of  the  associative 
hyper-linking graphic chaos of the World Wide Web. There is a much more 
practical side to it. Simply put, for many autistics the Internet is Braille. 33 
 
 
One autistic wrote: "It was through the Internet that I discovered AS and the 
whole concept of neurological differences. Without the Internet, I'd still be 
seeing myself as the cause of my own 'failure' (failure to be NT)... . it wasn't 
until I met other Aspies on the internet that I was able to gain a deeper 
understanding of what being Aspie means." (Blume, 1997). 
 
Since this article first appeared, the size and number of autistic communities online 
has  grown  substantially  (Davidson,  2008).    At  the  2011  Computers  and  Autism 
conference organised by the NAS research division Research Autism, autistic spaces 
online were framed as one of the first sets of communities of which the emergence 
was dependent upon the internet as a medium (NAS, 2011b).  This relates not only 
to online communities, but also face-to-face meetings organised by and involving a 
majority of AS-participants.  Discussions between long-standing professionals and 
researchers at Computers and Autism also offered a historical perspective on the 
impact of the internet.  The overriding theme of these discussions was that very few, 
if any non-AS practitioners working in the field expected those categorised as AS to 
be capable of establishing their own communities prior to the emergence of the 
internet.  For example, in her opening speech, Lorna Wing voiced her ‘surprise’ at 
the existence of a conference linking autism and internet technologies due to her 
assumption  that  online  communication  would  be  incompatible  with  autistic 34 
 
 
people’s dispositions.  However, in her closing address Wing noted that the event 
had changed her perception of what was possible for people on the spectrum in 
relation to the internet (NAS, 2011b).  
 
If some had believed that internet communications might be unsuitable for people 
on the autism spectrum, much less was it expected that research and education 
conferences organised and attended by a majority of autistic people would or could 
succeed.    However,  as  examples  such  as  the  Autscape  and  Autistic  Intelligence 
conferences  indicate,  majority-AS  communities  have  not  only  emerged  in  both 
online and co-present forms, but have done so in ways that mediate many of the 
practical  issues associated  with interactions  in majority non-AS  fields  (Autscape, 
2011).    The  emergence  of  AS  communities  online,  and  subsequent  co-present 
meetings, are thus one of the major reasons why notions of AS consisting of a 
uniform absence of sociality have been discredited. 
 
This  has  also  been  noted  in  research  literature,  for  example,  Jones  and  Meldal 
(2001)  analysed  ‘single-authored  accounts  of  first  person  experience’  from  the 
personal  websites  of  five  people  who  self-identified  as  having  an  AS  diagnosis 
(Jones and Meldal, 2001, 37).  The authors highlighted awareness of communication 
difficulties, attempts to fit in with non-AS people using role play, the importance of 35 
 
 
the internet and autism-specific social networks, and a desire for relationships as 
key themes in discussions.  They argued that in light of these discussions ‘the view 
of  people  with  Asperger  as  having  little  or  no  interest  in  social  relationships  is 
simply not sustainable’ (Jones and Meldal, 2001, 39).  This claim was supported by 
later research undertaken by Howard et al. (2006), who focused on understanding 
and negotiation of friendships.  The authors conducted a single case-study of a male 
AS adolescent using a multi-methods approach involving participant photography, 
semi-structured  interviews  with  both  the  participant  and  his  parents,  and 
assessments using the Youth Quality of Life and Friendship Qualities scales (Howard 
et al., 2006, 621).  They reported that the participants’ understanding of friendship 
involved  shared  interests,  provision  of  help  and  support,  mutual  caring  and 
responsiveness, forgiveness and reciprocity, casting further doubt upon a universal 
lack of interest in social relationships in AS people (Howard et al., 2006, 622-625). 
 
Elsewhere,  Whitehouse  et  al.  (2009)  explored  relationships  between  friendship, 
loneliness and depression in AS adolescents.  35 AS participants and 35 non-AS 
controls,  matched  on  chronological  age,  gender  and  school  year  were  asked  to 
complete  a  number  of questionnaires  for  comparative  analysis  including  the De 
Jong-Gierveld Loneliness Scale, the Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression 
Scale  (CES-DC),  the  Friendship  Quality  Questionnaire  (FQQ)  and  Friendship 
Motivation Questionnaire (FMQ) (Whitehouse et al., 2009, 313-314).  Scores from 36 
 
 
instruments  measuring  depression  and  loneliness  were  compared  with  those 
exploring  friendship  quality  and  motivation  indicators  (Whitehouse  et  al.,  2009, 
310-311).  AS participants reported poorer quality best friendships compared with 
controls, while loneliness was also higher among this group (although these scores 
were not in themselves deemed to be ‘high’) (Whitehouse et al., 2009, 316-317).   
Interestingly, while loneliness scores were predicted by overall friendship quality 
(FQQ) values in the control group, this was not the case for those in the AS category 
(Whitehouse et al., 2009, 318).  The ‘conflict/betrayal’ subscale of the FQQ was 
however  found  to  be  a  predictor  of  both  depression  and  loneliness  in  AS 
participants (Whitehouse et al., 2009, 318).  AS participants had lower scores for 
intrinsic  motivations  towards  friendship  on  the  FMQ  than  the  control  group, 
suggesting  that  understandings  of  and  dispositions  toward  friendship  may  have 
differed between the groups (Whitehouse et al., 2009, 317).  While observing that 
some of their findings ‘may be consistent [with the assumption that]…AS individuals 
have less desire to develop friendships than typically developing peers and may 
even  favour  social  isolation’,  there  was  also  evidence  that  friendship  remains 
important for AS people during adolescence  (Whitehouse et al., 2009, 317-319).  
This suggests that for AS people, dispositional orientations towards social relations 
may  differ  qualitatively  from  those  of  non-AS  people;  however,  these 
understandings are not mutually exclusive and may be part of a wider continuum of 
relationality.  While  everyday  social  encounters  often  present  challenges  for  AS 37 
 
 
people, underpinned by differences in the way information about the social world is 
processed and understood, this does not imply a uniform absence of sociality. 
 
The  emergence  of  majority-AS  communities  has  been  significant  in  challenging 
accounts of the condition as involving only deficit and provides another example of 
the  category AS  operating  as  an  ‘interactive  kind’,  where those  diagnosed have 
challenged  aspects  of  their  classification,  and  thereby  changed  not  only 
understandings of AS but the language in which it is discussed (e.g. through terms 
such  as  ‘neurodiversity’).    This  underlines  the  relevance  of  framing  AS  as  an 
‘interactive  kind’,  not  only  in  terms  of  challenging  overly  general  claims  about 
sociality, but by re-framing it from something inherently pathological, to a condition 
involving a variable range of strengths and limitations.  As a diagnostic category and 
an  aspect  of  personal  and  contemporary  identity,  AS  is  a  category  that  has 
undergone significant change, and may well do so again in the future.  Given this 
contingency, we need to consider how to frame and discuss AS as an object of study. 
1.3 – Framing and discussing AS 
 
1.3.1 – Disability or difference? 
 
Given  the  discussion  thus  far,  one  aspect  of  framing  and  discussing  AS  area  to 
consider is the extent to which AS can or should be considered a disability, in light 38 
 
 
of different and at times competing accounts of AS.  For example, in Madriaga et 
al.’s report on transitions to higher education for AS students, the authors argue 
that: 
 
There  are  two  competing  views  of  AS,  firstly,  an  ‘official’  view  of  the 
condition  based  on  a  medical  model  of  disability;  and  secondly,  an 
alternative, ‘vernacular’ view of the condition based on the social model of 
disability… The medical model view of AS considers the condition within the 
autistic spectrum. It is believed to be a ‘devastating developmental disorder’ 
(Williams, 2004, p. 704), or a ‘neurological abnormality’ (Frith, 2003, p. 1), 
‘due to a physical dysfunction of the brain’ (National Autistic Society, 1998, p. 
26)…This perspective is considered an ‘official’ view because individuals with 
AS will not be able to access specialist funding without an ‘official’ medical 
diagnosis.  (2008,  12)…Instead  of  viewing  disability  as  an  indicator  of 
individual  failing  and  stigmatisation,  the  social  model  of  disability 
comprehends disability as purely social phenomena [sic]. This means that 
disabled people are not disabled due to their impairments. They are disabled 
due  to  dominant  societal  attitudes  that  are  perpetuated  by  taken-for-
granted notions of non-disabled people as ‘normal’ (Madriaga et al., 2008, 
11-12).  
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The authors draw on the work of Molloy and Vasil, who present what they refer to 
as  a  ‘vernacular’  view  of  AS  as  a  discursive  construct,  used  to  typify  and 
communicate understandings about a diverse range of people with different needs, 
dispositions and biographical circumstances (2002, 666).  This creates a language 
that  allows  different  service  providers  and  agencies  to  develop  common 
understandings of a fixed category, as a target for interventions, affordances and 
assistance.  The authors argue that ‘AS is never simply located within the individual: 
no gene or discovery of different neurological “wiring” arrangements will wholly 
explain  AS’  (Molloy  and  Vasil,  2002,  662).    While  not  denying  the  existence  of 
physical impairments, these are seen as separate from experiences of disability that 
stem  from  understandings  of  normalcy  and  the  pathologisation  of  difference 
(Molloy and Vasil, 2002, 659) 
 
The ‘vernacular’ view indicates how understandings of AS emerge in the context of 
a need for fixed categories that can then be the basis for intervention, ‘treatment’ 
and assistance (Madriaga et al., 2008, 12).  This can be beneficial, for example, a 
child may obtain specialist funding or assistance as a result of receiving an official 
diagnosis; however, their  categorisation  may  also  mark  them  out for  ‘specialist’ 
provision  that  segregates  them  from  other  children  (Madriaga  et al., 2008, 12).  
Thus one function of the ‘official view’ can be to emphasise particular aspects of AS 
people’s experiences (often specific people recruited for clinical research), to the 40 
 
 
neglect  of  others.    In  contrast,  the  ‘vernacular’  view  draws  attention  to  the 
importance of social positioning and institutional priorities in how AS people are 
understood by particular actors, and how operations of clinical and institutional 
power may exclude experiences that do not fit with categorical understandings.  
Deficit-focused categorical understandings may also lead people to treat deviance 
from  a  perceived  ‘normal’  range  of  social  and  environmental  experiences  and 
behaviours as pathological (a process that Madriaga has referred to elsewhere as 
‘ableism’)  (Madriaga,  2010,  24).    This  recalls  Clarke  and  van  Amerom’s  (2007) 
discussion of ‘surplus suffering’, and is also supported by Milton’s suggestion that 
such practices may have broader consequences for experiencing one’s differences 
as legitimate: 
 
The  imposition  of  one’s  views  upon  another  and  the  subsequent 
internalisation  of  this  view  can  be  seen  to  be  a  form  of  internalised 
oppression,  where  the  negative  connotations  of  the  normative  model  of 
pathological  difference  become  a  self-fulfilling  prophecy  (Becker  1963), 
leading to a self-imposed psycho-emotional disablement (Reeve, 2011). For 
those  who  resist,  such  self-identifications  and  attempts  to  normalise  – 
however ‘well intentioned’ – are experienced as an ‘invasion’ of the ‘autistic’ 
‘lifeworld’  by  people  wanting  to  modify  one’s  behaviour  to  suit  their 
purposes and not one’s own (Milton, 2012, 3). 41 
 
 
 
The  concept  of  ‘psycho-emotional  disablement’  is  here  used  to  indicate  how 
‘surplus suffering’ caused by problematic demands for adaptation, may lead to the 
‘invasion’  and  reconfiguration  of  experience  at  the  phenomenological  level  (i.e. 
through internalisation of ideas of one’s ways of being as inherently harmful or 
defective).    Research  indicates  that  many  of  the  challenges  encountered  by  AS 
people in everyday life have social and environmental elements which, to varying 
degrees, can be improved, mediated or even removed by appropriate adaptations 
(Clarke and van Amerom, 2007; Madriaga et al., 2008; Ryan and Räisänen, 2008; 
Davidson, 2010; Madriaga, 2010). 
 
The distinction between the ‘official’ and ‘vernacular’ views (and by extension the 
medical/social  models  which  underpin  them)  is  useful  heuristically,  in  order  to 
understand how different actors have emphasised different aspects of AS-related 
experiences.  However, as Shakespeare notes, it is advisable to note the limits of the 
medical/social model dichotomy with caution, as many perspectives on disability 
will  incorporate  aspects  of  both  'models’  (2006,  15).    In  the  case  of  AS,  this  is 
important because the positions of some of the clinicians (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009; 
Baron-Cohen, 2008a; Attwood, 2007; Tantam, 2012) and practitioners within the 
literature which can cut across both domains.  It is also useful to note that what is 42 
 
 
termed  the  ‘social  model’  may  itself  involve  varying  perspectives,  with  differing 
degrees  of  emphasis  on  the  relationship  between  physical  differences  and/or 
impairments, and experiences of disability.  For example, as indicated in a cartoon 
from the disability blog ‘Square 8’ (see Image 1).  The cartoonist (‘Bev’ – a blogger 
who identifies as AS) here contrasts a caricatured view of the social model with her 
own understanding, based around recognition of needs, decision making rights and 
power  relations.    Interestingly,  the  cartoonist  here  distances  herself  from  an 
ontological  separation  between  impairment  and  disability.    Thus,  not  only  may 
different  perspectives  not  sit  easily  within  either  domain  of  the  medical/social 
model set out by Madriaga et al. (2008), but also understandings of these models 
may vary. 
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Image 1 – An episode of the webcomic series 'Square Talk' - 
http://aspergersquare8.blogspot.co.uk/2009/10/square-talk-social-model.html 
 
The  ontological  separation  of  impairment  from  disability  is  also  problematic  for 
other reasons, such as the exclusion of those who do appear to connect impairment 
and disability in their descriptions of experience.  For example, AS author Donna 
Williams writes of her ‘body as other’, in which her ability to connect with the world 
around her (which she terms ‘resonance’) was continually interrupted by sensory 
sensitivities: 44 
 
 
 
I spent much of my very early childhood slapping, biting and trying to run 
away from my body to get rid of it following me with these annoyances and 
interruptions to resonance. It was like these sensations were ‘blinding’ me, 
cutting me off from the sense I used most to get a feeling of cohesion and 
understanding of the pattern, feel and nature of objects, people, situations 
and  happenings…My  later  experiences  in  mid  to  late  childhood  and  into 
adulthood  of  self-in-relation-to-other  involved  attacking  myself  out  of 
frustration and sense of invasion and overload...I saw my body as external 
and theirs [other people’s], not mine. Only as a tool, a sensory tool, did I feel 
glad to have it (Williams, 2003, 89). 
 
Here, the author identifies disturbances in her experience of body as a source of 
discomfort and distress, similar examples of which are reflected in autobiographical 
writing by other AS authors (Bogdashina, 2003, 56; Davidson, 2007, 666-667).  This 
is not necessarily in conflict with the points made by Madriaga et al. regarding the 
importance of social and environmental factors in everyday experiences of disability.  
Rather,  (following  Shakespeare’s  caution)  it  serves  to  illustrate  that  not  all 
experiences  of  disability  in  relation  to  AS  can  be  reduced  entirely  to  social  or 
environmental factors, and points to the diversity of both individual experiences 
and ways of framing and talking about AS.  45 
 
 
 
In his work on autistic autobiography, Hacking argues that these texts ‘are not just 
stories or  histories,  describing  a  given  reality [but  are]  creating the  language  in 
which  to  describe  the  experience  of  autism,  and  hence  helping  to  forge  the 
concepts in which to think autism’ (Hacking, 2009, 1467).  He also urges caution 
with regard to their reception, using the example of promotional materials claiming 
to  offer  insights  into  ‘the  autistic  mind’,  as  opposed  to  a  perspective  that  is 
constituent of a wider ‘interactive kind’ (Hacking, 2009).  Analyses of writing by AS 
authors  indicate  diversity  of  biological,  social,  cultural  and  environmental 
circumstances, and corresponding ways of discussing and framing AS. One area of 
variation  relates  to  how  different  AS  people  frame  and  communicate  their 
experiences.  For example, Clarke and van Amerom’s (2007) analysis of blogs by AS 
authors  indicated  widespread  support  for  the  ‘notion  that  there  was  nothing 
inherent in their [AS] differences to merit a pathologizing designation’ (2007, 769).  
Elsewhere however, autobiographers such as Gunilla Gerland (1997, 248) and John 
Elder Robison (2008, 194), have described AS as a ‘handicap’.  This is not to state 
that  either  of  the  authors  frames  their  conditions  entirely  in  negative  terms; 
Gerland places great value on her ‘sharp vision’ (1997, 249) as a positive AS-related 
trait,  while  Robison  sees  his  ‘Aspergerian  traits’  towards  ‘logic  and  reason’  as 
dispositional strengths (Robison, 2008, 190); but rather, that experiences of AS and 
the  language  used  to  represent  those  experiences  can  vary.    This  diversity  also 46 
 
 
extends to framing AS people’s need for the support of non-AS people, an example 
of which comes from a BBC interview with AS author and researcher Wendy Lawson, 
in which she states: 
 
We need to walk along beside each other, we need your support, and I 
would suggest to you that we can have quite a lot to give back to you, in all 
sorts of ways; we have lots of talents (Hill, 2000). 
 
However,  in  Brownlow’s  exploration  of  AS  forums  online,  comments  by  one  AS 
contributor (‘Ronald’) we find a contrasting sentiment that indicates potential limits 
on how far some AS people wish to enter the non-AS world: 
 
If you are Adult with Autism Diagnosis you have to have experience with 
medicine. Applied Behaviour Analysis is a way to bring you completely into 
the social world and I do not want to go. I want to stay in my world and just 
visit the social world (Brownlow, 2010b, 247). 
 
This diversity has direct implications for practice, with respect to how support for AS 
people is framed, as orientations to social interaction may vary (this is supported 
elsewhere by the findings of Whitehouse et al., 2009).  The appropriateness of what 
is termed ‘social inclusion’ may therefore depend on what is meant by inclusion as 47 
 
 
well as the dispositions and preferences of the individual (Madriaga et al., 2008; 
Madriaga,  2010).    This  is  indicative  of  a  wider  point  regarding  variation  in 
experiences  of  AS,  which  can  involve  both  positive  and  disabling  features  of 
differing  combinations  and  qualities  that  reflect  different  configurations  of 
biological, social and environmental circumstances.  In addition, while people in the 
AS  category  typically  experience  difficulties  in  relation  to  the  social  and 
environmental  aspects  of  everyday  life,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  condition 
should be thought of entirely in terms of deficit, for there are also examples of 
positive associations with AS.  To attempt to arrive at an overarching idea as to the 
status of AS in relation to disability is thus perhaps unwise.  Given the ambiguities 
and contingencies discussed thus far, we might even question the degree to which 
AS is useful for understanding its associated experiences, differences and difficulties. 
 
1.3.2 – Do we need AS at all? 
 
Happe et al. have argued that ‘heterogeneity within the autism spectrum is perhaps 
the  biggest  single  obstacle  to  research  at  all  levels’,  with  research  increasingly 
suggesting  that  a  single  ‘explanation’  for  autism  spectrum  conditions  is  unlikely 
(2006b, 1220).  Elsewhere, Moloney has voiced concern over the ambiguity and 
range of application of the AS diagnosis, and speculates that ‘many’ of the problems 48 
 
 
associated  with  the  condition  may  stem  from  differences  in  socio-economic 
conditions: 
 
 
As a worryingly elastic diagnostic label, Aspergers [sic] syndrome seems to 
be capable of extension to a wide range of individuals who might otherwise 
have  little  in  common  save  their  isolation,  their  apparent  interpersonal 
awkwardness,  their  dislike  of  change  and,  in  a  socially  and  vocationally 
competitive age, the understandable concern of their families…Given the 
doubts  about  the  coherence  and  validity  of  the  diagnosis,  there  is  the 
nagging thought that in many, and perhaps most, instances what we are 
talking about is not so much a clearly demarcated ‘developmental disorder’ 
as a spectrum of character traits or dispositions that fit poorly with the ethos 
of  our  current  business  and  consumer  culture.  More  frequently  than  is 
recognised, the ‘problems’ presented by Aspergers syndrome may lie in a 
world that increasingly struggles to accept any form of difference from the 
notional norm…(Moloney, 2010, 146). 
 
Given the degree of variability both in language used by AS people to describe their 
experiences, social conditions and variable application of the category in different 
settings, might it not be better just to do away with AS altogether?  This is the 49 
 
 
proposal of Timimi et al. (2010), who argue that the changing history of the autism 
spectrum and failure to provide clear aetiological explanations indicates that it is of 
no scientific, clinical or social value, and should therefore be abolished (this claim 
relates to the entire spectrum).  As the discussion thus far has indicated, elements 
of  social  construction,  historical  contingency  and  variability  in  terms  of 
understandings and applications of the term AS are evident; however, this does not 
mean that Timimi et al.’s proposals should be accepted.  Highlighting existing gaps 
in knowledge does not necessarily equal falsification of current understandings, and 
Timimi  et  al.’s  work  provides  no  convincing  refutations  of  findings  suggesting 
patterns of neurological difference between those categorised as AS and non-AS 
people.   In addition, their suggestion of wholesale rejection of the autism spectrum 
without any adequate replacement is at this point in time ethically dubious (Bracher 
and Thackray, 2012), as Baron-Cohen writes in relation to the possible removal of 
AS from the new edition of the DSM: 
 
We…need  to  be  aware  of  the  consequences  of  removing  it.  First,  what 
happens  to  those  people  and  their  families  who  waited  so  long  for  a 
diagnostic label that does a good job of describing their profile? Will they 
have to go back to the clinics to get their diagnoses changed? The likelihood 
of causing them confusion and upset seems high (Baron-Cohen, 2009). 
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Elsewhere, despite his reservations Moloney also acknowledges this as an ethical 
issue in the development of knowledge and provision in relation to AS: 
 
Of course, it has to be acknowledged that for many the diagnosis has its uses. 
For  those  who  are  able  to  negotiate  the  current  health  and  social  care 
systems acquisition of this label may open up pathways towards financial 
and material assistance and also towards improved personal assistance at 
school, college or work, all of which may be badly needed and, when made 
available, may make the person’s world an altogether more benign place. 
There  may  also  be  some  advantage  to  being  diagnosed  with  Aspergers 
syndrome, where the alternatives might include the more pejorative labels 
of ‘psychosis’ or ‘schizophrenia’… (Moloney, 2010, 146) 
 
Clearly, there are complex ethical issues at play that require careful consideration, 
and these may not involve a universal answer.  In the absence of more concrete 
suggestions as to what might take its place (Timimi et al. make no such proposals), 
the status of AS as a category of ethical significance is perhaps one of its clearer 
features.  Whatever the degree of certainty regarding its ontological status, or the 
potential  problematic  effects  of  labelling,  in  the  current  context  getting  an  AS 51 
 
 
diagnosis often has very real ethical consequences for those diagnosed and their 
families  (this  will  be  discussed  in  2.1.2).    Acknowledging  the  contingency  and 
uncertainty associated with the term does not imply wholesale rejection of its value 
or operation in the lives of people associated with it.   
 
It  may  be  that,  given  changes  in  the  institutional  organisation  of  support  and 
assistance for people currently categorised as AS, we may see moves to a more 
‘person-centred’  model  focused  on  individual  needs  rather  than  categorical 
understandings (this is something that Timimi has argued for elsewhere) (Timimi, 
2011).    However,  the  type  of  institutional  change  that  this  would  require  goes 
beyond AS as a diagnostic category towards questions regarding the treatment of 
impairment and disability in more general terms.  Wholesale rejection of AS at this 
point in time would not, in my view, be ethically supportable without a clear idea of 
how the existing needs of AS people and their families could be met.  AS may not be 
the  same,  or  even  exist,  as  a  diagnostic  category  in  ten  or  twenty  years  time; 
however, at this point it does, and its existence has ethical weight irrespective of 
how its ontological status is understood. 
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1.3.3 – Talking about AS – notes on language 
 
 
There is also the question as to how far AS-related traits are in any sense separable 
from the ‘rest’ of the person; Asperger syndrome (AS) is sometimes referred to as 
‘Asperger Disorder’ (AD), particularly in the clinical literature (it is also sometimes 
rendered in the possessive form ‘Asperger’s’) (White et al., 2009; Mazefsky et al., 
2010;  Singh,  2011;  Lawrence  et  al.,  2010).    ‘Disorder’  implies  disruption  to  a 
normative state (an ‘order’) by some process or event.  This does not appear to fit 
AS very well, as it would imply that there is a ‘normal’ person obscured or corrupted 
by AS ‘symptoms’, and that this is may in some sense be reversible or ‘curable’.  For 
some, such as Jim Sinclair, the idea of Autism Spectrum conditions being separable 
from the person is not sustainable: 
 
Autism isn't something a person has, or a "shell" that a person is trapped 
inside. There's no normal child hidden behind the autism. Autism is a way of 
being. It is pervasive; it colors every experience, every sensation, perception, 
thought,  emotion,  and  encounter,  every  aspect  of  existence.  It  is  not 
possible to separate the autism from the person - and if it were possible, the 
person  you'd  have  left  would  not  be  the  same  person  you  started  with 
(Sinclair, 1993). 53 
 
 
However, literature from elsewhere indicates that this view is not be universally 
accepted by all AS people.  In their exploration of the relationship between AS, 
identity  and  adolescence,  Molloy  and  Vasil  observed  that  participants  faced  a 
common challenge of separating out ‘which aspects of their personalities, interests 
and behaviours display AS traits and which have nothing to do with AS’ (Molloy and 
Vasil, 2004, 121).  They also observed that participant experiences of ‘AS symptoms’ 
changed as they grew older, with implications for their experiences of self: 
 
 
During  late  adolescence,  when  the  teen  is  grappling  with  additional  and 
more complex elements of identity, such as vocational identity, a political 
identity, a religious identity, and so on, it is likely that his or her sense of 
identity  will  be  less  heavily  based  on  earlier,  simpler,  perhaps  conferred 
aspects  of  identity.    For  adolescents…who  have  experienced  a  marked 
decrease in their AS ‘symptoms’ as they have grown, their present sense of 
identity is less clearly dominated by their diagnosis of AS.  AS simply holds 
less significance in defining who they now are (Molloy and Vasil, 2004, 123). 
 
 
It is possible that these statements could be reconciled.  Sinclair’s statement could 
be read as a phenomenological argument regarding the possibility of separating 54 
 
 
constituent experiences from the totality of the person; while Molloy and Vasil’s 
observations  could  reflect  a  labelling/framing  effect,  in  the  sense  that  only  the 
difficult aspects of difference were attributed to AS (neither position would directly 
contradict the other).  What the discussion here illustrates is that different people 
categorised  as  AS  may  frame  their  experiences  in  various  ways.    Given  the 
ambiguities surrounding the diagnosis, does this variation place the category AS 
itself in question?   
 
 
Among  those  who  accept  (to  whatever  degree)  the  diagnosis  as  a  concept  for 
understanding a particular set of people, there is variation in how AS is framed and 
discussed.  The UK National Autistic Society has published a guide for journalists and 
the wider public entitled How to talk about autism, in which they offer a table of 
contrasting terms labelled ‘do say’ and ‘don’t say’; for example, autism (including 
Asperger  syndrome);  do  say:  he/she  has  autism;  don’t  say:  an 
autistic/autist/autie/aspie [Some individuals may refer to themselves in this way, 
however]’ (NAS, 2012a - emphasis in the original).  As the authors acknowledge, this 
contrasts  with  how  other  AS  people  choose  to  talk  about  themselves,  while 
arguments from elsewhere have problematised the type of ‘person-first’ language 
suggested by the NAS. Sinclair gives three reasons as to why ‘person first’ language 
may  be  inappropriate  for  talking  about  AS  people:  firstly,  because  ‘person-first 55 
 
 
language’  is  intended  to  make  us  see  the person  rather  than their  impairment, 
which  implies  that  AS-related  differences  are  exclusively  impairments  (Sinclair, 
2007).  Secondly, that AS is a marginal or peripheral part of the person, rather than 
fundamental to their identity and ways of being (Sinclair, 2007).  Finally, that AS-
related traits can be separated from the person, or that their lives are lived ‘in spite 
of’ rather than through their differences (Sinclair, 2007).  The positions of both NAS 
and Sinclair have merit, and it is difficult (perhaps impossible) to favour one over 
the  other,  given  the  discussion  thus  far  regarding  the  ontological  status  of  AS.  
Therefore, it is perhaps better to see them as reflecting of the heterogeneity of 
experiences and perspectives on AS, and the corresponding range of terms used to 
describe and discuss them. 
 
Finally, I must say a little about a term originating within AS-related self-advocacy 
literature, that has also been readily accepted by some social scientists (Davidson, 
2008; Davidson and Smith, 2009; Brownlow, 2010b; Jaarsma and Welin, 2011) to 
describe non-AS people, neurotypical (NT).  Neurotypicality relates to the autism 
spectrum in the sense that it refers to a ‘normative’ range of social, communicative 
and perceptual experiences that exclude those associated with the autism spectrum 
(Brownlow,  2010b).    In  majority  AS  communities,  particularly  those  online,  it  is 
often used to separate non-autistic people (‘neurotypicals’ or ‘NTs’) from those on 
the  autism  spectrum  (the  ‘neurologically diverse’)  (Brownlow,  2010b).    This  is  a 56 
 
 
term which originates with Jim Sinclair, the use of which has expanded beyond its 
original boundaries of AS communities online, and entered popular usage by non-AS 
others.  At the time of writing, NAS includes the term in its online guidance for 
‘talking about autism’, citing it as a desirable term preferable to ‘normal’ when 
referring  to  non-AS  people  (2012a).    However,  this  term  has  not  been  without 
criticism,  for  example,  AS  autobiographer  Stephen  Shore  explicitly  avoids  using 
‘neurotypical’ for what he views as its ‘slightly derogatory connotations’ in favour of 
the term ‘non-spectrum’ (Shore, 2001, 163).  While there is evidence that NT has 
been used in a derogatory context to refer to non-AS people (for example, in online 
discussion forums) this does not characterise the entirety of its usage (Brownlow et 
al., 2006).  However, there are also other reasons for avoiding this term. 
 
The  neurodiversity  movement  has  bought  to  the  attention  of  wider  publics 
important questions relating to biosociality and the nature of embodied difference 
in contemporary societies.  In my view, the term NT risks limiting these questions by 
reproducing  the  type  of  overly  general  concepts  that  were  originally  subject  to 
criticism.  NT as a concept is used to distinguish autistic people from those not on 
the  spectrum;  however,  it  also  homogenises  those  positioned  within  both 
categories.    Neurodiversity,  if  one  takes  this  to  mean  a  plurality  of  embodied 
dispositions shaped by variations in neurodevelopment, likely involves far greater 
variation, and in this sense the validity of the term is therefore questionable.  For 57 
 
 
my  purposes  here  I  therefore  prefer  the  term  ‘non-AS’,  in  part  because,  while 
serving  a  distinctive  function,  it  also  respects  the  ambiguities  and  unknowns  in 
current knowledge on AS/non-AS differences.  Ultimately, however, it may be that 
no  such  clear  separation  can  be  found,  and  so  this  distinction  again  reflects  a 
categorical, rather than an ontological understanding. 
 
1.4 – Summary 
 
 
In this chapter, I have set out to frame and justify my approach to AS as an object of 
study,  and  to  position  this  within  the  context  of  historical  and  contemporary 
debates.  I have explored the history of AS both as a diagnostic category, and as a 
way of understanding experiences of difference and disability.  I have attempted to 
show how, while AS lacks a definite aetiological explanation, neither the category 
nor the set of phenomena to which it relates can be understood entirely in terms of 
social, environmental or biological processes; rather, it appears to involve relations 
of mutual affect between the three domains, all of which are themselves partially 
understood and subject to variation.  Through Hacking’s concept of the ‘interactive 
kind’, I have set out my position on the ontological status of AS, and supported this 
with evidence from existing literature with respect to the diversity of experiences 
and perspectives arising from people in this category.  I have indicated that while 58 
 
 
experiences of disability are common for AS people, these may not be the inevitable 
result of a ‘flat effect’ in terms of social, environmental or biological factors, but 
may involve varying combinations of them.  This is reflected, I argue, in the diversity 
of language used to describe AS-related experiences, which has led me to adopt this 
perspective.   
 
In the next chapter, I will set out the specific focus of the investigation that follows, 
and position this within the context of existing social scientific research on AS.  I will 
argue that the pre-diagnostic experiences of adults who live for long periods of life 
without a formal diagnosis represents a significant gap in existing literature, that is 
of  demonstrable  intellectual  and ethical  significance.  The discussion will  explore 
important themes within existing social scientific literature, including the impact of 
the diagnosis, as well as research from elsewhere on the impact of living with an 
undiagnosed condition.   
 
 
 
 59 
 
 
2 – Focus on pre-diagnostic identities (rationale and research 
questions). 
 
 
Having set out my understanding of AS as an object of study, and discussed the 
implications of this for the term in which it is framed and discussed, I now turn to 
the specific focus of thesis.  Which is to explore the pre-diagnostic experiences of AS 
people born before 1980 who were diagnosed in adulthood; I will also identify the 
specific research questions to be pursued, and indicate the ethical and intellectual 
significance of my investigation. 
 
2.1 – Why focus on pre-diagnostic identities? 
 
In order to frame the focus on formations of pre-diagnostic identity for AS people 
diagnosed in adulthood within the context of existing literature, it will be necessary 
to first explore  research relating to AS people in general.  This is because (as I will 
indicate)  pre-diagnostic  experiences  of  those  who  receive  their  diagnosis  in 
adulthood have yet to be explored in any significant detail in research literature.  
My approach in this section will therefore be: firstly, to explore literature relating to 
the wellbeing of AS adults, in order to highlight some live intellectual ethical issues 
relating  to the  experiences  of  people  in  this  category;  secondly,  to  indicate the 60 
 
 
significance of the relationship between identity and diagnosis; thirdly, to justify the 
specific focus on pre-diagnostic identities in light of the preceding discussion.   
 
 
 
2.1.1 - AS adults and wellbeing. 
 
 
The majority of research on AS has focused on children, with comparatively little 
attention  given  to  the  lived  experiences  of  adults  (Baron-Cohen  et  al.,  2007; 
Lawrence et al., 2010, 229).  However, in recent years there has been increasing 
concern with the challenges faced by those in the latter group, in particular with 
respect to outcomes associated with wellbeing.  For example, Jennes-Coussens et al. 
explored  quality  of  life of  AS  young  people in Alberta,  Canada  using the  World 
Health  Organisation  (WHO)  Quality  of  Life  measure,  the  Peer  Support  Network 
Inventory  and  semi-structured  interviews  (2006,  403).    The  responses  of  12  AS 
young men aged 18-21 were compared with those of a non-autistic control group 
(n=13) in order to explore factors affecting quality of life (Jennes-Coussens et al., 
2006, 403).  The authors reported similarities in the types of issues identified as 
significant by respondents, such as living arrangements, education, social support, 
number of close friends, and overall quality of life; however, there were significant 61 
 
 
qualitative differences between the groups in terms of wellbeing (Jennes-Coussens 
et  al.,  2006,  410).    AS  participants  reported  less  satisfaction  with  their  physical 
health, particularly in areas relating to pain and discomfort, dependence on medical 
treatment,  activities  of  daily  living,  work  capacity,  energy  and  fatigue,  mobility, 
sleep  and  rest.    The  authors  argued  that this may  be  linked to the  issues  with 
sensory sensitivity and motor function, citing participant reports of difficulties in 
manual labour-type jobs and learning to drive (Jennes-Coussens et al., 2006, 410).  
They  also  observed  high  levels  of  self-perception  of  ‘social  skills  deficits’,  which 
participants saw as having a major impact on quality of life, while half also reported 
being unemployed despite all but three respondents having completed high school 
education (2006, 411). 
 
These findings have been reflected elsewhere in a UK report exploring the lives of 
autistic  adults  and  their  parents/carers
1,  as  well  services  provided  by   Local 
Authorities  (LA’s)
2,  and  NHS  Primary  Care  Trusts
3 in England  (2008, 44).  Here, 
Rosenblatt (2008)  also observed that  the  social lives of  adults on the spectrum  
(including  AS  people)  were  often  highly  restricted   (2008,  44),  with  75%  of 
                                                      
 
1 Two stage questionnaire – 1,412 respondents to the first stage which asked for details regarding the 
person with autism.  Of these, 1,179 respondents also completed the second stage which concerned 
experiences of adults on the spectrum.  Within this group, 42% completed the section by themselves, 
18% did so with support, while the remaining 40% of responses were completed by parents/carers 
(Rosenblatt, 2008, 46) 
2 53 out of 150 Local Authorities responded (36% response rate) (Rosenblatt, 2008, 46). 
3 24 of 148 Primary Care Trusts responded (16% response rate) (Rosenblatt, 2008, 46). 62 
 
 
respondents reporting that they ‘did not have any friends or found it hard or very 
hard to make friends’, and 72% stating that they would like to ‘spend more time in 
the company of other people’ (Rosenblatt, 2008, 44).  Only 15% of respondents 
were in full time employment while 66% held no form of employment (including 
voluntary work), and over 60% reported being economically dependent on their 
families  (Rosenblatt,  2008,  44).    Lack  of  control  and  choice  in  social  life  was 
widespread among those surveyed, with only 15% living in their own homes ‘with 
support’, despite 37% reporting that they would like to live in their own flat or 
house  with  support  (Rosenblatt,  2008,  44).    Of  those  living  in  their  own 
accommodation, over 70% of those living on their own reported being harassed or 
bullied (Rosenblatt, 2008, 44).  In addition 33% experienced a ‘serious mental health 
problem’ linked to a lack of social support (2008, 2).  This is reflected elsewhere in 
research suggesting that mental health morbidity may be particularly high among 
AS  people  compared  with  the  general  population,  and  that  social  isolation  is  a 
significant factor in this (Ghaziuddin, 2005; Baron-Cohen, 2008a, 98).   
 
The final report of the UK All Party Parliamentary Group on Autism (APPGA) echoed 
Rosenblatt’s findings in relation to the types of issues faced by adults on the autism 
spectrum  (including  AS)  in  the  transition  to  adulthood  (Allard,  2009,  5-12).  
Transitions  to  adulthood  typically  involve  profound  changes  in  the  social  and 
environmental organisation of daily life, for example in  transitions from school to 63 
 
 
work/training/further  study  (Allard,  2009,  2-5).    Inadequate  planning  by  service 
providers, as well as a lack of appropriate inter-agency coordination were seen to 
increase the risk of poor transitions (Allard, 2009, 2-5). These findings were again 
supported by Lawrence et al., who conducted a review of literature relating to the 
transition  to  adulthood  for  AS  people  in  order  to  establish  what  the  authors 
describe  as  a  ‘comprehensive,  evidence-based  transition  assessment  guide’  for 
healthcare professionals framed through Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (2010, 227).  
Areas  of  concern  included  management  of  diet  and  exercise,  management  of 
sensory  overload,  transportation  and  mobility,  housing,  community  integration, 
love and belonging, self-esteem and self-actualisation (Lawrence et al., 2010, 230-
236).    Reflecting  the  findings  of  both  Rosenblatt  (2008)  and  Allard  (2009),  the 
authors conclude that professionals supporting AS young people and their families 
need to identify needs early and allow adequate time for adaptation to new living 
arrangements (Lawrence et al., 2010, 236).  Taken together, these studies indicate 
that AS people may face a range of challenges as they move through the life course, 
as a result of changes in the social and environmental organisation of everyday life.   
 
Portway and Johnson argue that ‘longer term’ risks such as unemployment and 
mental ill health need to be understood in the context of exposure to ‘everyday’ 
risks, such as being misunderstood, bullying, isolation and loneliness (Portway and 
Johnson, 2005, 76-78)   The authors explored risks encountered by AS people in 64 
 
 
everyday  life  through  semi-structured  interviews  with  25  (4  female,  21  male) 
participants aged 18-35 and their families (2005, 74-75).  Problems with sensory 
aspects of environments, misunderstanding social norms, and coercive or abusive 
behaviour on the part of other children or young people were common; while social 
integration was often framed as ‘at best superficial’ (Portway and Johnson, 2005, 
81).  The findings also reflected issues with housing and independent living: only 
one  of  the  respondents  lived  independently,  while  over  half  (16)  lived  in  the 
parental  home,  with  the  remainder  residing  in  supported  housing  or  with  daily 
support from parents (Portway and Johnson, 2005, 79).  Many parents were also 
engaged  in  what  were  described  as  ‘24  hour  mental  commitments’  involving 
psychological  guardianship,  social  support,  and  putting  into  place  ‘unseen 
safeguards’ against mental distress for their children (Portway and Johnson, 2005, 
79).    This  dependency  was  itself  framed  as  risk,  with  the  benefits  of  support 
weighed  against  the  risk  of  dependency  for  stifling  personal  development  and 
opportunity  (here  framed  as  a  dilemma  for  both  AS  participants  and  parents), 
pointing to the wider role of social relationships in mediating both everyday and 
long-term risks. 
 
Research  indicates  that  the  needs  of  AS  adults  are  often  poorly  understood  by 
service providers (Allard, 2009; Rosenblatt, 2008), and in particular Portway and 
Johnson emphasise the need to understand more general profiles of everyday risk 65 
 
 
exposure.  However, this also implies a need for careful attention to the narratives 
of everyday experience provided by AS adults, and this has been a limitation of 
some  of  the  existing  literature  on  wellbeing  and  risk.    Jennes-Coussens  et  al.’s 
(2006) quality of life measures are based upon pre-determined indicators, with little 
discussion of how these might play out within the lives of specific participants.  For 
example, the authors claim at one point that ‘results [relating to satisfaction with 
physical  health]  may  relate  to  clumsiness  of  movements  or  to  sensory 
hypersensitivity’ (Jennes-Coussens et al., 2006, 410); however they do not appear to 
have followed up on this point with participants in their semi-structured interviews, 
limiting the specificity and scope of the claim.  Similarly Lawrence et al.’s (2010) use 
of  Maslow’s  hierarchy  of  needs  to  frame  important  areas  in  the  transition  to 
adulthood is limited by a lack of engagement with first person narratives in their 
review  of  literature.    While  they  emphasise  ‘self-actualisation’  as  important  for 
maintaining quality of life, they give no examples of how this may be achieved by 
specific people, or any accounts of variation.  
 
Portway  and  Johnson’s  unqualified  description  of  the  behaviours  of  their 
participants  as  ‘odd’  or  bizarre’  also  betrays  a  failure  to  explore  the  potential 
meaning or significance of these activities as legitimate and valued experiences, or 
as important strategies for coping with social and/or sensory issues (2005, 80).  This 
is significant because wellbeing does not simply imply the absence of difficulty, but 66 
 
 
also the ability for individuals to be involved in their communities, and to pursue 
happiness.    For  example,  the  World  Health  Organisation  (WHO)  uses  the  term 
‘wellbeing’ in their definition of ‘mental health’: 
 
Mental health is defined as a state of well-being in which every individual 
realizes his or her own potential, can cope with the normal stresses of life, 
can work productively and fruitfully, and is able to make a contribution to 
her or his community (WHO, 2011). 
 
Literature discussed in this section indicates the relevance of this definition to AS 
people,  who  are  often  at  risk  of  mental  ill  health  as  a  result  of  social  and 
environmental  stress,  isolation  and  exclusion  from  areas  of  social  life  such  as 
employment (Allard, 2009; Rosenblatt, 2008).  In the case of AS people, wellbeing 
also relates to a person’s ability to experience ways of being that are compatible 
with their dispositions, without being forced to mimic non-autistic behaviours that 
can  be  confusing  or  bewildering  to  them  (Bogdashina,  2001;  Clarke  and  van 
Amerom,  2007;  Milton,  2012).    It  is  important  therefore  to  understand  the 
subjective significance of AS related experiences in relation to wellbeing, as these 
may not be immediately apparent, in particular to non-AS observers.  Therefore, 
with respect to the present study, understanding pre-diagnostic experiences implies 67 
 
 
not  only  exploring  difficulties  and  coping  strategies,  but  also  those  aspects  of 
experience  which  are  important  for  maintaining  wellbeing.    This  is  an 
epistemological  concern  that  will  be  explored  further  in  discussions  of  the 
theoretical (chapter three), methodological (chapter four) and analytical (chapter 
five) approaches I have adopted. 
 
AS adults face a range of challenges and risks in relation to wellbeing throughout 
the life course; these include social isolation, education, employment, independent 
living, and mental and physical health.  These are shaped not only by the fact that a 
person ‘has’ AS, but by the social and environmental conditions of life, resulting in a 
diversity  of  experiences  and  needs  that  may  change  across  the  life  course.    As 
indicated in the introduction, most AS diagnoses are now made in childhood, and 
awareness of AS has increased substantially since the condition was first introduced 
into the DSM and ICD in the early 1990s (Baron-Cohen et al., 2007).  However, there 
remain people who are not diagnosed until adulthood (Baron-Cohen et al., 2007; 
Beardon and Worton, 2011), and for them the pre-diagnostic phase of life may be 
especially challenging, as they meet with difficulties in everyday life that often have 
no obvious causes.  Understanding pre-diagnostic experiences has the potential to 
contribute to wider debates around understanding the diverse needs of AS adults, 
with existing studies indicating that these are often poorly understood (Rosenblatt, 
2008; Allard, 2009; Burr et al., 2009; Griffith et al., 2011).  This is of contemporary 68 
 
 
relevance to social policy, with the passing of the 2009 UK Autism Act leading to the 
publication of a national autism strategy (D.o.H, 2010), and further frameworks at 
the  local  level  (for  example,  HAPB,  2012).    The  authors  of  these  documents 
emphasise the need for continued efforts to understand and meet the diversity of 
needs within the ASC population (HAPB, 2012, 7, 15-16), in particular those of AS 
adults (Rosenblatt, 2008, 1-2; Allard, 2009, 9).  My task now is to indicate why a 
particular focus on the pre-diagnostic experiences of AS adults who live for long 
periods without a diagnosis is a valid area for investigation.  I begin by exploring 
research  on  the  impact  of  having  a  diagnosis,  and  from  here  will  discuss  the 
potential challenges associated with living undiagnosed. 
 
2.1.2 – Diagnosis and the self. 
 
 
Existing literature indicates that getting a diagnosis is often a significant event in the 
life of an AS person in terms of understanding oneself and one’s life, helping the 
person to access services and affordances, opening up new opportunities for social 
connection  through  contact  with  similar  others,  and  granting  access  to  legal 
protection  from  discrimination  (for  example,  under  the  provisions  of  the  UK 
Equality Act, 2010) (Attwood, 2007; Baron-Cohen et al., 2007; Baron-Cohen, 2008a; 
Baron-Cohen,  2009;  NAS,  2011c).    Social  scientists  have  contributed  to 69 
 
 
understanding the impact of a diagnosis by exploring lived experiences, and while 
broadly supportive of the idea that diagnosis is often beneficial for the AS person, 
research indicates that its impact may vary both between people and across the 
individual’s life course. In addition to its potential benefits, the experience of being 
diagnosed (or being told about an existing diagnosis if made in early childhood) can 
also involve shock and disruption to existing understandings of self. 
 
For example, Molloy and Vasil investigated experiences of having a diagnosis, as 
part  of  their  study  of  the  relationship  between  AS,  adolescence  and  identity, 
through comparative case study of six AS young people aged between twelve and 
eighteen
4, using biographical interviews  (2004, 7-11).  The authors reported that  
while the initial response to the diagnosis could be one of ‘shock and disbelief’, it 
also  provided  resources  for  making  sense  of  their  everyday  difficulties  and  life 
events (Molloy and Vasil, 2004, 114-115).  They noted the variable impact of the 
diagnosis, with many older participants facing challenges in terms of sorting out 
‘which aspects of their personalities, interests and behaviours display AS traits and 
which have nothing to do with AS’ (Molloy and Vasil, 2004, 121).  This was linked to 
the  danger  of  over-identification  with  static  diagnostic  criteria  that  may  not 
adequately reflect individual differences (Molloy and Vasil, 2004, 123).   
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These findings were echoed in later work by Huws & Jones (2008), who explored 
the  relationship  between  diagnostic  criteria  and  young  people’s  experiences  of 
‘having  [high-functioning]  autism’,  through  semi-structured  interviews  with  nine 
students
5 at an autism-specialist college (Huws and Jones, 2008, 100).  Awareness 
of diagnosis was associated with a diverse range of feelings such as ‘shock and 
disappointment’,  indicating  that  the  experience  of  being  diagnosed  can  involve 
qualitatively different  feelings  of  difference from  those  encountered  in  the  pre-
diagnostic phase (Huws and Jones, 2008, 102).  In addition, diagnosis also provided 
an explanatory narrative for making sense of everyday difficulties and life events 
(Huws and Jones, 2008, 102).  The authors also noted that diagnostic labelling could 
have both positive and negative implications, for example, helping a person gain 
access to services, and/or marking them out for discrimination by others (Huws and 
Jones, 2008, 102).  The impact of the diagnosis on the experiences of ‘having AS’ 
was  therefore  framed  in  terms  of  both  disruptions  to  social  life,  and  also 
opportunities for developing increased biographical coherence and understanding 
of  everyday  challenges  (Huws  and  Jones,  2008,  103-104).    The  notion  of  the 
diagnosis  having  multiple  effects  has  also  been  observed  in  relation  to  those 
diagnosed  in  adulthood  by  Singh,  who  described  the  case  of  ‘Helen’,  a  woman 
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diagnosed at age 32 (Singh, 2011, 249).  Singh identifies the positive aspects of 
‘Helen’s  diagnosis  as  ‘legitimisation’,  ‘relief’  and  ‘coherence’,  alongside  the 
‘upsetting notion that social interactions will always be difficult’ (Singh, 2011, 249).  
These  findings  support  the  idea  that  the  diagnosis  can  be  important  in 
understanding  aspects  of  self  and  life  events  associated  with  AS;  however,  one 
should not assume that the diagnosis in and of itself results in an unproblematic 
experience of self. 
 
While  formal  diagnosis  can  provide  resources  for  making  sense  of  everyday 
difficulties,  differences  and  life  events,  the  potential  for  actualisation  of  these 
resources in terms of developing a liveable sense of self is contingent upon wider 
social and biographical conditions.  This is illustrated in Bagatell’s case study of ‘Ben’, 
a 21 year old AS college student in the USA (2007, 414-415), in which the author 
describes a series of events through which he moved from experiencing his AS as 
something of which he sought to be ‘cured’, to an understanding of the condition as 
a legitimate and valued aspect of self.  The research narrative takes place in light 
of  ’Ben’s  recent  history  of  suicidal  thoughts,  self-injurious  behaviour,  social 
exclusion, drug and alcohol use as self-medication for anxiety and depression, and 
the  breakdown  of  his  first  romantic  relationship  (Bagatell,  2007,  416-422).  
Diagnosed at the age of 15, ‘Ben’ described being treated as an outsider for most of 72 
 
 
his life and had begun to wish for a ‘cure’ for AS, hoping that science would one day 
provide this for him (Bagatell, 2007, 416-418).   
 
However,  shortly  after  the  research  began,  ‘Ben’  attended  a  local  autism 
conference where two significant events led to changes in his understanding of self.  
Firstly, he attended a lecture given by a neurologist on the neurobiology of autism, 
an experience which presented him with a new way of understanding AS, not as 
personal flaws, but as a set of neurodevelopmental differences (Bagatell, 2007, 418-
419).  Secondly, he met other AS people whose experiences offered the possibility 
of a liveable life without ‘pretending to be normal’ (Bagatell, 2007, 419).  He began 
to adopt an ‘Aspie’
6 identity, and engaged with other ‘Aspies’ through online forums 
and physical meetings (Bagatell, 2007, 422).  As a result, ‘Ben’ placed less emphasis 
on the norms of non-autistic behaviour, and instead began to judge his identity and 
self-worth by the norms of ‘Aspie’ culture (Bagatell, 2007, 421).  Diagnosis did not 
give ‘Ben’ a ready-made or unproblematic identity, but rather provided resources 
for  developing  a  more  liveable  sense  of  self.    His  ability  to  make  use  of  these 
resources was however dependent upon changes in his social life (i.e. the new-
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found  ‘Aspie’  communities  within  which  he  found  acceptance),  and  also  in  his 
understanding of AS as a set of neurodevelopmental differences.   
 
This idea is supported by the fact that Ben’s life did not suddenly became problem-
free as a result of these changes; as Bagatell notes, tensions remained between 
‘neuro-typical’ social arenas and those of ‘Ben’s newfound ‘Aspie’ culture (Bagatell, 
2007,  422-423).    His  life  became  stretched  across  areas  within  which  he  was 
encouraged and obliged to ‘fit in’, and ‘Aspie’ spaces within which AS experiences 
were legitimate and accepted ways of being.  What ‘Ben’s case illustrates is that 
simply having a diagnosis does not inevitably result in significant changes in identity 
or wellbeing.  The impact of diagnosis on self and self-other understandings, as well 
as one’s sense of life narrative, may depend upon how it is understood relative to 
the social and biographical circumstances into which it enters as a life event.   This 
study  also  points  to  the  importance  of  diagnosis  not  only  in  relation  to 
understandings but also presentations of self, through the challenge of choosing 
whether or not to disclose one’s AS identity to others. 
 
Disclosure  is  a  significant  theme  in  the  literature,  and  is  a  common  everyday 
challenge throughout the life course for those with a diagnosis.  For example, in 
their exploration of social inclusion for HFA children within mainstream classroom 74 
 
 
settings, Ochs et al. (2001) note that the frequency and effectiveness of inclusive 
interactions  with  non-HFA  children  were  linked  to  ‘disclosure  practices’.    These 
related to teachers informing non-HFA children of the HFA child’s aptitudes and 
limitations, a practice that was reported as the most significant factor in facilitating 
inclusion, irrespective of the IQ scores of the HFA children (these were expected to 
be a significant factor in mediating inclusion) (Ochs et al., 2001, 415-416).  While in 
childhood disclosure may be managed by a teacher or caregiver, increasingly this 
can  become  a  concern  for  the  AS  person  themselves  as  they  grow  older.    For 
example, Madriaga et al. (2008) explored the transition to higher education for AS 
young people, and highlighted a number of situations relating to disclosure, such as 
whether to disclose their AS status to flatmates and university lecturers, as well as a 
range of responses to these challenges (Madriaga et al., 2008, 28-30).  For some 
participants, such as ‘Alan’, disclosure was ‘not an issue’, as he readily discussed his 
AS with flatmates; however, others such as ‘Karen’ were more guarded, choosing to 
conceal  her  AS  status  when  seen  leaving  an  exam  room  for  disabled  students 
(Madriaga et al., 2008, 29-30).   
 
The pragmatics of disclosure have also been explored in the lives of adults more 
generally, in the work of Davidson and Henderson (2010a).  The authors explored 
AS people’s experiences of identity disclosure in everyday social encounters through 
examination  of  autobiographical  narratives  (2010,  155),  observing  a  range  of 75 
 
 
strategies relating to concealment and disclosure in everyday exchanges.  AS people 
often reported being able to ‘pass’ as non-autistic due to their intelligence and skills 
with language (Davidson and Henderson, 2010a, 155-156).  ‘Passing’ was framed as 
a  necessary  strategy  in  order  to  protect  against  discrimination,  ill-treatment  or 
exclusion, and the authors identified a range of ‘repertoires’ for mediating these 
hazards (Davidson and Henderson, 2010a, 155).  One of these was referred to as the 
‘qualified deception’ repertoire, where a person’s AS status was concealed from 
selected others within particular settings (Davidson and Henderson, 2010a, 157).  
For  example,  Toni  Sano  described  her  development  of  ‘pre-programmed 
behaviours’ as a way of negotiating the potentially destabilising social landscape of 
majority non-AS arenas (Davidson and Henderson, 2010a, 161).  Qualified deception 
also functioned in relation to another prominent repertoire, which involved keeping 
safe  through  careful  management  of  those  to  whom  AS  status  is  disclosed 
(Davidson and Henderson, 2010a, 158-160).  Examples of this include Ruth Hane’s 
use of worksheets for ‘evaluating the pros and cons of self-disclosure’ to different 
people  (Davidson  and Henderson,  2010a,  159).    Hane’s  ‘worksheets’ and  Sano’s 
‘pre-programmed behaviours’ are examples of the everyday efforts that many AS 
people undertake in managing their presentations of self.  Sano’s comment that her 
‘pre-programmed  behaviours’  represent  a  ‘shell’  indicates  that  ‘passing’  may 
involve  not  only  performative  effort,  but  also  negotiation  of  confusion  and 76 
 
 
contradiction  between  understandings  and  presentations  of  one’s  identity 
(Davidson and Henderson, 2010a, 161).     
 
The  presentation  of  the  self  as  an  AS  person  can  also  depend  upon  how  one 
understands the status of the diagnosis, and also how one believes others may view 
its significance.  Clarke and van Amerom (2008) explored understandings of AS in 
parents and caregivers as compared with those diagnosed, through analysis of 60 
blog  websites  (30  in  each  group)  (85).    The  authors  reported  a  substantial 
divergence of opinion between the ‘cure focused’ understandings of parents and 
caregivers, and the more positive view of AS presented by those diagnosed (Clarke 
and van Amerom, 2008, 100-103).  While negative experiences and suffering were 
framed as being intrinsic to AS by parents and caregivers, those diagnosed argued 
that most of this was a result of discrimination and misunderstanding on the part of 
non-AS  others  (Clarke  and  van  Amerom,  2008,  85).    ‘Aspie’  bloggers  also 
emphasised the importance of the internet in facilitating both the development of 
autistic culture and providing the resources for them to challenge both ‘cure’ and 
deficit-focused  accounts  of  AS  (Clarke  and  van  Amerom,  2008,  93-94).    This 
indicates that the significance of the diagnosis for understanding and presenting the 
self may well involve a critical engagement with diagnostic categories. 
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There are also indications that the pragmatics of identity disclosure involves other 
aspects  of  self,  such  as  gender  identities.   Everyday  challenges  and  experiences 
cannot be reduced to a single aspect of self, but involves different identities that 
intersect  within  various  social  settings.    For  example,  in  her  exploration  of  the 
challenges faced by women on the spectrum, Faherty (2006) describes the view of a 
participant within an HFA/AS women’s group with which she worked: 
 
One  woman  explained  that,  from  her  perspective,  there  is  a  subtle 
interaction between these two  sets  of  issues [being  a  woman  and  being 
HFA/AS].  “Problems related to the [autism] spectrum are combined with 
problems of society’s expectations of women.  How one looks, what one 
wears, how one is supposed to relate socially, that a woman is supposed to 
have  natural  empathy  towards  others,  expectations  about  dating  and 
marriage…”.  Women are affected by autism in the same ways as their male 
counterparts; however, they are doubly challenged by the assumptions that 
society places on the female gender (Faherty, 2006, 12). 
 
Understanding and negotiating gender norms was a particularly significant topic for 
participants in this group, both in relation to understandings of self and to how they 
were perceived by others.  Contributors to the group spoke of feeling that more 78 
 
 
was  expected  of  them  in  terms  of  adherence  to  social  gender  norms,  when 
compared  to  their  male  counterparts,  in  particular  those  relating  to  ‘feminine’ 
intuition  and  empathy  (Faherty,  2006,  13).    Faherty  also  observes  that  for 
participants,  being  an  AS  woman  was  also  linked  to  specific  experiences  of 
insecurity and risk, relating to difficulties in understanding implicit social queues 
and intuitive aspects of social interaction: 
 
Interestingly, after discussing these issues, the first requested topic was how 
to read body language and how to tell if someone is trying to take advantage 
of you (Faherty, 2006, 13). 
 
Having an AS diagnosis has implications not only for how a person sees themselves 
and  their  relationships  with  others,  but  also  the  potential  insecurities  and  risks 
which they may face.  Although the subject of having a diagnosis is not discussed 
directly here, all of the participants had been diagnosed, and the group itself was 
situated  within  a  support  centre  for  HFA/AS  adults  (Faherty,  2006,  10).    This 
provides an example of how social resources for understanding and presenting the 
self,  as  well  as  understanding  the  intersection  of  different  identities  and  their 
consequences for everyday life, may be mediated by having a diagnosis.   
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The  impact  of  formal  diagnosis,  while  apparently  beneficial  for  many  of  those 
diagnosed, can be highly variable both between individuals and within individual 
biographies.  Davidson and Henderson’s (2010) work shows that presentations of 
self in relation to disclosure are closely related to the management of everyday risks 
people,  such  as  potential  discrimination  or  victimisation.      Explorations  of  the 
impact  of  the  diagnosis,  in  particular  those  relating  to  adults,  also  open  up 
questions  relating  to  the  experience  of  living  without  a  diagnosis.    Increased 
biographical  coherence  may  imply  prior  issues  with  making  sense  of  one’s  life; 
feelings  of  greater  self-acceptance  may  imply  that  these  were  not  present  or 
reduced in the pre-diagnostic phase; the importance of the diagnosis in formations 
of collective identities may also point to fewer opportunities for such involvement 
prior to diagnosis.  Therefore, one may also ask: what might the consequences of 
not  having  a  diagnosis  be,  in  particular  for  those  who  go  into  adulthood 
undiagnosed? 
 
2.1.3 – Living without a diagnosis 
 
 
Narratives of AS people who have lived for long periods without a diagnosis offer 
indications that this can involve significant challenges.  AS author Jerry Newport 
writes that the ‘worst’ AS-related experience of his life was ‘not knowing about it’ 80 
 
 
(Newport, 2001, 119-120).  In a published collection of interviews with AS college 
students in the USA, one participant (‘Jim’) observed that ‘[t]he trauma of knowing 
[about one’s AS] does not even approach the trauma of growing up not knowing 
why the world is so difficult to comprehend’ (Prince-Hughes, 2002).  Pre-diagnostic 
experiences have  received far  less  attention  in  research than  the  impact  of  the 
diagnosis; however, issues relating to pre-diagnostic life are indicated in a limited 
number of publications.  For example, Singh’s participant ‘Helen’ (discussed in 2.1.1) 
described ‘constant misunderstanding’ and ‘feeling like an alien’ as features of her 
pre-diagnostic  life  (Singh,  2011,  248)  Elsewhere,  in  their  explorations  of  risks 
associated  with  AS  as  a  ‘non-obvious  disability’,  Portway  and  Johnson  point  to 
additional risks experienced by those who receive a late diagnosis: 
 
The findings of this study indicate that early recognition of AS could have 
benefits in terms of ameliorating everyday and longer term risks identified 
with respect to participants who had only received their diagnoses in late 
adolescence  and  adulthood.    Examples  of  harm  associated  with  late 
diagnosis and low intervention include underachievement, high dependency 
on parents, negative feelings of low self esteem, high anxiety, depression 
and  suicidal  tendencies.  It  must  be  acknowledged  this  debate  is  not 
straightforward,  and  that  amongst  the  undiagnosed  and  inaccessible 
population  of  people  with  AS  there  may  be  opposing  viewpoints.  It  is 81 
 
 
unlikely that everyone with AS will accept or need such a diagnosis, and 
further research is needed to measure any potential negative costs of such a 
labelling  against  the  gains  of  diagnosis  and  intervention  (Portway  and 
Johnson, 2005, 81-82). 
 
 
Here, it is suggested that living for a long period without a diagnosis can involve 
different experiences of risk when compared with those diagnosed in childhood.  
However,  there  is  no  detailed  discussion  of  this  in  relation  to  their  empirical 
material: no information was provided for the age of diagnosis of the participants, 
nor was this identified as a key issue in the design or discussed in the main report of 
findings.    This  leaves a  gap  not only  in  the  comparison  between  early  and  late 
diagnosis,  but  also  in  terms  of  understanding  the  specificity  of  experiences  of 
growing up undiagnosed.  One aspect of further research invited by Portway and 
Johnson (2005) may therefore be to explore the challenges of pre-diagnostic life, in 
order to inform service provision for those who receive a very late diagnosis.   
 
Elsewhere, in a report prepared for the National Autistic Society focused on the 
needs of adults with autism, Rosenblatt observes: 
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Many adults with autism, particularly those with Asperger syndrome or high-
functioning autism, are only now seeking or receiving a diagnosis, as there 
was  little  awareness  of  the  condition  when  they  were  growing  up. 
Consequently, although autism is a lifelong disability, older adults are more 
likely  to have  received their  diagnosis  later  in life,  compared to  younger 
adults (Rosenblatt, 2008, 11). 
 
This suggests that exposure to risks may be associated not only with the timing of 
the diagnosis, but also the socio-historical situation of the person.  Drawing on case 
knowledge from clinical practice, Baron-Cohen et al. observe: 
 
[M]ost teachers, clinicians, social workers, and parents have now heard of 
AS, and thankfully many children with AS are being identified and diagnosed 
by middle childhood…But what of the generation who were born before 
1980, who may have had AS but for whom there was no diagnosis available? 
No specialist clinical teams, not even the concept of AS. How did they fare? 
The answer is that they were overlooked, and struggled through their school 
years…they had trouble making friends or fitting in…many were bullied by 
the other children, both physically and verbally…many felt like “an alien in 
the playground”.  The lucky ones managed to stay in school long enough to 83 
 
 
get their SATs, and  some got to university. But not without feeling their 
teens were an uphill struggle. By young adulthood many had suffered clinical 
depression and even felt suicidal…Some of them had enjoyed the closeness 
of an intimate relationship only for this to break down. Some had found 
employment only for them to run into problems in the work place through 
not  understanding  what  the  employer  and  other  staff  might  expect  of 
them…The unlucky ones succumbed to the low self-esteem that comes from 
a childhood of being bullied or feeling excluded and dropped out of school. 
In some cases, they were asked to leave because the school couldn’t cope 
with their odd and disruptive behaviour in class. In other cases, the children 
themselves gradually truanted, because the lessons seemed pointless…Sadly, 
these unlucky ones left school by 15 years old, with no qualifications on 
paper, and many have been unemployed for long periods if not continuously, 
ever since…And then – somehow – they heard that AS exists. Maybe through 
a newspaper article, or a website, or in a poster on the wall in the GP/Health 
Centre waiting room. And for many of them, they describe that moment of 
feeling: “This is me” (Baron-Cohen et al., 2007). 
 
Here, the authors highlight those born before 1980 as a cohort at particular risk of 
having lived for long periods without a diagnosis, and have also identified online 
communications as a common route to recognition of AS-related differences.  For 84 
 
 
this  cohort,  not  only  was  the  diagnosis  not  available,  but  also opportunities  for 
connecting with similar others (such AS communities online) were also restricted.  
This is a group whose access to resources (both in terms of the diagnosis and also 
understandings of AS within wider society) has been highly restricted for much of 
their lives.  People in this cohort have been ‘overlooked’ both in the sense of not 
having access to specialist assistance or diagnostic services, and also through a lack 
of research engagement with their experiences.  This gap is significant not only for 
those born before 1980, but also later cohorts of adults who may have grown up 
without a diagnosis in social settings where the condition is poorly understood.  As 
Beardon notes: 
 
Currently,  if  we  believe  published  epidemiological  studies  alongside 
statistical data from local authorities, it would seem that there are a lot of 
people out there who would qualify for a diagnosis of AS but do not have 
one.  If one has AS but does not know it, then there is the potential for 
major problems with identification of self and understanding who one is – 
and why (Beardon in Beardon and Worton, 2011, 9-10). 
 
The pre-diagnostic experiences of those born before 1980 who were diagnosed in 
adulthood is an area that appears ripe for further investigation.  While no studies in 85 
 
 
social  science  have  yet  explored  this  issue  specifically,  there  are  indications  in 
literature  from  elsewhere  that  social  scientific  study  of  living  with  undiagnosed 
conditions provides further evidence for potential social scientific contribution to 
this area of study. 
 
Comparisons  between  AS  and  conditions  clearly  definable  as  illnesses  must  be 
made with great caution; here, this comparison is made only in so far as it shows 
some of social consequences of living without a diagnosis.  For example, Juuso et al. 
explored  the  meanings  of  pain  among  women  with  fibromyalgia
7, whom they 
characterised as facing a ‘double burden’ both from the physical pain itself, and 
persistent doubts by others of the legitimacy of their symptoms (2011, 7).  This 
concept  is  useful  for  present  purposes  if  one  treats  it  as  referring  to  both  the 
absence  of  a  diagnosis  and  the  everyday  challenges  faced  by  AS  adults  more 
generally; the latter of which is understood to refer to the challenges themselves, 
and  does  not  imply  that  AS-related  experiences  are  inherently  pathological.  
Elsewhere, Nettleton explored the experiences of neurology patients with medically 
unexplained symptoms (MUS) who lack a medical diagnosis.  Participant narratives 
revealed common experiences of not being able to ‘make sense’ of their illness due 
                                                      
 
7 Fibromyalgia is a chronic pain condition of unknown aetiology.  It is associated with fatigue, poor 
quality sleep, headache, stiffness, and perceived weakness (Juuso et al. 2011). 86 
 
 
to the lack of a ‘medical explanation’ to engage with (Nettleton, 2006, 1165).  As 
with Juuso’s participants, legitimacy was a key issue for participants who expressed 
concerns  about  their  illness  being  framed  as  ‘imagined’  or  ‘fake’,  and  that 
psychological explanations offered to explain their symptoms carried less legitimacy 
than organic theories.  Nettleton situates the experience of MUS within the context 
of wider social demands for accountability: 
 
In an uncertain context the pressure of constantly having to account for 
oneself and remake ones identity can be relentless and unsettling.  Having to 
be seen to be ‘reflexively’ making an effort to find solutions and restore 
physical  and  social  coherence  can  be  as  intolerable  as  the  symptoms 
themselves.  One  is  not  allowed  to  be  anomalously  ‘ill’.  Society  does  not 
readily  give  people  permission  to  be  ill  in  the  absence  of  an  ‘accepted’ 
abnormal pathology or physiology.  Furthermore ‘other people’ and indeed 
society more generally is uncomfortable with, and indeed even fearful of 
such  anomalies.  Biomedical  classifications  are  socially  [sic]  constructions 
which  have  the  symbolic  effect  of  stabilising  identity  and  restoring 
coherence.  But they also generate ambivalence (Nettleton, 2006, 1176 - 
emphasis added). 
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Here,  Nettleton  draws  our  attention  to  the  social  impact  of  living  with  an 
undiagnosed condition, and also to the negative effects of diagnostic categories on 
those  who  are  excluded  from  them.    Having  a  diagnosis  can  help  a  person  to 
understand experiences of illness, and also provide credibility in terms of how they 
are seen by others.  Conversely not having a diagnosis can generate ambivalence, 
both at the personal level of self-understanding, and the social level in which the 
person  is  continually  called  to  account  for  the  difficulties  associated  with  their 
illness.   
 
Research on adults who have self-diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder
8 (ADHD) presents a qualitatively closer comparison with AS, in particular 
because respondents often point to positive aspects of their condition.   Henry and 
Hill Jones explored the experiences of older  women  who were diagnosed with 
ADHD in later years, including their experiences of pre-diagnostic life (2011, 246).  
The authors highlighted ‘peer rejection’ and ‘feeling different’ as key features of this 
phase,  along  with  creative  adaptation  within  the  workplace  where  participants 
sought to mediate difficulties with repetitive or menial tasks (Henry and Hill Jones, 
                                                      
 
8 “The…DSM-IV-TR describes the essential feature of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder as a 
‘persistent pattern of inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that is more frequently displayed 
and more severe than is typically observed in individuals at a comparable level of development” 
(Henry and Hill Jones, 2011, 247) 88 
 
 
2011,  256).    The  theme  of  ‘creative  adaptation’  is  of  interest  here  because  it 
indicates that while pre-diagnostic experiences of ADHD may lack the coherence 
provided by the diagnosis, participants did operate with understandings of personal 
dispositions later attributed to ADHD in this phase of life.  This opens up questions 
as  to  how  AS  people  understand  their  differences  and  difficulties  in  the  pre-
diagnostic phase of life. 
 
In  spite  of  a  lack  of  specific  research  literature,  there  are  indications  that  life 
without a diagnosis can be especially stressful for AS people, in particular due to the 
lack of coherent understanding of everyday difficulties as well as support for them.  
Baron-Cohen et al.’s observations from clinical practice point to a particular cohort 
who  may  be  at  increased  risk  of  being  diagnosed  very  late,  and  indicate  that 
experiences may have socio-historical dimensions with respect to the resources and 
knowledge  available  during  their  lifetime.    As  indicated  at  the  beginning  of  the 
chapter,  recent  policy-related  literature  points  to  the  need  for  greater 
understanding of the diversity of needs within the adult AS population, of which 
those who have received a very late diagnosis are a part (Allard, 2009; Rosenblatt, 
2008; HAPB, 2012).    Although no specific research attention has been paid to AS 
adults’ experience of living without a diagnosis, literature indicates some of the 
issues involved in living with an undiagnosed condition.  Juuso et al’s (2011) concept 
of the ‘double burden’ highlights the additional strain placed upon those living with 89 
 
 
an undiagnosed condition in relation to struggles for credibility.  Nettleton (2006) 
points to the social context of living without a diagnosis, where the struggle for 
credibility also involves continual demands for accountability for one’s illness to 
which the person is often not equipped to respond.    Elsewhere, Henry and Hill 
Jones’ (2011) work on older women diagnosed with ADHD in later years points to 
the existence of pre-diagnostic understandings of differences associated with the 
condition.     
 
In all of the research considered in this section, the relationship between diagnosis 
and  identity  is  a  central  theme.    Further  investigation  of  this  topic  can  help  to 
address  a  wider  gap  in  research  knowledge  with  regard  to  the  needs  and 
experiences  of  AS  adults,  and  be  of  relevance  to  both  researchers  and  service 
providers with interests in this group.  In particular, it may also be of interest to 
diagnosticians in terms of understanding how pre-diagnostic experiences may affect 
the impact of the diagnosis.  It can also contribute to debates around living with 
undiagnosed conditions, and to the nascent sociology of diagnosis more generally 
(Jutel,  2009;  Annemarie,  2011;  Jutel  and  Nettleton,  2011).    However,  this  is 
potentially a very broad area, and attention to some of the wider themes in social 
research relating to AS can help develop more specific research questions. 
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2.2 – Investigating formations of pre-diagnostic identities (research 
questions). 
 
 
Thus  far  my  aim  has  been  to  demonstrate  why  there  is  a  need  for  further 
investigation of the pre-diagnostic life experiences in relation to AS adults who were 
diagnosed in later life.  In this part of the chapter, my task will be to derive some 
specific research questions from existing studies on the experiences of AS people 
more generally, in order to frame the present investigation. 
2.2.1 – Understanding the dispositional self. 
 
One common feature of AS people compared to non-AS others, is greater attention 
to detail and often intense interest in a narrow and/or repetitive range of stimuli.  
This  is  often  attended  by  preferences  for  predictable,  sequential  ways  of 
understanding and acting in the world, and discomfort in the face of ambiguity or 
sudden change (Attwood, 2007; Baron-Cohen, 2008a).  The basis of these traits is 
believed to be neurodevelopmental, specifically in how the sensory information is 
organised  in  perception,  and  resulting  in  a  range  of  dispositional  strengths  and 
limitations.    In  the  social  scientific  literature,  researchers  have  noted  the 
implications of differences in dispositional engagements with the social world for 
experiences of everyday life.  For example, Ryan and Räisänen explored experiences 
of social life through semi-structured interviews with 16 AS adults, and in some 
cases their non-AS partners (2008, 137).  They argued that while non-AS people not 91 
 
 
only learn social ‘rules’ but ‘internalise’ them as a taken-for-granted way of going on 
in the world, AS people typically do not, and continue to rely upon express rules as 
opposed to intuition in social life (2008, 137-139).  As a result, participants in the 
study  requested  changes  to  the  semi-structured  interview  format,  preferring  a 
more formal question and answer format over open-ended conversation (Ryan and 
Räisänen, 2008, 137).  Their responses revealed constant efforts to ‘fit in’ with the 
norms of everyday life, which were often experienced as vague or confusing.  AS 
participants  also  felt  unable  to  grasp  social  encounters  with  non-AS  others 
intuitively,  instead  relying  upon  learned  and  consciously  enacted  responses,  as 
indicated in this response from ‘Tim’: 
 
You do learn strategies from an early age I think and the problem is with 
people probably on the spectrum is that you have got a lot of information 
that you need to store away because you have to remember the strategies 
for those situations [um] because it doesn’t come naturally so you have to 
pull that out of your little film cabinet that you have got in your head and 
play it quite quickly so you know what to do. It is not inherent really (Ryan 
and Räisänen, 2008, 140). 
  
This is an example of what Ryan and Räisänen refer to as a ‘different logic’ for social 
agency,  characterised  by  dispositions  toward  predictable,  rule-based  ways  of 92 
 
 
understanding over tacit, intuitive forms. This idea of a ‘different logic’ is supported 
elsewhere in the literature, for example in the work of Sterponi, who explored the 
construction  of  rules,  accountability  and  moral  identities  of  children  with  ‘high-
functioning autism’ in spoken interactions (2004, 207).  She argues that for the AS 
children in her study: 
 
…social skills are linked with the capacity to operate with sequentially based 
understandings. Prior courses of action constitute for the autistic children 
the  fundamental  source  for  reaching  an  understanding  of  what  is  in  the 
mind  of  other  people,  specifically  their  expectations  and  normative 
references,  and  subsequently for  constructing their own  lines  of  conduct 
(Sterponi, 2004, 222). 
 
While  these  were  seen  as  characteristic  of    AS  children’s  dispositions  towards 
understanding  and  maintaining  accountability  in  communicative  exchange,  the 
‘dynamism  and  creativity  typical  of  accountability  practices  [in  non-AS  people] 
constitut[ed] serious challenges for children with autism’ (Sterponi, 2004, 221).  In 
emphasising  the  practical  nature  of  rule-following  in  language,  Sterponi  frames 
dispositions  towards  social  coordination  in  terms  of  an  opposition  between 
sequential (AS) and creative/dynamic (non-AS) orientations to applying social rules 
(2004, 222-223).  This is also reflected in the work of Ochs et al. (2004), who argue 93 
 
 
that  the  aptitudes  and  limitations  of  high-functioning  autistic  children  are 
illustrative  of  the  important  role  that  creative  adaptation  plays  in  non-autistic 
interaction  (as  well  as  its  potential  limitations)    Drawing  on  anthropological 
linguistic research, they argue that:   
 
Social life also entails the ability to construe and respond to fluid, contingent 
circumstances and indeterminate meanings…The social challenges of those 
with autism make plainly evident the importance of improvisational models 
that  depict  members  as  agents  of  social  experience.  Although  the  high-
functioning children with autistic spectrum disorders who participated in our 
study exhibited improvisational strategies for taking part in conversational 
interactions,  they  also  evidenced  pronounced  difficulties  in  grasping  the 
range  of  socio-cultural  dispositions,  acts,  identities,  activities,  and 
institutions  indexed  moment-by-moment  by  linguistic  and  other 
conventional semiotic features of shifting social situations (Ochs et al., 2004, 
173). 
 
This was reaffirmed by later work by Ochs and Solomon (2007) who argued that in 
co-present encounters AS children: 
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‘…strategically invert right there and then the practical logic of imminent 
social  exigencies  into  the  logical  logic  of  patterned  objective  knowledge, 
reversing  the  default  directionality  of  the  logic  of  objective  structures 
transformed  into  practical  logic  required  for  on-the-spot  situational 
exigencies’ (Ochs and Solomon, 2007, 162).   
 
In other words, while non-AS participants relied on a tacit ‘feel for the game’ as a 
means of going on in the social world, the AS children in their study made sense of 
interactions through systematic observation and construction of rules.  This issue 
was  taken  up  in  later  work  by  Ochs  and  Solomon  (2010)  on  autistic  sociality, 
informed by a decade-long programme of anthropological-linguistic research with 
children across the spectrum (Ochs and Solomon, 2010, 69).  Drawing on Bourdieu’s 
concept  of  habitus  -  a  ‘circumscribed  yet  transformable  set  of  dispositions  and 
situated logics that members of social groups employ to interpret and enact social 
practices’ - the authors situate autistic sociality within a wider human ‘range of 
possibilities for social coordination with others, influenced by the dynamics of both 
individuals  and  social  groups’  (Ochs  and  Solomon,  2010,  69,  72).    The  authors 
argued that while autistic children faced significant difficulties in social interactions, 
these did not automatically exclude them from social life.  Rather, in addition to 
their limiting aspects, autistic traits also include a range of orientations to social 95 
 
 
interaction, including dispositions towards sequential, rule-based ways of engaging 
with the world (Ochs and Solomon, 2010, 69). 
 
How one understands one’s dispositional ways of being is also significant in terms of 
how they experience everyday life.  For example, in Ryan and Räisänen’s (2008) 
study, one participant (‘Paul’) spoke of his fear of committing ‘social suicide’ as an 
everyday anxiety related to ‘being’ AS; this involved saying something inappropriate, 
and then exacerbating the situation by making more problematic comments due to 
his anxiety at having made the original statement) (Ryan and Räisänen, 2008, 139).  
As  a  way  of  mediating  these  risks,  ‘Paul’  reported  relying  upon  mundane  but 
predictable topics of conversation which Ryan and Räisänen (following  Goffman) 
refer to as ‘safe supplies’: 
 
I would, you know, find, even if it wasn’t particularly interesting; ‘‘Oh look, 
butter, do you like butter?’’ ‘‘Yes, butter.’’ And even it if it was just like a two 
minute conversation I would just pick something randomly in the room, just 
like, talk about the microwave for five minutes and then realise I had talked 
about microwaves for five minutes, you know, and then it would, I would 
stop thinking about things in the room and then try and  pick up I guess 
personality traits, or what people were wearing, or I guess if I noticed any 96 
 
 
differences, like if someone had had a hair cut I would try, I guess, and make 
conversation about that (Ryan and Räisänen, 2008, 139) 
 
The authors note that while the use of ‘safe supplies’ may also be a strategy familiar 
to non-AS people, the key difference was the frequency and intensity with which 
these were relied upon in the absence of taken-for-granted ways of interacting with 
non-autistic others (Ryan and Räisänen, 2008, 139).  Elsewhere, in Madriaga’s study 
of AS students in higher education, the participant ‘Alan’ noted that understanding 
his  spatial  sensitivity  to  crowds  and  noise  helped  him  develop  strategies  for 
managing these in everyday life (Madriaga, 2010, 27).  Diagnosed shortly before 
beginning his university course, ‘Alan’ describes how he went from not being able to 
tolerate crowds and noise during the society fair in the opening week of term, to 
being able to work and interact with others while working in a busy bar (Madriaga, 
2010, 29). 
 
It  is  important  to  note  that  not  all  understandings  of  dispositions  relate  to 
difficulties; in many cases those diagnosed emphasise the positive aspects of being 
AS,  when  compared  with  ways  of  being  associated  with  non-autistic  people.  
Brownlow et al. (2006) provide examples of this from their exploration of identity 
construction in online discussion forums; for example, one respondent (referred to 97 
 
 
as  ‘Person  5’)  contrasted  what  they  saw  as  problematic  aspects  of  non-AS 
communication with a more direct style associated with AS: 
 
Humans, even NTs, possess the linguistic ability to express concepts, ideas, 
and  emotions  verbally  with  clarity,  but  the  NT  brain  seems  incapable  of 
actually  doing  so.  They  rely  heavily  on  the  animalistic  means  of  body 
language. It’s primitive and unnecessary, I think. Further, NTs can’t seem to 
express thoughts completely. They use an irritating form of verbal shorthand, 
where significant gaps are left to be filled by the listener. It’s absurd! If I 
were to design a communication paradigm to be applied to a sentient race 
of primates, it would be a lot closer to the AS way than the ‘‘normal’’ way 
(Brownlow et al., 2006, 319). 
 
In a later comment, ‘Person 5’ goes on to explicitly reject the idea of their AS as a 
disability, and affirms the value of their AS-related qualities to their sense of self: 
 
I won’t use the term ‘disability’ to describe AS . . . I do not feel disabled or 
impaired. I am not broken and I do not need to be fixed or cured. If I were to 
become NT, I would not be ‘me’ anymore, and a lot of my good qualities 
would disappear (Brownlow et al., 2006, 319). 98 
 
 
 
These  examples  show  how  a  person’s  dispositional  self  can  be  understood  and 
presented through the lens of the category AS as a valued and defended aspect of 
self.  For those who have a diagnosis, understanding one’s dispositional orientations 
to the world, and how this may affect relations with others, is one important effect 
of being diagnosed.  In certain circumstances, knowledge of the person’s AS status 
can also provide a basis for understanding on the part of others, with the potential 
for mediation of problematic aspects of social interactions.  However, AS-related 
dispositions do not simply ‘appear’ when a diagnosis is made, and this raises the 
question of how dispositional aspects of self are understood and experienced in the 
time before one is diagnosed.  Thus the first question explored in this thesis is - How 
do AS people who are diagnosed in adulthood understand their dispositional selves 
in the pre-diagnostic phase of life?   
 
2.2.2 – Self-other relations and identity. 
 
 
In  addition  to  understanding  the  dispositional  self,  research  indicates  that 
understanding oneself through the category AS plays an important role in how one 
understands and presents themselves in relations with others, for example, who 
one identifies with or distinguishes themselves from, and why.  One example of this 99 
 
 
has already been demonstrated in Bagatell’s case study of ‘Ben’, where changes in 
his understanding of dispositional self also led to changes in who he identified with, 
and  the  kinds  of  social  relationships  that  were  important  for  him.    Having  a 
diagnosis can affect not only how the person understands and presents themselves 
to others, but also the ways that they are ‘seen’ and treated by others.  This can 
have  implications  for  wellbeing,  for  example,  in  terms  of  having  access  to 
supportive relationships in order to mitigate risks associated with mental ill health 
(Rosenblatt,  2008;  Allard,  2009).    This  was  noted  by  Sirota,  who  explored  the 
politeness  practices  of  HFA  children  through  ethnographic  observation  of 
interactions within ‘naturally occurring family and community settings’ (2004, 229).  
She  observed  that  many  participants  were  able  to  successfully  negotiate  tasks 
involving positive politeness practices in the presence of caregivers, who were able 
to  mentor  them  in  developing  appropriate  responses  (Sirota,  2004,  230).  
Performance in naturalistic theory of mind tasks involving positive politeness was 
contrasted with poorer performance in clinical tasks by 7 of the 15 children involved, 
and  Sirota  observed  that  this  may be due  to the  absence  of  social  ‘scaffolding’ 
provided by the guidance and prompting of parents (Sirota, 2004, 245).   
 
Elsewhere, Kremer-Sadik studied HFA children’s responses to everyday questions 
(for example, ‘what is the time?’, ‘what do you mean?’) as ‘naturalistic theory of 
mind tasks’ in order to explore skills related to perspective taking (2004, 185).  The 100 
 
 
author observed that HFA children often did better in perspective-taking tasks when 
their parents are available to assist them in attending ‘to predictable features and 
perceptual  cues  embedded  in  social  situations  to  appropriately  respond  to  and 
participate  in  social  activities,  as  well  as  to  better  understand  the  internal 
dispositions of members participating in them’ (2004, 200).  Kremer-Sadik argues 
that a focus on interpersonal perspective-taking in lab-based theory of mind tasks 
may  obscure  socio-cultural  perspective-taking  practices  in  assessments  of  AS 
children’s social competence (2004, 200).  This was also supported by Sirota, who 
noted  that  for  the  children  in  her  study  ‘participation  in  quotidian  practices  of 
positive politeness entailed a number of socio-culturally mediated resources that, 
although  vital  to  the  constitution  of  meaningful  social  discourse,  generally  have 
remained  under-acknowledged  and  unavailable  for  study  via  experimental 
laboratory  research’  (2004,  245).   Both of these  studies  suggest that aspects  of 
social competence and perspective taking abilities may be linked to the availability 
of supportive relationships for HFA children. 
 
The  importance  of  relationships  in  meeting  everyday  challenges  has  also  been 
observed  in  research  relating  to  AS  adults.    For  example,  in  Davidson  and 
Henderson’s (2010) work on disclosure, the authors noted the importance of finding 
‘allies…who can fully grasp the complexity and nuances’ of AS people’s experiences, 
for  negotiating  everyday  interactions  (Davidson  and  Henderson,  2010a,  159).  101 
 
 
‘Allies’ were seen as important not only for their status as people to whom one’s AS 
identity could safely be disclosed, but as sources of support and counsel in deciding 
how to present oneself within other social relationships (Davidson and Henderson, 
2010a, 159). This was particularly relevant in relation to those whom the authors 
termed  ‘stigma  coaches’,  or  people  who  emphasised  the  importance  of 
concealment and ‘passing’ in negotiating the non-autistic social world (Davidson 
and  Henderson,  2010a,  158-159).    Clinicians,  parents,  friends  and  other 
professionals  were  cited  as  examples  of  others  who  advised  AS  participants  to 
conceal  their  diagnosis  from  non-autistic  others,  such  as  potential  employers 
(Davidson and Henderson, 2010a, 158-159).  Davidson and Henderson’s work draws 
our  attention  to  the  social  variability  of  disclosure,  and  the  idea  that  the 
experiences of different AS people in self-other relations can involve variations in 
cultural and social context (i.e. where they are, and with whom). 
 
 
Elsewhere,  Rosqvist  (2012)  explored  the  impact  of  the  diagnosis  through 
ethnographic  research  in  a  ‘Swedish  educational  setting’,  involving  12  AS 
participants who were diagnosed in adulthood (Rosqvist, 2012, 120).  In common 
with  the  findings  of  previous  studies  concerning  the  impact  of  the  diagnosis, 
participants framed it as an important life event in terms of self-understanding, 
collective identity and self-acceptance (Rosqvist, 2012, 122).  Diagnosis was linked 102 
 
 
to what the author describes as an ‘ambivalent ideal of openness’, where disclosure 
of one’s AS identity was assumed to be the default course of action (Rosqvist, 2012, 
122).  However, participants also acknowledged that the pragmatics of individual 
social encounters may mean that this is not possible or desirable, and this was 
framed in terms of risks associated with ignorance or discrimination on the part of 
others  (Rosqvist,  2012,  122).    Participants  also  spoke  of  an  active  and  critical 
engagement with diagnostic criteria and with the normative ‘holders of knowledge’ 
in  biomedical  and  clinical  sciences  (Rosqvist,  2012,  122).    These  activities  were 
framed as attempts to rebalance understandings of AS away from deficit-focused 
accounts, towards an appreciation of both strengths and limitations associated with 
AS differences (Rosqvist, 2012, 123-125).  For participants, the diagnosis was taken 
as an imperfect concept, to be developed and contested, providing further evidence 
of potential variability and change in the relationship between the diagnosis and the 
self. 
 
Differences in the quality of relations with others, as well as the wider norms and 
expectations that shape behaviour in different settings can influence how a person 
acts and is perceived by others.  In the case of AS people, how they experience and 
deal with social and environmental situations may contrast with those prescribed by 
the social norms and demands of a given situation.  These expectations may involve 
assumptions about ‘normative’ perceptual experiences of the social world that does 103 
 
 
not  hold  in  the  case  of  AS  people.    Understanding  the  dispositional  self  can 
therefore involve intersubjective aspects, in terms of how one understands oneself 
in relation to others, and also how one is seen and treated by others relative to 
their presented self.  Research indicates that throughout the lifecourse, having a 
diagnosis plays an important role in both of these aspects of self-other relations, 
notably through the challenge of disclosure.  As indicated earlier (in 2.1.3), living 
with an undiagnosed condition has been associated with feelings of ambivalence 
and  difficulties  in  understanding  one’s  differences  from  others,  in  addition  to 
everyday challenges associated with the condition (the ‘double burden’). Not having 
a diagnosis may therefore involve particular challenges in relation to how a person 
understands and presents themselves to others, and also how they are seen by 
them.  Therefore, the second question that I will pursue in this thesis will be: How 
do self-other relations affect pre-diagnostic understandings of self? 
 
2.2.3 – Understanding and presenting the self in the management of everyday 
insecurities. 
 
 
Another important feature of existing social scientific research on the lives of AS 
people is the presence of social and environmental challenges that can manifest in 
the form of everyday insecurities. Differences in the way one is disposed to engage 
with the social world can mean that many aspects of daily life appear strange or 104 
 
 
confusing, and this insecurity becomes a perennial feature of everyday life.  For 
example,  Ryan  and  Räisänen  reported  participant  experiences  characterised  by 
‘constant feelings of not belonging’ in both social and environmental contexts (Ryan 
and Räisänen, 2008, 138).  The authors frame these experiences in terms of an 
opposition between AS people’s preferences for clarity and consistency, and what 
they see as problematic features of modern societies such as uncertainty, fluidity, 
individualism and weakening of social bonds (Ryan and Räisänen, 2008, 135).  They 
argue  that  under  these  conditions,  while  many  non-AS  actors  operate  by 
‘maintaining  an  illusion  of  safety  based  upon  trust  and  reciprocity’  developed 
through ‘a common sense attitude which reduces these concerns to the level of 
largely taken for granted and unremarkable’, this is often not possible for many AS 
people (Ryan and Räisänen, 2008, 135, 141).   
 
 
By contrast, AS participants were seen to ‘move through social life with concern 
about the contingencies, risks and hazards that exist at a micro and macro level’ in a 
state of constant vigilance and anxiety regarding potential breaches in the ‘order’ of 
interactions with others (Ryan and Räisänen, 2008, 142).  The state of ‘ontological 
security’ which for non-AS people ‘maintain[s] an illusion of safety based upon trust 
and reciprocity’ and ‘…reduces [awareness of contingencies, risks and hazards in 
everyday life] to the level of largely taken-for-granted and unremarkable’ was often 105 
 
 
out of reach for the AS adults in this study (Ryan and Räisänen, 2008, 135, 141).    
This observation was reflected elsewhere in research by Portway and Johnson, who 
identified  experiences  of  ‘not  quite  fitting’  (what  they  refer  to  as  ‘marginal 
normality’) as common features of participants’ lives (Portway and Johnson, 2005, 
77). 
 
Chronic insecurity also extends to experiences of social space, which can motivate 
practical  strategies  in  response  to  challenges  posed  by  the  environment.    For 
example, Ryan and Räisänen noted that AS participants were ‘unusually sensitive to 
the presence and spatial practices of others in a way that most people are not’ 
(2008, 142).  This led to a common practice of making ‘safe spaces’, for example, 
one participant, ‘Trisha’ disliked having anyone but her children in her home, and 
described ‘how one person visited her each month and she could not wait for her to 
leave because she felt so ‘unsafe’ when [this person] was there’ (Ryan and Räisänen, 
2008,  141).    However,  for  ‘Trisha’  different  spaces  presented  contrasting 
opportunities for managing socio-spatial issues, and despite her aversion to home-
visitors she often welcomed local school children into her allotment where she felt 
safe  and  comfortable  (Ryan  and  Räisänen,  2008,  141).    This  indicates  how 
experiences  of  environments  (and  attendant  insecurities)  can  vary  within  and 
between  AS  people,  even  within  the  same  space,  as  observed  elsewhere  by 
Madriaga (2010) in his investigation of the transition to higher education for first 106 
 
 
year AS students at a UK university.  In this study, participants described common 
(though qualitatively variable) difficulties in gaining access to study, living and social 
leisure  spaces  (Madriaga,  2010,  23).    For  example,  one  respondent  (‘Louis’) 
described the need to strike a careful balance between a lack of annoying sounds 
and complete isolation, in order to study effectively in the library; while another 
(‘Lisa’)  was  completely  unable  to  work  in  this  space  due  to  annoying  humming 
sounds from computer equipment  (Madriaga, 2010, 29-30).  Sensory issues also 
mediated opportunities for social exchange within leisure spaces, such as pubs and 
clubs,  which  became  inaccessible  in  the  evening  due  to  crowding  and  noise 
(Madriaga, 2010, 27-29).  Madriaga also observes a common dilemma faced by AS 
participants in dealing with problematic environments, specifically whether or not 
to withdraw in the face of problematic stimuli and risk further social isolation.   
 
 
Everyday insecurities involve both social and environmental aspects of everyday life, 
for  example,  Davidson  and  Henderson  characterise  ‘autistic  lifeworlds’  as  those 
within  which  ‘spatial  and  embodied  coherence  is  challenged  at  every  turn’ 
(Davidson  and  Henderson,  2010b,  462).  In  their  analysis  of  autobiographical 
narratives written by authors on the spectrum, Davidson and Henderson observe 
the frequent presence of ‘travel analogies’ that describe perpetual re-encounters 
with everyday environments; spaces that should ostensibly be familiar but never 107 
 
 
become so due to difficulties with spatial orientation and change  (2010b, 462, 472-
473).  In addition, what for non-AS people might appear as minute or trivial changes 
in the physical geography of places often caused profound confusion and stress for 
AS authors (Davidson and Henderson, 2010b, 472-473).  The interrelation of social 
and  environmental  concerns  in  spatial  access  leads Davidson  to  frame  this  as  a 
relational  process,  requiring  reciprocal  understanding  by  both  AS  and  non-AS 
people of the dispositions and needs of the other (Davidson, 2010, 305).   
 
 
Echoing the work of Ryan and Räisänen (2008), Davidson also observes that AS 
people are almost always compelled to make extraordinary efforts to both access 
everyday spaces, and to understand the unfamiliar behaviour of others (Davidson, 
2010, 309-311).  Drawing on evidence from autobiographical narratives, the author 
observes that spatial access for AS people often depends not on ‘correcting’ AS-
related behaviours, but on appreciation by non-AS people of their sensitivities and 
coping strategies (Davidson, 2010, 305-307).  This indicates that while dispositions 
towards  sequential,  rule-based  ways  of  understanding  the  world  can  shape 
experiences  of  the  social,  they  also  involve  environmental  experiences.    It  also 
points to the need to explore experiences of insecurity in terms of both social and 
environmental  aspects; for  example,  supportive  relationships  may  help  facilitate 108 
 
 
spatial access; while changes to problematic aspects of environment provide better 
conditions for interactions with others. 
 
 
Differences in dispositional ways of understanding and acting in social life, as well as 
sensory  sensitivities,  mean  that  AS  people  experience  everyday  situations 
differently from many non-AS others.  Current literature indicates that for many AS 
people,  everyday  life  can  involve  experiences  of  chronic  insecurity,  involving 
challenges to social as well as ‘spatial and embodied coherence’.  This can motivate 
strategies for managing insecurities, for example, making ‘safe spaces’ or through 
withdrawal  from  problematic  situations.    Given  the  discussion  thus  far  in  this 
chapter,  in  terms  of  how  a  diagnosis  can  help  a  person  to  understand  their 
differences and relationship to the people and places of everyday life, we might ask 
how these challenges are met in the time before one receives their diagnosis.  If, as 
existing studies suggest, a diagnosis can help the person to develop more coherent 
understandings  of  both  the  self  and  of  life  events,  then  the  management  of 
everyday insecurities in the pre-diagnostic phase could therefore involve confusion 
associated with the ‘double burden’ of living without a diagnosis.  Furthermore, if 
managing  insecurity  is  implicated  in  understanding  and  presenting  the  self  in 
everyday  interactions,  then  this  constitutes  another  area  of  potential  important 
with respect to formations of pre-diagnostic identity.   The third and final question 109 
 
 
to be pursued in this thesis will therefore be: How does management of everyday 
insecurities relate to formations of the pre-diagnostic self? 
 
2.3 – Summary 
 
 
My aims in this chapter have been: firstly, to justify the broad focus of the thesis; 
secondly, to set out the specific research questions to be pursued.  The main focus 
of this thesis is to explore the pre-diagnostic experiences of AS people born before 
1980 who were diagnosed in adulthood, and the research questions are as follows: 
 
1.  How  do  AS  people  understand  their  dispositional  selves  in  the  pre-
diagnostic phase of life?   
2.  How do self-other relations affect pre-diagnostic understandings of self? 
3.  How does management of everyday insecurities relate to formations of the 
pre-diagnostic self? 
 
All three questions relate to understanding and presenting the self in everyday life; 
however, they refer to different, though related aspects of this.  The first question 
focuses on the experiences and processes that shape AS people’s pre-diagnostic 
understandings  of  their  dispositional  selves,  while  the  second  question  explores 110 
 
 
how these understandings of dispositional difference affect how a person presents 
themselves to others in a given situation.  The link between these two questions 
involves a shift from the personal to the intersubjective aspects of experience, and 
question three then moves to another level in terms of the context of everyday life.  
In  addressing  this  question,  I  will  explore  how  the  practical  management  of 
everyday insecurities, including those relating to understandings of self and self-
other relations, is shaped by social, cultural and environmental conditions. 
 
Given that these questions are part of broader focus on pre-diagnostic experiences, 
my next task will be to set out how I have approached these questions conceptually, 
in order to link the three questions into an overall research narrative.  I will explore 
the benefits and limitations of theoretical approaches used in existing studies, and 
draw on resources in phenomenological and sociological theory (in particular the 
work of Bourdieu) to establish a framework for exploring pre-diagnostic experiences.  
From here, I will move on (in chapter four) to discuss my methodological approach 
(life story analysis), and the sources of empirical material (autobiographies) that 
have informed my investigation  Once again, through a discussion of the strengths 
and  limitations  of  existing  approaches,  I  explain  my  decision  to  undertake  a 
comparative  case  study  using  autobiographies.    This  will  include  a  treatment of 
ethical and epistemological issues, and the value and limitations of my approach in 
terms  of  addressing  the  questions  identified.    I  will  also  discuss  the  individual 111 
 
 
narratives in terms of their contributions to the questions identified in this chapter, 
and set out my approach to analysing the texts.  I will then move on (in part two) to 
my analysis of the autobiographies. 
3 – Framing and exploring pre-diagnostic formations of self 
(theoretical approach) 
 
Having set out the focus and questions that frame the investigation, the aim of this 
chapter is to explain my theoretical approach to exploring pre-diagnostic identities.  
Identity is a contested concept, with a range of perspectives underpinning different 
approaches to framing and exploring this area (Lawler, 2008).  However, as Lawler 
observes, the basic claim common to sociological perspectives on identity, is that 
the  self  (however  defined)  cannot  be  understood  with  reference  only  to  the 
individual, but needs to be explored in relational terms (i.e. who a person feels that 
‘are’  or  ‘are not’,  issues  of  sameness  and  difference,  dis/identification  with  and 
positioning  within  particular  collective  and  categories)  (Lawler,  2008,  1-7).    The 
relevance  of  this  approach  for  present  purposes  has  already  been  indicated  in 
Hacking’s conception of autism as an ‘interactive kind’, and in chapter two, where 
different sets of social and cultural circumstances were seen to interact with social 
and environmental factors in shaping experiences of ‘being’ AS (Molloy and Vasil, 
2004;  Portway  and  Johnson,  2005).    My  approach  has  been  informed  by 
Bourdieusian  theory,  drawing  on  developmental  critiques  of  Bourdieu’s  original 
concepts, as well as some of his phenomenological influences. In this chapter, I will 112 
 
 
argue that Bourdieu’s integrated concepts of practice, habitus, field and forms of 
capital,  in  combination  with  Bottero’s  approach  to  identity  provide  a  useful 
framework for exploring formations of pre-diagnostic self.  I suggest that this body 
of  theory  can  be  particularly  useful  as  a  way  of  framing  connections  between 
dispositional and social aspects of experience, and for accommodating a diversity of 
potential experiences relevant to formations of pre-diagnostic identity. 
 
Existing  literature  indicates  the  potential  utility  of  these  ideas  for  exploring  AS 
people’s experiences of social life (Ochs et al., 2004; Ochs and Solomon, 2004; Ochs 
and  Solomon, 2007;  Ochs  and  Solomon,  2010);  however,  their  use  has  hitherto 
been restricted to isolated concepts of practice and habitus, rather than application 
of the overall framework.  This is significant for present purposes because a major 
strength  of  Bourdieu’s  work  lies  in  his  holisitic  approach  to  exploring  relations 
between subjective, intersubjective and wider socio-cultural aspects of social life.  
This carries through into Bottero’s identity framework, which seeks to go beyond 
purely  reflexive  or  social  constructionist  approaches  to  identity  (Bottero,  2010).  
Existing studies relating to AS people’s identities have focused almost exclusively on 
these aspects, and none have sought to explore in detail links between dispositional, 
reflexive  and  collective  aspects  of  self  (Bagatell,  2007;  Brownlow  et  al.,  2006; 
Molloy and Vasil, 2004;  Sterponi, 2004).  However, before proceeding it will be 
necessary  to  explore  some  of  the  assumptions  that  Bourdieu  makes  about 113 
 
 
perceptual functioning in relation to social agency, and this will be my first task in 
this chapter.   
 
Beginning with a discussion of how Bourdieu’s ‘logic of practice’ can help us to 
better understand the ‘different logic’ identified by Ryan and Raisanen (2008), I will 
connect this with his ideas concerning intersubjective coordination (habitus) and 
wider cultural horizons (field, through the concepts of habitus, field and forms of 
capital.    I  suggest  that  Bourdieu’s  emphasis  on  habitual  and  tacit  ways  of 
understanding and acting in the social world need to be reconsidered, and propose 
that for AS people, reflexivity plays a much greater role in everyday life that his 
framework allows.  These concepts provide one set of ‘thinking tools’ for exploring 
formations  of  pre-diagnostic  identities;  my  next  task  will  be  to  link  them  with 
Bottero’s approach to identity, augmented by intersectionality theory, as a way of 
framing  different  aspects  of  identity  and  their  interaction  in  pre-diagnostic 
formations of self.  Finally, I introduce the idea that authenticity, accountability and 
legitimacy can be used as interrelated concepts in order to explore specific issues 
relating to the formations of pre-diagnostic identity.  I will explore and expand upon 
this  framework  as  I  move  through  the  analysis  in  chapters  five,  six  and  seven; 
however, for the purposes of clarity I will introduce them as part of the theoretical 
framework.  I will begin by exploring the relationship between perception and the 
practice in Bourdieu’s account of social agency. 114 
 
 
 
 
3.1 – ‘Terms of engagement’ and ‘logics’ of practice – exploring the 
conceptual relationship between perceptual differences and sociality. 
 
Existing studies point to a range of differences in dispositional orientations to social 
activity  (Ochs  and  Solomon,  2010;  Sterponi,  2004),  or  what  Ryan  and  Raisanen 
(2008) describe as a ‘different logic’ for understanding and acting in the social world.  
Neuropsychological  research  literature  (Tomchek  and  Dunn,  2007;  Baron-Cohen, 
2008a; Baron-Cohen, 2008b; Baron-Cohen et al., 2009; Schroeder et al., 2010), as 
well  as  descriptions  of  first-person  experience  from  AS  writers  (Lawson,  1998; 
Lawson,  2009;  Milton,  2011;  Williams,  1994),  point  to  a  range  of  perceptual 
experiences that may differ from those typical of many non-autistic people.  Thus as 
a starting point, we need to appreciate how differences in a person’s perceptual 
‘terms  of  engagement’ with  their  surrounding world  shape  dispositions  towards 
social agency. 
 
3.1.1 – AS differences in perception and their significance for dispositional 
orientations to social action. 
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Bourdieu’s  theory  of  social  agency  is  grounded  in  the  work  of  Merleau-Ponty, 
whose account of the relationship between perception and experience underpins 
the former’s concept of the ‘logic of practice’ (Crossley, 2001; Dreyfus, 2007).  As 
Dreyfus observes: 
 
[W]hat interests [Merleau-Ponty] is coping…how you are able to respond to 
the particular situation…the way your body has of immediately grasping the 
gestalt of what’s going on, or failing to and doing it better next time (Dreyfus, 
2006). 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, the experience of ‘lifeworld’ as a taken-for-granted experience 
of  everyday  situations  and  environments  arises  from  the  body’s  ‘constant 
conversation’  with  the  surrounding  world,  in  which  objects  of  perception  are 
‘grasped’ as both physical and meaningful entities (Thompson, 2007). Perception is 
not  the  same  as  sensation,  nor  is  it  a  neutral  reporting  of  an  unreconstructed 
physical  world;  rather,  perception  involves  the  organisation  of  sense  data  in 
interest-relative and context specific ways (Thompson, 2006).  Interest and context 
are mediated by the meaning and purpose that the perceiving body attaches to 
them,  where  ‘meaning’  refers  to  the  significance  of  perceived  objects  to  the 
perceiving body, and ‘purpose’ involves the intentional relationship which that body 
has  to  the  objects  of  perception  (i.e.  what  things  are  for)  (Crossley,  2001,  65).  116 
 
 
Meaning and purpose are not products of conscious action; they are principles upon 
which  sense  data  are  organised  to  produce  a  progressive,  meaningful  and 
interested experience of being-in-the-world (Crossley, 2001, 69).   
 
One grasps the world not as a series of separate, discrete sensations but as an 
overall or gestalt picture of what is going on (Dreyfus, 2006).  Gestalt perception 
arises from the interplay of sensory information, where stimuli in particular sense 
domains  are  rendered meaningful  not only  in the  sense  of  their  own  particular 
qualities but also in combination with experiences in others (Crossley offers the 
illustrative example of the role of music in film, altering the mood of scenes which 
may  remain  unchanged  in  visual  terms)  (Crossley,  2001).      The  perceptual 
organisation of stimuli (what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the gaze) is not fixed, but 
evolves in response to its on-going experiences of environment (Crossley, 2001, 72; 
Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 263-4).  The gaze of perception is ‘never disinterested’; it is 
always  directed  towards  some  phenomena  or  intended  object  (Crossley,  2001).  
Meaningful  and purposive  relationships  with the  objects  of perception  motivate 
actions  and  responses  which  alter  the  gestalt,  generating  new  perceptual 
experiences, which in turn generate new responses, and so on, creating a feedback 
loop which Merleau-Ponty refers to as an ‘intentional arc’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 
14).  Perception is thus revealed as: 117 
 
 
 
…an outcome of the process in which the organism interrogates its worldly 
surround, guided by both biological sensitivities and behavioural-perceptual 
schemas,  thereby  creating  for  itself  a  subjective  ‘milieu’  or  ‘lifeworld’ 
(Crossley, 2001, 71). 
 
For  Merleau-Ponty,  the  emergence  of  the  ‘lifeworld’  in  perception  involves  a 
process of habituation in relation to familiar environments and situations, through 
which the perceiving body develops an ‘equilibrium’ with the surrounding world 
(Merleau-Ponty,  1962,  153).    In  this  view,  habitual  familiarity  with  the  people, 
places and practical challenges of everyday situations allows a person to skilfully 
cope with them, and thereby feel ‘at home’ in doing so.  For Merleau-Ponty (and for 
Bourdieu) it is through this process of habituation that a person’s taken-for-granted 
experience of everyday life arises; however, as we have seen, for AS people many 
everyday situations cannot be taken-for-granted in the same way as for many non-
AS people, and can involve  different experiences such as ‘resonance’ with aspects 
of the physical world, and/or chronic insecurity in problematic environments (Ryan 
and Räisänen, 2008), as well as challenges to ‘spatial and embodied coherence’ 
(Davidson  and  Henderson,  2010b,  462).    Merleau-Ponty’s  work  indicates  the 
importance of perceptual dispositions in shaping orientations to acting in the world, 118 
 
 
and Bourdieu takes up this view of human agency in his account of social agency 
through his account of the ‘logic of practice’ (Taylor, 1995; Dreyfus, 2007). 
 
For Bourdieu, most of what  people do, most of the time involves ‘doxa’: tacitly 
enacted and largely unconscious activities that become habitual through repeated 
enactments, out of which a ‘practical sense’ of appropriate behaviour arises within 
a  given  social  context  (Bourdieu,  1990b,  66-67).    Doxic  forms  of  practice  allow 
similarly disposed actors to synchronise with each other, and for their exchanges to 
develop a rhythm and tempo that is central to the meaning of everyday interactions 
(Bourdieu, 1990b, 86-87).  The flow of conversation, reciprocal comportment of the 
body in interactions, and the length of utterances are all examples of how practices 
shape and are shaped by experiences of temporality  (1990b, 91).  In this view, 
coordination between actors in terms of how they synchronise with each other and 
develop  this  rhythm  and  tempo  is  shaped  by a  tacit  ‘feel for  the  game’,  which 
Bourdieu refers to as the ‘practical sense’, through which people learn to do the 
‘right thing, in the right way, at the right time’ (Bourdieu, 1990b, 82; Dreyfus, 2006).  
This intuitive sense of what must be done in order to go on in the world develops as 
the progressive result of encounters with wider social and cultural regularities in 
particular forms of life.  Bourdieu’s account of the logic of practice provides a useful 
starting point for framing social agency in AS people, precisely because many of the 
assumptions  in  this  model  are  problematised  by  AS-related  differences  in 119 
 
 
perception.  Given  these  differences,  how  then  might  we  use  this  account  of 
practice  as  a  way  of  understanding  the  impact  of  dispositional  differences  on 
orientations to sociality? 
3.1.2 – Perception and the ‘different logic’ – theorising the relationship between AS-
related differences and practice. 
 
One important difference in AS people’s terms of engagement with the social world 
has to do with the organisation of information in perception, involving a range of 
associated strengths and limitations.  For example, Murray et al. (2005) describe 
heightened attention to detail and issues with gestalt awareness in people on the 
autism spectrum as features of a ‘monotropic’ perceptual style.  This is where a 
person’s attention tends toward local, specific features of people or objects rather 
than the overall picture of a situation (Murray et al., 2005, 145-150).  Elsewhere, 
Mottron et al. observe that a key feature of the Autism spectrum is what they refer 
to as Enhanced Perceptual Functioning (EPF), supported by superior performance 
by autistic people in local processing of information vs. non-autistic controls (2006, 
39-40).  Baron-Cohen et al. (2009) have also argued that strong dispositions towards 
systematic ways of understanding and acting in the world are rooted in sensory 
hypersensitivity (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009, 1380).  While local processing and detail 
focused  attention  appear  to  be  dispositional  strengths  relating  to  the  autism 
spectrum, dealing with sudden change, ambiguity and making gestalt connections 
between  different  experiences  are  also  common  difficulties  (Bogdashina,  2003).  120 
 
 
This is significant because gestalt processing and intuitive understanding are central 
to Bourdieu’s understanding of how agents develop a ‘feel for the game’, and his 
emphasis on doxic forms of activity may therefore need to be adjusted in relation to 
AS people. 
 
Bourdieu’s  rejects  the  idea  that  human  sociality  operates  according  to  sets  of 
express rules, which can be understood in totality and stated explicitly by actors.  
He  argues  that  such  approaches  obscure  the  immediacy  of  social  life  and  the 
spontaneity  required  to  negotiate  emergent  nature  of  practical  exchanges 
(Bourdieu,  1990b,  86-87).    This  aspect  of  his  thought  reveals  the  influence  of 
Wittgenstein (1968), who argued that absolute reliance on express rules could not 
be the foundation for people’s use and understanding of language.  Wittgenstein 
claims that such a basis is implausible because it would require total understanding 
of  all  possible  conditions  for  application  of  a  particular  rule,  including  its 
relationship to all other rules (Bourdieu, 1990b, 9, 10, 18).  For each additional layer 
of conditions for application of the original rule, a new set of conditions would need 
to be added in order to understand their application, and so on, ad infinitum (Taylor, 
1995, 166-167).  Therefore, Wittgenstein’s conclusion is that at some point people 
must necessarily ‘stand’ on an incomplete, inarticulate sense or understanding of 
how to use language (1968, 211, 217). 121 
 
 
 
The implications of Wittgenstein’s argument for Bourdieu are that express rules, far 
from being the basis of human agency, can only emerge, be understood and provide 
guidance  for action  on the  basis  of  an  inarticulate, practical  grasp  of the  world 
which actors develop through experience (Bourdieu, 1990a, 9; Taylor, 1995).  In this 
view, express rules are ‘brought to life’ through practical activity and enacted within 
the broader context of embodied social ‘know how’ (Taylor, 1995, 178).  The phrase 
‘know  how’  here describes  a form  of  knowledge  which  is  tacit  and  intuitive, as 
distinct  from  knowing  that,  which  denotes  formal,  conceptual  knowledge  (Ryle, 
2000, 28-32).  Knowing that one should, for example, make eye contact with other 
people during conversation, is different from knowing how to perform this action; 
even where a set of express rules may be available for such a task, mere conceptual 
knowledge of these rules carries no guarantee of their successful enactment (Ryle, 
2000, 28-32).   
 
In Bourdieu’s thought, doxa are those forms of know-how that allow a person to 
coordinate socially with others, and to feel ‘at home’ in everyday social situations.  
Although these two ways of knowing are framed as common features of human 
activity, it is Bourdieu’s emphasis on doxa as a way of going on in the social world 122 
 
 
that  is  potentially  problematic  in  relation  to  AS  people.    Drawing  on  Garfinkel, 
Milton argues that: 
 
[Non-AS] [p]eople have a tendency to ‘fill in the gaps’ in their perception in 
order to gain what they think is a full or whole picture.  Due to differences in 
the way autistic people process information (whether it be monotropism, a 
weak drive toward central coherence, a lack of mirror neurons, or a lack of 
long-range connectivity in the brain), this ‘filling of gaps’ tends not to occur 
(at least to the same extent).  Autistic people have a tendency to be more 
literal, and work upon what is tangible and present, thus conclusions are 
reached through available information (without ‘filling in the gaps’) (Milton, 
2011). 
 
Given the findings of existing research, suggesting that everyday spaces can often 
remain unfamiliar despite repeated encounters (Davidson and Henderson, 2010b) 
and that AS people often have difficulties with ‘internalising’ social rules (Ryan and 
Räisänen, 2008,  137-139),  what  are the  implications  for  re-framing the  ‘logic  of 
practice’?   
 123 
 
 
What appears different about the ‘different logic’ (when compared to Bourdieu’s 
original doxic account of the ‘logic of practice’) is how AS people are disposed to 
understand, make sense of and act in relation to the everyday world, due to their 
different perceptual ‘terms of engagement’ with it.  For this reason, many everyday 
social and environmental situations that may be unproblematic for non-AS others 
represent  significant  challenges  for  AS  people.      While  this  helps  to  describe 
orientations to social practice, one also needs to appreciate the affect that this can 
have on the qualitative experience of everyday situations in terms of their affective 
significance.  While AS people may have difficulties in feeling ‘at home’ within some 
of the social and environmental situations of everyday life, this does not mean that 
AS lifeworlds consist only of challenges to ‘spatial and embodied coherence’.  For 
example,  Davidson  has  noted  strong  emotional  connections  to  the  physical 
environment, in particular feelings of ‘resonance’ and connection to elements of 
the natural world, in her analysis of AS women’s writing: 
 
Williams [an AS autobiographer]…experienced social pleasures in her own 
autistic world: ‘I was a social kid: social with the dirt, the trees, the grass . . . I 
felt the world deeply and passionately. I was cheerful in my own world and I 
had a fascination with anything that was not directly confrontational and 
which would allow me to simply be’  (Davidson, 2007, 668-670). 
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Differences in AS people’s perceptual terms of engagement with the world should 
therefore not be assumed to be pathological; rather, if we accept the underlying 
ontology  proposed  by  Merleau-Ponty,  perception  is  the  basis  upon  which 
connection to the world (sensory, practical, affective) becomes possible at all.  This 
has  ethical  significance  given,  as  Davidson  (2007,  and  elsewhere  Davidson  and 
Smith,  2009)  have  noted,  whether  or  not  a  person  can  freely  experience  these 
forms of connection (referred to as ‘autistic emotion’) has implications for wellbeing.  
Elsewhere, Hodge notes that investigations of different lifeworld experiences have 
the potential to guard against deficit focused descriptions or analyses by seeking to 
preserve  a  more  holistic  view  of  experience  (2007,  31-32),  and  this  will  be  
particularly significant in the exploration of understandings of dispositional self (in 
chapter five).  For now, I will briefly summarise the main arguments in this section. 
1.  Bourdieu’s idea of the ‘logic of practice’ is based on the development of 
habitual familiarity with everyday situations and environments, through an 
inarticulate ‘grasp’ rooted in the perceptual relationship that a person has 
with the world. 
 
2.  For  AS  people,  their  practical  ‘grasp’  of  the  everyday  situations  obeys  a 
‘different  logic’,  one  that  can  involve  a  variety  of  dispositions  towards 
sequential, rule-based ways of knowing, arising from different perceptual 125 
 
 
‘terms of engagement’ with the world.  This can affect not only the explicitly 
practical  business  of  coping  with  social  exchanges  and  environmental 
challenges, but also experiences of meaningful and affective connection. 
 
Thus far I have used Bourdieu’s concept of the ‘logic of practice’ to understand how 
differences in AS people’s perceptual terms of engagement with the world shape 
dispositions  towards  practical  coordination.    However,  social  activity  and  its 
implications  for  formations  of  identity  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  actions  of 
individuals, but need to be understood in intersubjective and wider social cultural 
contexts.    My  next  task  will  therefore  be  to  relate  the  preceding  discussion  to 
Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field and capital. 
 
3.2 – Framing self-other relations - Habitus as a ‘situated intersubjectivity’. 
 
 
While dispositions to act, as well as individual patterns of activity (whether habitual 
or  consciously  willed)  can  be  seen  as  properties  of  the  agent,  these  activities 
‘extend beyond agents’ predispositions’ to encompass the constraints and demands 
which shape and bring forth such activity (Bottero, 2010, 12).  For many AS people, 
what is not given to their experience of social life through lifeworld must often be 
understood in other ways, for example through express rules, which can result in 126 
 
 
‘asymmetry’ in the interactive styles of those engaged in joint practice (Ochs et al., 
2004, 173).  This asymmetry can lead to breaches in social coordination, both in the 
qualitative  content  of  interactions,  and  also  their  temporal  structure  (i.e.  the 
rhythm and flow of exchanges) (Ochs et al., 2004; Ochs and Solomon, 2007; Ochs 
and Solomon, 2010).  Bourdieu’s concept of habitus has been used previously in the 
work of Ochs and Solomon (2010), to explore these issues in terms of differences in 
dispositions towards spoken communication that shape parent (non-AS) / child (AS) 
interactions.  I argue that Bottero’s developmental critique of this concept can also 
help us understand not only how dispositions to act affect social coordination, but 
how the regularities of social coordination in given settings also shape dispositions 
to act and understandings of self.  I will begin by outlining the concept and its 
relationship to practice, before considering its relevance for present purposes. 
 
If the practical sense can be understood as an individual actor’s grasp of ‘what to 
do’, then habitus is that which connects personal understandings together at the 
intersubjective level.  Habitus is not a property of individuals but arises through 
exchanges between actors, which shape and are in turn shaped by dispositional 
understandings  of  context-appropriate  activity  (Bourdieu,  1990b,  53).    These 
produce what Bourdieu refers to as ‘systems of transposable, durable dispositions’ 
through which a shared sense of social regularities is created, not as a set of express 
rules, but as ‘generative principles’ for going on in the world (Bourdieu, 1990b, 52).  127 
 
 
For Bourdieu these ‘generative principles’ operate as ‘structured structures’ shaped 
by  the  meeting  of  actors  in  practical  exchanges  within  given  sets  of  social  and 
environmental  circumstances  (Bourdieu,  1990b,  53).    They  also  function  as 
‘structuring structures’ by providing means for social agents to engage in context-
appropriate activity through adaptable understandings (Bourdieu, 1990b, 53).  In 
this view, habitus does not involve a closed system of operations which one is able 
to predict, but rather consists of and produces general guidance for developing and 
amending social practices (Bourdieu, 1990b, 87).  However, Bottero argues that, 
rather than Bourdieu’s notion of habitus as a ‘socialised subjectivity’, it is more 
useful  to  think  in  terms  of  a  ‘situated  intersubjectivity’  ‘circumscribed  by  a 
particular cultural horizon’ (Bottero, 2010, 17).  In this view, a person’s sense of 
what  is  appropriate  and  ‘what  one  can  get  away  with’  are  produced  through 
exchange  within  particular  cultural  contexts  (Bottero,  2010,  16).    Thus  while 
individuals  may  have  personal  understandings  of  social  regularities  (i.e.  their 
practical  sense),  these  are  (Bottero  argues)  animated,  sustained  and  amended 
through social exchange, and as such habitus is neither separate from nor reducible 
to individual agents.   
 
In her critique of habitus, Bottero introduces two ideas which can help us frame 
how dispositional differences may constrain opportunities for social coordination 
between differently disposed actors.  Firstly, she argues that dispositions to act are 128 
 
 
always oriented and adjusted by ‘calls to order from the group’, or those engaged in 
joint practice, which involve expectations and influences of other actors in concrete 
networks (i.e. situated sets of relations between specific people) creating a space 
for indeterminate features of interaction such as ambivalence and irony to shape 
social relations (Bottero, 2010, 16).  This is significant for AS people because if social 
regularities are affirmed and negotiated through ironic or ambivalent exchanges 
then  the  ability  of  an  AS  person  to  understand  these  ‘calls’  may  be  limited.  
Secondly, Bottero argues that agents continually provide a ‘commentary’ on their 
activities  in  social  interaction,  whether  through  overt  statements  or  other  tacit 
forms  of  communication,  which  indicate  qualities  of  intention,  and  in  so  doing 
‘routinely expect and provide’ accountability as a basis for social coordination, but 
also for sustaining a shared sense of what they are likely to do in the future (Bottero, 
2010,  16).    ‘Calls  to  order’  are  therefore  not  about  enforcing  social  rules,  but 
signalling  demands  for  accountability.    In  a  general  sense,  this  means  being 
available to others through mutually understood means of interacting, so that a 
person is able to maintain a degree of connection with the ‘‘logic’ of what the other 
is  up  to,    and  what  they  are  likely  to  do  in  the  future’  (Bottero,  2010,  16).  
Accountability thus refers to the conditions of possibility for successful exchange 
between actors, but implies nothing of the practical forms which calls to order may 
take.   
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AS people’s dispositions toward sequential, rule-based ways of knowing may violate 
dispositional understandings of appropriate conduct which are consensual within 
majority non-AS groups by, for example, making explicit that which is understood as 
needing  to  pass  unspoken.    This  also  highlights  the  temporal  consequences  of 
dispositional differences in terms of coordination through habitus, but also opens 
up the potential for framing how these difficulties may be overcome practically.  
The  difference  between  knowing  how  and  knowing  that  is  significant  in  social 
relations, because the ‘logic’ of many practical encounters rests on the timing and 
coordination of responses.  If one’s dispositional  connection to habitus rests on 
knowing  how  rather  than  knowing  that,  then  this  can  put  the  person  at  a 
disadvantage in social situations where, for example, improvisation and spontaneity 
are required aspects of participation.  However, the ability of AS people to know 
that certain forms of practical exchange are going on around them that may be 
dispositionally difficult, even if they may not know how to participate, suggests that 
the possibility of renegotiating the practical demands of habitus may be one route 
to  successful  coordination  in  AS/non-AS  interactions.  Thus,  while  accountability 
may not be about ‘enforcing social rules’, more explicit forms of social exchange 
may enable better and more equitable conditions of accountability in exchanges 
between differently disposed actors (i.e.AS/non-AS).  Finding a way of connecting 
with differently disposed others in ways compatible with one’s own dispositions can 
thus be seen as an important challenge for AS people (Ryan and Räisänen, 2008); 130 
 
 
however, this possibility is mediated by the wider ‘cultural horizons’ which frame 
habitus being hospitable to such processes. 
 
3.3 – The ‘cultural horizon’ of fields and the relevance of capital forms. 
 
 
For Bourdieu, social fields are relational networks bought to life through practical 
exchanges between actors, or what he describes as ‘a network, or a configuration, 
of objective relations between positions…’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, 97).  For 
Bourdieu, the character of modern ‘highly differentiated’ societies is of a ‘social 
cosmos’  made  up  of  ‘relatively  autonomous  social  microcosms  which  contain 
specific logics that are irreducible to other fields’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, 
97).   For example, online forums, pubs, family homes and places of worship are all 
imbued with regimes of practical social and cultural exchange – how to speak, how 
to  dress,  what  to  say,  regimes  of  bodily  comportment,  and  so  on.    Following 
Bourdieu’s analogy of the social as a game, we may understand the concept of field 
as follows: if the practical sense is an understanding of how to play, and habitus 
denotes agents’ shared understanding of the regularities which shape the game, 
then  fields  are  structuring  horizons  that  define  the  limits  of  play.  Fields  thus 
provide the ‘cultural horizons’ for specific interactions.  This does however leave out 131 
 
 
one  crucial  component  –  what  is  played  with?  To  answer  this  one  needs  to 
understand how Bourdieu conceptualises the ‘stakes’ of the field as forms of capital. 
 
In Bourdieu’s view what defines a field is not any regime of social regularities (this 
belongs to habitus) but rather what is at ‘stake’ in it (Jenkins, 1992, 85).  Fields are 
relational  networks  within  which  social  resources  -  for  example,  educational 
qualifications, prestige, and/or economic resources – are negotiated, contested and 
actualised in social life (Jenkins, 1992, 85).  Bourdieu frames these resources as 
forms of capital where, in addition to economic capital, he conceptualises two other 
value  forms.    Social  capital  refers  to  the  strength,  range  and  number  of  social 
relationships  which  a  person  has,  through  which  they  may  be  able  to  access 
collectively  held  resources  and  partake  of  the  ‘credit’  to  which  the  relationship 
entitles them (Bourdieu, 1986, 51).  Access to information, economic resources, and 
introductions to disparate others are all examples of how one’s social capital can be 
actualised in the exchange and accrual of different social resources.   
 
Another type of resource is cultural capital, which in Bourdieu’s schema can take 
three forms. The embodied, which refers to ‘long-lasting dispositions of mind and 
body’ that have value and utility for the bearer within particular social fields, for 
example, knowing  how to speak or act in particular interactions (Bourdieu, 1986, 132 
 
 
47-48).  The objectified form, which inheres in material objects, for example, as art 
works, books, instruments or technical apparatus, items that confer value upon the 
owner or bearer in particular cultural contexts (Bourdieu, 1986, 50).  The value of 
this resource lies not in legal ownership of an object but by awareness of its cultural 
value and understanding  how  this  may  be  actualised  in  social  situations.   Mere 
possession  of  a  painting,  for  example,  does  not  actualise  its  value  as  capital; 
however,  discussing  it  with  guests  in  one’s  home  may  do  so  if  the  cultural 
conditions are appropriate (i.e. that the guests accept the value of the painting as a 
marker of taste or status).  Finally institutional cultural capital refers to a form of 
value that inheres in attachment of the bearer to a particular social institution, 
complete with the historical lineage as well as the social and legal guarantees of 
competence that this involves (Bourdieu, 1986, 50-51).  For example, an academic 
qualification in the form of a certificate may constitute a form of objectified capital, 
but it also links the bearer to the life and history of an institution, the legacy of 
which may confer particular forms of value. 
 
Bourdieu’s notions of field and capital allow for an appreciation of some of the 
wider  conditions  which  shape  AS people’s  experiences  of  social  life beyond the 
dispositional and intersubjective.  In social fields, what is crucial to the operation of 
the symbolic economy (i.e. what social and cultural capital forms are worth and 
how they may be actualised) are degrees of understanding and acceptance of the 133 
 
 
value  of  what  is  at  stake.    Just  as  habitus  requires  a  degree  of  dispositional 
alignment  in  practical  understanding  of  how  one  should  act  within  a  particular 
exchange,  so the  life  of  fields requires  a  sense  of the  significance  and  value  of 
different resources within the network of relations that constitute them.    Once 
again,  if  these  forms  of  value  and  their  actualisation  involve  tacit,  unspoken  or 
ambivalent performances then the ability of an AS person to participate in the social 
life of fields, and to access potential resources therein, may be limited.  This is 
significant  not  only  for  participation  but  also  for  understanding  relations  of 
domination and power, where the ability of the AS person to accrue and actualise 
different  symbolic  resources  may  be  meidated  by  dispositional  differences  in 
understanding the symbolic economies at play within different fields.  The potential 
for inclusion on the basis of appropriate practical conditions, and the practical and 
social conditions that make this possible, is something which Bourdieu’s account of 
reflexivity can help explore. 
 
3.3 – Reflexivity as a disposition. 
 
 
In phenomenological terms, reflexivity can be understood as a type of intentional 
activity in which a person ‘stands back’ from taken-for-granted experience, in order 
to  re-encounter  in  a  more  circumspect  fashion  that  which  otherwise  passes 134 
 
 
unquestioned in everyday experience.  This is something which also needs to be 
understood through  Bourdieu’s  ideas  of domination.    For  Bourdieu, relations of 
domination – of a particular individual, social/ethnic/religious group, or gender – 
are made possible not only through violent oppression, but through control of the 
conditionings  of  habitus  which  shape  the  practical  senses  of  actors  (Bourdieu, 
1990b, 128-131).  What is acceptable, what one should do in a given situation, and 
what  one  ‘can  get  away  with’,  are  all  understandings  which  shape  relations 
between actors, and that therefore have the potential to privilege actions that serve 
the interests of particular individuals, groups or institutions and/or to suppress or 
exclude those of others (Bottero, 2010, 17).  These forms of domination do not 
require  conscious  projects  of oppressive  activity,  but  can  result  from and/or be 
sustained  by  the  tacit  everyday  activities  of  actors  occupying  unequal  social 
positions (for example, being a non-AS person in an exchange with an AS person, 
where the practical sense of the former reflects the dominant habitus).  
 
Reflexive  consideration  of  what  is  tacitly  accepted  in  the  practical  sense,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
in habitus or within the cultural horizons of social fields offers human beings the 
potential  to  resist  these  forms  of  domination,  and/or  to  see  how  they  are 
implicated  in  one’s  own  practices  and  understandings  of  cultural  regularities.  
Reflexivity is for Bourdieu the ‘margin of freedom’ which occupies a figurative space 135 
 
 
between doxic experiences and the regularities of habitus which shape them (von 
Holdt,  2010,  1).    This  brings  to  our  attention  two  important  issues  regarding 
reflexivity, firstly its centrality to negotiating social relations for many AS people, 
and  secondly  its  value  as  a  potential  route  to  overcome  social  exclusion  by 
renegotiating the practical conditions of exchange with differently disposed others.  
If, as I have argued thus far, AS people are often rely on express rules as means for 
understanding that which is not given intuitively in social interactions, then this 
would also imply that reflexivity may be a normative, rather than exceptional, way 
of interacting with the world for people in this category.  The idea of reflexivity 
becoming  dispositional  under  certain  circumstances  for  non-AS  people  more 
generally has also been proposed elsewhere by Sweetman (2003); however, I argue 
that  this  has  special  relevance  for  AS  people  given  differences  in  dispositions 
towards social interactions. As discussed in chapter two, being AS in a largely non-
AS world can involve the need to be aware constantly of life ‘over there’ in the non-
AS  world,  and  for  ‘constant  vigilance’  (Ryan  and  Räisänen,  2008)  in  the  face  of 
persistent  challenges  to  social  as  well  as  ‘spatial  and  embodied  coherence’ 
(Davidson  and  Henderson,  2010b).    However,  it  can  also  involve  feelings  of 
attachment  and  resonance  with  aspects  of  the  world  that  others  may  take  for 
granted or experience as mundane (Davidson and Smith, 2009), as well as strengths 
associated with detail focused attention (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009; Mottron et al., 
2007).    What  cannot  be  achieved  through  doxic  activity  must  be  dealt  with 136 
 
 
reflexively, and this is significant for understanding AS people’s dispositions not as a 
uniform ‘absence’ of sociality, but part of a wider continuum. 
 
Bourdieu’s framework provides a useful set of ‘thinking tools’ for exploring how 
dispositional,  intersubjective  and  wider  cultural  aspects  are  implicated  in  the 
formation of social experiences.  Having set out these concepts and discussed their 
relevance to AS people, my task is now to explain how they inform the approach to 
identity used in this investigation.   
 
3.4 – Framing a neo-Bourdieusian approach to identity 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter (2.1.2), identity has been a significant focus of 
social  scientific  research  relating  to  AS  people;  however,  the  majority  of  these 
studies have focused on the conscious construction of identity and presentations of 
self as reflexive projects either in online discussion groups, forums and blogs (Jones 
and Meldal, 2001; Brownlow et al., 2006; Clarke and van Amerom, 2007; Clarke and 
van  Amerom,  2008;  Brownlow,  2010b;  Brownlow,  2010a),  or  in  co-present 
exchanges with non-AS others (Bagatell, 2007; Huws and Jones, 2008; Madriaga et 
al., 2008; Ryan and Räisänen, 2008; Bagatell, 2010; Madriaga, 2010), both of which 
have centred around the negotiation of the diagnostic label.  Existing approaches 137 
 
 
present two important theoretical gaps which need to be addressed; firstly, with 
respect to the need for a broader perspective on identity beyond the diagnosis itself, 
and secondly, how one might go beyond purely reflexive experiences of identity to 
explore relationships with other aspects of self.  This something which Bottero’s 
approach  can  help  provide,  by  connecting  an  account  of  identity  with  the 
perspective on social agency already established thus far. 
 
Bottero’s approach involves three different aspects of self.  Dispositional identities, 
which  are  those  ‘expressed  through  implicit  modes  of  being’  rooted  in  agents’ 
taken-for-granted  and  dispositionally  conditioned  ways  of  acting  in  the  world 
(Bottero,  2010,  20),  reflexive  identities  that  refer  to  those  which  are  explicitly 
affirmed and expressed through conscious identifications  (Bottero, 2010, 4), and 
collective identities relating to those which arise in the behaviour and mobilizations 
of groups of actors (2010, 7).  Dispositionality and reflexivity are here not framed as 
binary oppositions, but as conceptual poles between which much ‘slippage’ may be 
present (Bottero, 2010, 10). In this view, a person may have ‘multiple reflections’ 
upon ‘multiple dispositions’, and that may in turn be shaped by their position within 
particular social groups and wider fields (Bottero, 2010, 10).  In this way, Bottero 
seeks to preserve the advantages of a Bourdieusian approach to identity in terms of 
going beyond purely positional or constructivist notions of self, while retaining a 
critical  awareness  of  his  tendency  to  emphasise  homogeneity  and  reproduction 138 
 
 
over difference and diversity (Bottero, 2010, 10).  Bottero’s schema helps frame 
different  aspects  of  identity  as  objects  of  analysis,  while  the  Bourdieusian 
framework provides ‘thinking tools’ for exploring the social and cultural aspects of 
pre-diagnostic formation.  In addition, it is also important to recognise that just as 
different  aspects  of  self  (dispositional,  reflexive  and  collective)  may  interact  in 
formations of identity, so too may qualitative aspects of self. 
 
In the work of Molloy and Vasil (2004 – discussed in 2.1.2), it was noted that as the 
AS teenagers in their study grew older, and began to deal with other aspects of 
identity beyond their AS labels (such as political and sexual identities), that these 
processes affected both their overall sense of self and experiences of ‘having’ AS 
(Molloy and Vasil, 2004, 124).  This illustrates the significance of intersectionality as 
a component of identity formation (McCall, 2005, 1775-1778).  Intersectionality is a 
nebulous term, with multiple theoretical interpretations  that have been used to 
explore and conceptualise relations between different aspects of identity, and also 
contestation and difference within social groups who claim a similar identity (McCall, 
2005,  1771-1772).    Here,  I  adopt  what  McCall  refers  to  as  an  intercategorical 
understanding  of  intersectionality,  which  involves  examining  how  AS  people’s 
existing aspects of identity combine in different situations and at different points of 
life (McCall, 2005, 1785).  For example, we have already seen how the categorical 
aspects of AS and gendered selves were significant for women in the support group 139 
 
 
observed  by  Faherty  (2006,  12  -  discussed  in  2.1.2),  where  management  of  AS 
identity  was  linked  to  understandings  of  prevailing  gender  norms,  and  also 
management  of  everyday  insecurities  relating  to  unwanted  sexual  attention.  
Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that different qualitative aspects of self 
may  interact,  in  addition  to  the  dispositional,  reflexive  and  collective  elements 
identified by Bottero.  Concerns expressed by AS women around being made to ‘fit 
in’ with prevailing gender norms that force them to adopt what are often confusing 
and dispositionally inappropriate performances in everyday interactions, leads us to 
the  final  aspect  of  my  theoretical  framework,  the  interrelated  concepts  of 
authenticity, accountability and legitimacy.   
 
These  concepts  will  be  used  to  frame  particular  sets  of  issues  that  emerge  in 
negotiation of pre-diagnostic identities, and will be developed further as I move 
through the analysis in chapters five, six and seven.  However, for the purpose of 
clarity I will introduce them briefly here.  Authenticity is a term that I use to refer to 
dispositionally appropriate ways of understanding, experiencing and acting in the 
world compatible with the forms of ‘autistic emotion’ identified by Davidson and 
Smith (2009).  The ability to experience ways of being that feel authentic is often 
crucial  to  wellbeing,  and  conversely  can  be  restricted  by  unfavourable  social 
conditions in which a person is compelled to ‘pass’ as non-autistic or otherwise 
engage in dispositionally appropriate ways of being (Davidson, 2010; Milton, 2012; 140 
 
 
Milton and Moon, 2012).  This is significant because one’s sense of dispositional 
identity,  and  also  their  wellbeing,  may  depend  on  their  ability  to  access 
dispositionally appropriate ways of being (this theme will be discussed further in 
chapter five).    Accountability has already been defined (in 3.2) as the conditions of 
possibility  for  successful  exchange  between  actors,  maintained  through  ‘calls  to 
order’ (Bottero, 2010).  It has also been indicated as an issue with respect to the 
‘double burden’ of living with an undiagnosed condition, where a person may be 
unable  to  account  for  their  difficulties  as  demanded  by  the  dominant  habitus 
(Nettleton, 2006 - see section 2.1.3).  However, as I will argue (beginning in chapter 
five), accountability has special relevance for formations of pre-diagnostic identity 
not only due to practical difficulties in understanding implicit calls to order, but not 
understanding  why  these  issues  arise.    One  important  feature  of  life  without  a 
diagnosis is that one may not able to account for their differences and thus make 
claims  of  others  for  renegotiation  of  the  practical  conduct  of  problematic 
interactions.  The quality of accountability relations, particularly those that involve 
unequal  relations  of  power,  can  mediate  a  person’s  ability  to  experience 
dispositionally appropriate (and authentic) ways of being, and also influence how 
these are understood in relation to the self (this will be discussed in chapters five 
and six).  This leads to the issue of legitimacy, which refers to reflexive judgement as 
to  whether  or  not  the  way  a  person  acts  in  the  social  world  is  understood 
appropriate and acceptable, and this can refer to oneself as well as others (i.e. the 141 
 
 
way  that  people  view  the  actions  of  an  AS  person,  or  how  the  AS  person 
understands  either  their  own  actions  and/or  those  of  others)  (Milton,  2011).  
Legitimacy can thus be something that is conferred upon (or denied to) the AS 
person by others or themselves, with implications for formations of identity and for 
wellbeing. These concepts overlap and interplay with each other in a range of ways 
in  negotiation  of  pre-diagnostic  identity,  and  this  will  be expanded  upon  in the 
analysis (chapters five, six and seven). 
 
3.5 - Summary 
 
In the previous chapter, I set out the questions that frame my investigation; my 
objective in this chapter has been to set out my theoretical approach.  Identity 
remains a contested concept within sociology, with a range of approaches to its 
study, and I have argued that Bourdieusian theory offers a useful perspective for 
situating dispositional orientations to social life relative to intersubjective and wider 
cultural facts that shape and are shaped by them. Beginning with the relationship 
between perception and practice, I have argued that Bourdieu’s framework can 
help  go  beyond  individual  accounts  of  social  experience  by  connecting  the 
dispositional  with  intersubjective  and  wider  cultural  aspects  of  pre-diagnostic 
experience.    This  approach  informs  Bottero’s  approach  to  framing  identity  as 
involving dispositional, reflexive and collective aspects of self which, in addition to 142 
 
 
an intercategorical intersectionality perspective, can help explore formations of pre-
diagnostic  identity.    Finally,  I  have  introduced  the  idea  that  authenticity, 
accountability  and  legitimacy  represent  a  set  of  related  concepts  that  can  help 
frame issues arising from my analysis (these concepts will be discussed later in the 
analytical  chapters).    Having  set  out  my  conceptual  approach  to  exploring 
formations of pre-diagnostic identity, my final task in part one will be to explain the 
methodological  design  of  the  project,  how  sources  of  empirical  material  were 
selected and analysed, and how these analyses were organised into the discussion 
in part two. 
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4 – Exploring pre-diagnostic identities through life stories. 
 
 
Existing  research  has  explored  the  lives  of  AS  people  through  a  range  of 
methodological  approaches  and  analytical  frameworks.    In  this  thesis,  I  have 
adopted  an  approach  based  on  life  story  analysis  using  autobiographical 
monographs as sources, the rationale for which will be discussed in this chapter.  
Firstly, I will discuss the value and limits of existing methodological approaches, and 
my decision to adopt a life story approach using autobiographies.  Secondly, I will 
describe  the  process  by  which  the  specific  autobiographies  were  identified  and 
selected;  thirdly,  I  will  describe  how  the  autobiographies  were  analysed  and 
discussed in relation to the questions, and discuss interpretative issues in relation to 
this.  Finally, I will introduce each of the autobiographers and give a summary of 
their contributions to the discussion that will follow in part two.   
4.1 – Rationale for a Life Story approach 
 
My aim in this thesis is to explore the pre-diagnostic identities of AS adults.  As 
indicated in the previous chapter, identities and the social conditions in which they 
emerge are not fixed, and may change over the life course in response to different 
life events (Molloy and Vasil, 2004).  Therefore, the approach that I have taken is 
one that looks to explore these questions biographically across the pre-diagnostic 
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existing approaches before outlining my decision to take a life story approach using 
autobiographies. 
4.1.1 – Comparative life story analysis 
 
 
Existing studies in social science have drawn on a range of data sources in order to 
explore  the  lives  of  AS  people  including  semi-structured  interviews  (Molloy  and 
Vasil,  2004;  Jennes-Coussens  et  al.,  2006;  Ryan  and  Räisänen,  2008;  Madriaga, 
2010; Singh, 2011) as well as co-present (Ochs et al., 2004; Sirota, 2004; Bagatell, 
2007; Ochs and Solomon, 2010; Rosqvist, 2012) and online ethnography (Jones and 
Meldal, 2001; Brownlow et al., 2006; Clarke and van Amerom, 2007; Brownlow, 
2010b).  All  of  the  aforementioned  approaches  have  made  use  of  interesting 
empirical  material  through  which  authors  have  been  able  to  develop  new 
perspectives on AS people’s lives in a variety of contexts.  However, many of these 
(with the exception of Molloy and Vasil, 2004) have taken either entirely synchronic 
approaches in order to explore specific themes through cross-sectional analysis, or 
taken place within a restricted time frame (for example, three months in the case of 
Bagatell, 2007; and a year for Madriaga, 2010).  Given that, as existing research has 
shown,  AS  people’s  identities  are  changeable  relative  to  variations  in  the 
environments and situations of their lives (Molloy and Vasil, 2004; Bagatell, 2007), a 
diachronic approach appears appropriate.  The question now before us is: which 
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by assessing the strengths and limitations of existing approaches, before setting out 
my case for a life story approach. 
 
Ethnography involves contemporaneous observation of specific people or groups 
over  a  period  of  time,  and  is  therefore  impractical  for  exploring  pre-diagnostic 
experiences from a biographical point of view (Mason, 2002).  In the case of semi-
structured  interviews,  while  it  may  be  possible  to  obtain  relevant  material,  the 
biographical range and qualitative depth of the material may be limited by practical 
and ethical constraints involved in researching AS people’s lives.  This approach 
relies  to  a  large  degree  on  the  interaction  between  researcher  and  participant 
evolving over the course of the encounter, where a researcher’s questioning may be 
guided by core themes, but they are free to explore other aspects of the research 
topic with the interviewee (Mason, 2002; Hammersley, 2008).  This may be a fruitful 
approach, so long as the practical dispositions of researcher and participant share 
some synchronisation in habitus, something which cannot be presumed in the case 
of AS people.  For example, Ryan and Räisänen (2008) have noted the limitations of 
the  semi-structured  interview  method  for  participants  in  their  study,  who  were 
resistant  to  open  questions  and  requested  a  more  formal  question-and-answer 
format (Ryan and Räisänen, 2008, 137).  Thus the ability to explore life stories in 
detail within this format may be constrained by practical issues, especially given the 
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This method also presents ethical issues for this type of study, for the rendering of 
life  events  in  the  breadth  and  level  of  detail  needed  in  order  to  explore  pre-
diagnostic  identities  within  a  biographical  frame  would  require  a  considerable 
commitment by participants, both in terms of time and the potential breadth of 
issues to be explored (Silverman, 2008, 337).  Reflective research always carries an 
element of risk, and as the space for reflection (i.e. the range and depth of what is 
explored) increases so may the potential hazards in terms of mental and emotional 
distress (Merrill and West, 2009, 175).  This is a particular concern in the case of 
people who are already indicated to be at risk across a range of different aspects of 
wellbeing  (Rosenblatt,  2008,  2;  Silverman,  2008,  336-337;  Allard,  2009,  5-12).  
Therefore,  both  ethnography  and  semi-structured  interviews  were  deemed 
unsuitable. 
 
The  method  which  I  chose  to  adopt  was  life  story  analysis,  drawing  on  the 
productive  application  of  this  method  in  Molloy  and  Vasil’s  (2004)  work  on  AS, 
adolescence and identity.  This was used to explore the lives of six AS adolescents in 
terms of the relationship between their experience of ‘having’ AS and other aspects 
of  identity.    As  indicated  in  chapter  two  (2.1.2),  their  work  indicates  that  the 
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change over time, something highlighted by their biographical approach  (Molloy 
and  Vasil,  2004).  Their  approach  draws  on  the  work  of  Goodley  (2000),  who 
describes a life story as: 
 
[T]he  product  of  the  reminiscences  of  one  narrator  that  are  structured 
together chronologically or thematically in a storied fashion.  The life story 
relies on the accounts of a primary narrator…[and] can be written or told to 
others who collaborate in writing (Goodley, 2000, 48). 
 
Molloy and Vasil (2004) contrast life stories with clinical ‘case histories’.  In this view, 
investigations  of  the  latter  type  attempt  to  produce  a  ‘report  of  behaviours  or 
actions’ with little reference to their subjective rationale or meaningful significance 
for the person, and present these observations as the objective ‘truth’, used by 
professionals to determine appropriate types of ‘treatment’ (Molloy and Vasil, 2004, 
158).  Life story approaches, by contrast, explore how the world is experienced and 
dealt with not only practically but also meaningfully (Molloy and Vasil, 2004, 158).  
Life  histories  invite  readers  to  explore  personal  experiences  of  everyday  life, 
including the abstract aspects of meaningful and affective connection that are not 
readily  given  in  reports  of  observed  behaviour  (Goodley,  2000).    Part  of  the 
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identified in existing literature has been in terms of the ‘different logic[s]’ (Ryan and 
Räisänen, 2008) of actors in social coordination.  Furthermore, it has been noted 
that while AS people are often very aware of life ‘over there’ in the non-AS world, 
this  understanding  is  often  not  reciprocated  (Ryan  and  Räisänen,  2008).    As 
Pellicano writes: 
 
More  often  than  not,  the  onus  is  on  the  autistic  person to  meet  the 
demands of others...Rarely, however, are the expectations reversed, where 
the onus is instead on the non-autistic social partner to engage with the 
autistic person via his or her unique modes of communication and ways of 
interacting.  Exchanges  with  autistic  people  are  therefore  often  largely 
asymmetric – you could even say unequal – in nature (Pellicano, 2013, 131). 
 
One important epistemological strength of life stories is that they offer access to 
‘hidden  spheres’  (Thompson,  2008, 20),  not  only  in terms of  internal subjective 
experiences (e.g. emotions, thoughts etc.), but also to the more private fields of the 
social world (e.g. the family home).  In the case of AS people this is valuable because 
readers are invited to explore what may be hitherto unfamiliar experiences, and to 
glimpse (however partially) into the ‘logic’ of observable behaviours, offering new 
opportunities  for  practical  coordination.    In  so  doing,  they  help  to  ‘circumvent 149 
 
 
biomedical  check  points’  (Davidson  and  Henderson,  2010b,  462)  and  offer  the 
possibility of seeing differences as rooted in meaningful and valid experiences of 
being  in  the  world,  rather  than  automatically  classifying  them  as  ‘bizarre’  or 
‘strange’ (Davidson and Henderson, 2010b, 462), and/or as evidence of deviance or 
pathology (Molloy and Vasil, 2004).  In terms of the present project, this also applies 
to understanding the challenges faced by AS people in pre-diagnostic life, in terms 
of how they come to understand and negotiate different aspects of their identity.  
Having set out my rationale for adopting a life story approach, I will now discuss the 
source of empirical material used in this study, autobiographies, in terms of their 
suitability for exploring pre-diagnostic identities. 
 
 
4.1.2 – Autobiographical monographs as sources of material for life story 
investigation. 
 
Autobiographical writing has been significant in changing public understandings of 
Autistic  people  and  their  experiences,  in  particular  by  challenging  overly 
deterministic  or  categorical      representations  (i.e.  based  around  narrow 
interpretations of diagnostic criteria).  As Shore writes: 
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These  stories  of  disclosure  began  to  move  the  societal  construct  of  the 
person on the autism spectrum from the nonverbal, antisocial, self-abusive 
child  flapping  his  hands  in  the  corner  of  the  room  to  somebody  who  is 
capable of contributing to society (Shore, 2001, 137). 
 
Elsewhere, Hacking (2009) has noted the effect that autobiographical materials can 
have not only on representations of individual people, but on the wider processes 
through which the language in which Autistic experiences and people are framed as 
discussed  is  formed.    Here,  he  points  to  how  autobiography  has  enriched  both 
conceptual  understanding  of  autism,  and  the  language  through  which  it  is 
discussed: 
 
Different  kinds  of  item  influence  each  other  in  complex  ways.  Novelists 
study autobiographies, whose authors learn from theorists. Parents pick up 
ideas from novels when they are thinking about their children. We all watch 
movies and documentaries. A ‘thick’ kind of human being is coming into 
being, where once there was only a ‘thin’ one. The autistic thin man of yore, 
or  rather  the  thin  child,  when  not  having  a  tantrum,  was  a  silent  self-
absorbed creature, alone with bizarre habits (Hacking, 2009, 1467). 
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As  indicated  in  chapter  two,  autobiographical  monographs  have  been  used 
productively as sources of empirical material in previous social scientific research on 
the  experiences  of  AS  people.  For  example,  Davidson  et  al.  have  used  them  to 
explore experiences of spatial access, gender identities, and affective connections 
with environments (Davidson, 2007; Davidson, 2008;  Davidson and Smith, 2009; 
Davidson, 2010; Davidson and Henderson, 2010a; Davidson and Henderson, 2010b).  
Engaging with self-authored life narratives also offers a perspective on subjective 
experience, offering the kind of phenomenological detail  (including affective forms 
of connection) (Davidson and Smith, 2009) that is often obscured in observations of 
behaviour or clinical case reports: 
 
While autistic behaviour may seem strange when viewed from the outside… 
it makes a perfect kind of sense when seen in the context of the perceptually 
overwhelming  life-worlds...Through  close  reading  of  their  own  words,  it 
becomes  clear  that  ASD  ‘symptoms’  are  often  necessary  tactics  for 
emotional  or  environmental  protection,  and  perhaps  even  survival.  Such 
behavioural  differences  can  therefore  be  more  faithfully  understood  as 
inherently meaningful (Davidson, 2010, 307). 
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The ‘thick’ people who come into view through autobiographical accounts are those 
whose voice has largely been silenced in accounts of AS based upon clinical case 
histories (Waltz, 2005).  As Waltz observes, ‘people with autism are denied primacy, 
and even agency, in all but the least-mediated personal texts’, a description that 
indicates the value of autobiographical texts as sources (2005, 432).  As I observed 
in chapter two (2.1.1), in some social scientific studies that have engaged with the 
qualitative experiences of AS people, researchers have framed these in terms of 
pre-determined indicators or assumptions in relation to areas of wellbeing, without 
exploring  their  congruence  with  the  subjective  experiences  and  preferences  of 
participants.  Attention to narratives over which the AS person has the majority of 
control thus offers the opportunity to explore formations of pre-diagnostic identity, 
and their relationship to wellbeing. 
 
While  Davidson  and  colleagues  have  explored  these  texts  hitherto  through 
synchronic,  cross-sectional  approaches,  I  argue  that  they  also  provide  suitable 
material for the type of diachronic life story work undertaken by Molloy and Vasil 
(2004).    In  their  exploration  of  risks  associated  with  ‘having’  AS,  Portway  and 
Johnson  (2005)  suggest  that  undiagnosed  AS  people  were  by  definition 
‘inaccessible’ to their study.  This may be true in terms of immediate person-to-
person access; however, this does not mean that pre-diagnostic life is entirely ‘lost’ 
or  unavailable  for  exploration.    Reflective  materials  can  offer  insights  into  pre-153 
 
 
diagnostic experiences, and autobiographical narratives represent what appear to 
be the only publicly available sources of qualitative material for an investigation of 
this  type.    In  the  course  of  developing  my  methodological  approach,  I  made 
enquiries at the British Library, the British Archives, the Economic and Social Data 
Service (ESDS) Qualidata Archive, the Autism Diagnostic and Research Centre (ADRC, 
Southampton), the National Autistic Society (NAS) Research Autism database and 
the Autism Research Centre (ARC, Cambridge), none of which held, or could provide 
information  on  ways  of  obtaining  relevant  material.    However,  there  are  also 
practical, ethical and qualitative advantages to their use. 
 
From a practical perspective, the process of autobiographical writing appears to 
mediate some of the difficulties in generating qualitative data through methods 
that  rely  on  spontaneous  and/or  emergent  processes  such  as  semi-structured 
interviews.  For example, Davidson has observed that this may be for some the only 
way  in  which detailed  information about  life experiences  can  be  communicated 
effectively, and appears a practically appropriate way for people in this group to 
give  accounts  of  their  lives  (2007,  662).    Autobiographical  writing  appears 
compatible with many AS people because it gives the author time and space to 
order their reflections in narrative, and to produce an account of life experience in 
conditions favourable to their practical dispositions (Davidson, 2007, 663).  It is also 
a process over which the author has a large measure of control, both in terms of the 154 
 
 
practicalities of production and also over what is rendered in narrative, something 
that  helps  mediate  the  potential  hazard  of  unforeseen  emotional  and  mental 
distress emerging during semi-structured interviews (Waltz, 2005, 432-433; Merrill 
and West, 2009).   
 
There are also questions regarding the status of AS people’s narratives within the 
wider body of research literature.  As Silverman observes, the voices of AS people 
have  historically  been  excluded  in  the  production  of  knowledge  on  autism, 
something which has contributed to a homogenised view of AS-related experiences 
that have been challenged by authors on the spectrum (Silverman, 2008, 328-330; 
Milton and Moon, 2012; Milton, 2012).  For example, the centrality of sensory and 
perceptual issues has only come to prominence in clinical literature in the last five 
to ten years, despite its clear presence in the published narratives of AS people over 
a much longer period (Bogdashina, 2001, 1).  This is indicative of a comparative lack 
of both biographically informed knowledge and research attention paid to the lives 
of adults (Davidson, 2007, 659).  Autobiographies therefore represent a source of 
material that is appropriate for life story investigation, and for exploring formations 
of identity over broad periods of life.   
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Autobiographies (as with all sources of empirical material) have limits in terms of 
their epistemological value, something that is noted in existing literature and needs 
to  be  acknowledged  here  (Davidson  and  Smith,  2009).    One  limitation  is  the 
particular  quality  of  diachronicity  offered  by  the  narrative,  in  that  while  they 
contain accounts of specific events across broad periods of life, the level of detail 
cannot  be  expected  to  be  the  same  as  more  contemporaneous  methods  of 
recording, such as co-present ethnographic observation.  Autobiographies involve 
recollections of life events which are then re-presented as a storied sense of self in 
narrative  (Erben,  1998,  13).    They  can  be  thought  of  as  ‘situated  knowledges’, 
meaning  that  the  texts  are  ‘produced  in  specific  circumstances  and  that  those 
circumstances shape [them] in some way’ (Rose, 1997, 305).  For the researcher, 
these are contingencies to which one can only have partial access through ‘traces’ – 
fragments of past events and experiences which are then re-presented (Erben, 1993, 
19)  These traces relate not only to life experiences, but also the epistemological 
status of the material produced in terms of how it has been shaped by processes 
and conditions of production (Erben, 1998).  Beyond the fact that all first person 
accounts  are  necessarily  situated  perspectives,  rather  than  omniscient 
representations of events, there are other contingencies to consider in relation to 
the limits of autobiographies in terms of the selection, rendering, and ordering of 
life events. 
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Selection  of  life  events  first  implies  memory,  for  what  one  is  able  to  select  is 
dependent upon remembrance of it (Stanley, 1993; Erben, 1998).  Events in the 
distant past may have fallen from memory, been neglected or, particularly in the 
case of traumatic experiences, have been suppressed or intentionally left out of the 
narrative (Thompson, 2008, 24).  What is recollected can also be influenced by the 
mode of remembering, or the practical processes  through which life events are 
recalled and objectified (Erben, 1998; Goodley, 2000).  What a person remembers 
can be influenced by the reasons for remembering, and as such recollected events 
can be influenced by the period of life or themes of experience that structure these 
processes (Scott, 1998).  These are limitations of which one can have only partial 
knowledge, perhaps through traces in the text where an author indicates that an 
event has been left out, or through internal inconsistencies or disputations arising 
from external sources (Stanley, 1993).  Finally, the ordering of life events relates to 
the  narrative  structure  of  autobiographies,  something  which  may  not  follow 
chronology, but at times necessarily violate it (Erben, 1998).  How an author orders 
what is selected will depend upon the type of narrative one wishes to provide, and 
the points of life that they wish to emphasise.  This does not automatically imply 
distortion  or  untruth,  but  recognises  the  status  of  autobiographies  as  re-
presentations  of  self,  situated  at  a particular point  in  time.    Having  set  out  my 
rationale  for  using  autobiographies  as  sources  of  empirical  material,  I  will  now 157 
 
 
discuss my approach to analysis, and in particular how positional, interpretive and 
ethical issues were managed. 
 
4.2 – Investigating the monographs: interpretative, ethical and analytical 
approach 
 
4.2.1 – Positional concerns and reflexive practice 
 
Having set out some of the ethical advantages of using autobiographies over other 
sources  of  empirical  material,  it  is  important  to  discuss  some  of  the  potential 
hazards  of  using  these  materials,  and  how  they  were  managed  in  the  research 
process.  One of these relates to the re-presentation by a non-autistic author of life 
stories,  which  can  be  framed  using  Sinclair’s  concept  of  the  ‘self-narrating  zoo 
exhibit’.  This term was coined in 1994, to refer to how Autistic people are routinely 
used by non-AS people (primarily clinicians and professionals) in conferences or 
publications, typically in an attempt to show ‘Autism from the inside’ (Sinclair, 2005).  
However,  this  often  constitutes  a  form  of  tokenistic  involvement  where  autistic 
people are expected to provide their experiences as material to be analysed by non-
autistic  professionals  (in  Sinclair’s  terms,  AS  participants  are  expected  to  ‘speak 
when spoken to’ by non-autistic others) (Sinclair, 2005).  Use of autobiographical 
narratives goes some way to mediating this hazard, in terms of using sources over 158 
 
 
which AS authors have the majority of control.  However, this still leaves issues of 
selection and re-presentation, in what will be necessarily thematic (and therefore, 
selective) discussions of broader life stories.  Management of these issues requires 
attention to issues of positionality and reflexive practice, which are now discussed. 
 
One important question relates to my position as a non-AS sociologist exploring the 
dispositions, reflections and subjectivities of people whose dispositional ways of 
being may differ in a variety of ways from my own.  In the majority of literature on 
AS  experiences,  people  in  this  category  have  occupied  a  curious  position  as  (in 
Merton’s terms) insiders in terms of their status as ‘native experts’ (Bogdashina, 
2001, 1) on the lived experience of ASCs, but have been positioned as outsiders with 
respect to their exclusion from the processes of academic knowledge production 
(Merton, 1972; Silverman, 2008).  This is an issue that social scientists have begun 
to address by drawing explicitly on first-person accounts of experience as sources of 
empirical material for understanding sociality (Waltz, 2005, 13; Ryan and Räisänen, 
2008).  However the fact that these investigations are still mediated through the 
analytical lens of the non-AS researcher requires understanding the relationship of 
this body of knowledge to my own position in a number of respects.   
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In providing a perspective on formations of pre-diagnostic identity, my analyses will 
necessarily  involve  a  reconstruction  and  interpretation  of  them,  most  notably 
through  the  theoretical  perspective  set  out  in  chapter  two.    One  concern  here 
involves the use of language, in particular the relationship between what Schutz 
calls first and second order constructs: the former denote the language and terms 
used  by  authors,  while  the  latter  involve  concepts  that  the  analyst  may  use  to 
analyse and interpret them (Schutz, 1962, 220).  This is a practical challenge, in 
terms  of being  able to make  this  relationship visible to the  reader  and thereby 
preserve  something  of the  distinction between  the  original  source  and  my  own 
perspective.    I  have  attempted to  address  this  issue  through  my  use,  wherever 
possible, of the original language used by the authors to describe specific events, as 
well as being clear when my own terms are at play in the research narrative.  This is 
important  because  in  one  sense,  as  Arnold  argues  (drawing  on  McLuhan)  ‘the 
medium  is  the  message’  (Arnold,  2010)  with  respect  to  representations  of 
experience. Autobiographies are sources in which the authors’ choices of how to 
order and describe their stories can bring to the fore themes and perspectives that 
might not be obvious to a non-AS reader.  This brings into view questions of how 
first order constructs are understood and interpreted through my own dispositional 
understandings. 
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Flyvbjerg notes that analytical intuition, even that which is considered and ordered 
reflexively, necessarily involves dispositional forms of practical, inarticulate know-
how (2006, 218). While these types of understanding are, by their very nature, only 
partially visible through practical activity, one can gain an indirect appreciation of 
the  context  for  these  understandings  by  reflecting  on  one’s  own  biographical 
situation.  I  explore  these  life  experiences  through  their  rendering  in 
autobiographical narratives, bringing my own understandings and assumptions to 
this  work,  as  well  as  areas  of  ignorance.    I  am  very  much  an  ‘outsider’  in 
understanding these processes, not only in dispositional terms but also in social, 
environmental  and  biographical  contexts  (Merton,  1972;  Stanley,  1993).    For 
example, one of the themes I will explore (in 6.1.2) relates to Jen Birch’s experience 
of different iterations of gendered and sexual self (heterosexual, lesbian, bi-sexual 
and ‘unlabelled’) (Birch, 2003).  As a heterosexual non-autistic person, my purchase 
on these issues is mediated not only by conditions of access through language, but 
also by differences in social and embodied experience which form the basis for 
interpretive judgement – my own dispositional ways of knowing and being.  This is 
not to state that the experiences of people different from my own are unintelligible 
to me, or that it is impossible for me to say anything of value about them.  Rather, it 
is to recognise that I come to these texts from a position qualitatively different from 
those of the authors, who themselves are attempting to bridge this gap through 
language.  In these texts, there are passages communicating experiences of, for 161 
 
 
example, elation or suffering, in addition to descriptions of perceptual renderings 
and embodied performances, understanding of which I can only approach through 
my own approximations (Davidson and Smith, 2009, 898).  Reading autobiographies 
draws  on  a  range  of  emotional,  sensual  and  intellectual  experiences  arising  in 
response to the engagement with the texts, but that does not of course mean that 
it is the same as the experience of the author.  The question thus becomes, how 
have I attempted to manage these contingencies in my reflexive practice? 
 
Reflexivity is a central concern in contemporary sociological research, and this is 
particularly  apparent  in  Bourdieu’s  concepts  of  practice,  habitus  and  field  as 
‘thinking  tools’  in  the  production  of  knowledge.    Commitment  to  rigorous  and 
ethical  social  science  implies  an  intention  to  avoid  harmful  distortions  or 
oversimplifications of experiences, and thus that reflexivity be incorporated into the 
practice of sociological research (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Plummer, 2001; 
Mason,  2002).    This  is  not  something  that  gives  unmediated  or transcendental 
access to one’s own position, for as Rose observes, acts of reflection are always 
situated, thus one can have multiple reflections providing different perspectives on 
sociality (1997).  Access to our dispositions and the wider regularities of habitus (e.g. 
the institution within which I conducted this PhD) and field (e.g. the wider discipline 
of  sociology)  are  not  in  any  sense  transparent,  but  involve  socially  situated 
perspectives that evolve over time (Rose, 1997, 316).   162 
 
 
 
Initially,  as  someone  unfamiliar  with the  world  of  autism but  with  a  theoretical 
interest  in  the  relationship  between  mind  and  brain  sciences  I  was  drawn  to 
questions of how differences in neurodevelopment could impact upon social agency.  
In the beginning I was therefore very attentive to the writings of those in the clinical 
and neuropsychological sciences, in particular categorical descriptions enshrined in 
diagnostic criteria.  This was not an unwise or ‘bad’ move, for it provided me with 
some basic understandings or ‘rules’ which, as a novice in the field, were necessary 
to make sense of it.  However, as the months went on I came into contact not only 
with the autobiographical writings of AS people, but also met individuals in this 
category whose experiences and reflections indicated to me a need to move beyond 
categorical  understandings  of  their  lives  (i.e.  diagnostic  schemas).    In  the  early 
stages of the project, I recall hearing the phrase that ‘when you’ve met one person 
with  autism,  you’ve  met  one  person  with  autism’,  signifying  the  diversity  of 
experiences within that AS people may have.  Contact with a range of different life 
stories bore out the importance of this observation, opening up a more detailed and 
diverse  range  of  experiences  than  had  been  readily  visible  through  categorical 
understandings of AS.  Through engagement with these life stories, I was able to 
explore a different kind of knowledge in the forms of ‘know how’ that AS people, as 
‘native experts’ (Bogdashina, 2001, 1) develop as they go on in the world. 
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Throughout  the  project,  I  have  sought  to  engage  with  a  range  of  different 
perspectives  on  AS  people’s  experiences,  not  only  those  described  in  published 
literature (both peer-reviewed and lay texts) but through exchanges with AS people 
whom  I  met  along  the  way.    In  the  development  of  both  theoretical  and 
methodological  approaches,  I  have  engaged  with  other  social  scientists  on  the 
spectrum (such as Damian Milton and Larry Arnold at the University of Birmingham), 
and was also joined by Tony Brown (consultant clinical psychologist at the Autism 
Diagnostic Research Centre, Southampton) who acted as a project advisor.  I also 
continued to develop my practical understanding of AS people’s social experiences 
through  voluntary  work  with  the  National  Autistic  Society  through  their  e-
befriending service.  While this role was not directly related to the existing research, 
the  desire  to  become  involved  with  this  stemmed  from  a  wish  to  develop  my 
knowledge of autistic people’s experiences through practical social exchange, as 
well as contributing to an area of public need.  This describes some of the reflexive 
processes involved in the constitution of knowledge on autism in general.  What I 
will  now  do  is  outline  how  these  were  managed  in  the  practical  processes  of 
analysis and construction of the analytical discussion. 
4.2.2 - Description of the analytical process and structure of discussion. 
 
The  perspective  provided  by  this  thesis  is  not  intended  to  override  the  original 
narratives of authors, or to establish an authoritative reading of their texts.  Rather, 164 
 
 
my  aim  has  been  to  explore  comparatively  different  formations  of  identity 
represented in the monographs and, through the conceptual approach set out in 
chapter three, and to connect these together within a holistic theoretical frame that 
contributes to knowledge.  The positional and reflexive concerns discussed thus far 
in this chapter have informed my approach to analysing the texts, and in particular 
my concern with preserving as far as possible the original language used by authors 
in the thematic analysis of sources.  This does not mean uncritical acceptance of the 
claims of authors (Thompson, 2008, 23-24); as discussed in the previous chapter, I 
have  attempted  to  explore  where  possible  the  integrity  of  the  monographs  (as 
discussed in 4.1.1).  Rather, it indicates my understanding of how my position has 
affected the limits of what I have been able to do with these sources in terms of 
producing new knowledge. 
 
Thus far, I have argued that reflexivity is an important part of sociological research 
and  is  something  that  needs  to  be  managed  continuously  within  the  research 
process.  Therefore, my first act in the analytical phase was to create a research 
diary  for  recording  observations  on  the  development  of  my  practice,  and  as  a 
resource for reflection on my relationship to the material and research questions.  
The second step was to develop a method of organising my observations that would 
allow  me  to produce  comparative analyses,  while  preserving  the  context  of  the 
cases.    While  guidance  from  the  methodological  literature  and  existing  studies 165 
 
 
hitherto  discussed  was  useful  for  informing  this  approach,  the  process  was  not 
something that I was able to take ‘off the shelf’ in totality, but emerged as a process 
of practical problem solving.  As Erben observes, understanding autobiographical 
texts involves a process that involves a relationship between particular events and 
their place within the whole of the narrative (1993).  This follows the logic of the 
‘hermeneutic circle’, where the text (in this case a life narrative) is encountered as a 
whole, analysed in terms of its particular events and their relationship to each other, 
and these observations are then re-interpreted within the context of a wider life 
narrative (Malpas, 2009).  The researcher seeks to understand the life as presented, 
then to analyse particular aspects (in this case the themes underpinning the three 
research questions identified in chapter three) and then to understand how these 
aspects are contingent upon their relationship to wider aspects that make up the 
whole (Erben, 1993; Malpas, 2009).   
 
Broadly, there were three stages to my investigation of the monographs.  In stage 
one,  the  autobiographies  were  read  through  in  their  entirety,  so  that  I  could 
familiarise myself with the broad context of each source, during which particular 
observations relevant to each of the three research questions were noted.  Once 
each monograph had been read in full, these observations were typed up into an 
electronic document, creating a second ‘pass’ over the observations in which errors 
or omissions could be spotted (e.g. mis-readings or incongruent observations), and 166 
 
 
also findings reassessed in light of my understanding of the ‘whole’ of the narrative.  
In stage two, these documents were loaded into the NVivo qualitative data analysis 
software  package  for  coding,  something  which  had  a  number  of  practical 
advantages.  Firstly, it allowed for a large amount of text-based data to be indexed 
in  such  a  way  that  material  could  be  organised  thematically  across  cases.  
Approximately 19,000 words of notes were generated, and so this assisted greatly 
in working with this material (Mason, 2002, 152).  Secondly, the different narratives 
structures of the autobiographies meant that observations relating to a particular 
theme sometimes appeared at different points within the monograph.  Coding in 
NVivo allowed material both within and across cases to be organised in relation to 
themes, and also for observations to be indexed according to their relevance to 
each area as well as sub-fields within them.  This is important because observations 
can then be arranged and re-arranged according to the emergent structure of the 
analysis as one moves through the texts.  Using this software helped to maintain 
and develop a clear understanding of the relationship between the chronological 
order of life events, and their ordering in narrative. 
 
In practical terms the first step in the process was to create a project file in Nvivo, 
beginning with each research question as a base node (highest level tree node), and 
then further child nodes (core nodes) corresponding to themes within each area.  
Each  base  node  produced  an  output  summarising  the  individual  observations 167 
 
 
relating to each individual source, which then allowed me to explore sources in 
terms of their relevance to specific questions.  The autobiographies varied in terms 
of themes discussed, and this process was helpful in organising sources for analysis 
and discussion.  For the first two questions, individual narratives were selected in 
relation  to  relevant  themes  within  the  monographs,  which  were  explored 
individually  and  then  discussed  comparatively  (this  process  also  informed  the 
structure  of  chapters  six,  seven  and  eight).    For  question  three,  my  approach 
differed with respect to the organisation of the discussion into sub-themes, within 
which  individual  life  experiences  contributed  to  a  more  general  discussion  of 
understandings and negotiations of risk (this is reflected in the structure of chapter 
seven).  My aim was thus to explore different lives in context and identify specific 
themes relevant to each question, and then to discuss them in detail, before a 
comparative discussion at the end of the chapter.  This approach was chosen over 
discussion of the autobiographies cross-sectionally for the reasons stated hitherto 
(in 4.1.1).  
Secondly, focusing on individual lives prior to comparative discussion allowed for 
more detailed exploration of the particularities that affect individual lives, and for 
appreciation  of  the  factors  that  may  affect  individual  lives.    This  is  important 
because my approach to discussion of each of the autobiographies was to begin 
with early experiences of dispositionality, and then explore how these developed in 
relation to life events and other aspects of self, in relation to each of the themes 168 
 
 
discussed.  For example, in chapter six (6.1.2), I explore how Jen Birch came to 
understand her AS-related dispositions in the pre-diagnostic phase in relation to 
regularities of gender and sexuality operating within different fields.  Here, I begin 
by setting out how Birch came to understand her dispositions in early childhood and 
from  there  trace  how  they  developed  in  relation  to  other  aspects  of  self  with 
respect to different manifestations of her gendered and sexual self.  This allowed 
me to explore biographically, how her sense of self in relation to these aspects of 
identity developed across broad periods of pre-diagnostic life.  The life stories will 
be explored individually before being discussed comparatively at the end of each 
chapter (or at the end of each section in chapter seven).  Here, I explore how the 
different life stories, and the themes they present in relation to each of the research 
questions,  can help  contribute to understanding  of  formations  of  pre-diagnostic 
identity, and help develop the interrelated concepts of authenticity, accountability 
and legitimacy as a way of understanding them.  Having set out my approach to 
managing positional, reflexive and ethical issues in the practical process of analysis, 
I will now discuss the specific autobiographies, first in terms of their selection, and 
secondly in relation to the particular contribution that each monograph will make to 
the discussion in part two. 
 
4.3 – Identification and selection of source material 
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4.3.1 - Identification process 
 
The starting criteria for identifying suitable materials was any published (having an 
ISBN or ISSN number) self-authored autobiographical monograph produced by a 
person over the age of 18 at time of publication, born before 1980.  On the basis of 
these criteria, an initial long-list of materials was identified through a number of 
searching strategies: 
 
  Search  of  the  Jessica  Kingsley  publications  database  –  Jessica  Kingsley 
Publishers  (JKP)  are  the  largest  publishing  house  for  AS-authored  and 
relevant texts in the English language, both by and for people with autism, 
their  families  and  professionals.    The  search  strategy  for  this  repository 
involved  an  item-by-item  exploration  of  all  materials  listed  under  the 
‘Asperger’s Syndrome, Autism and other Syndromes’ (478 items returned) 
and ‘Fiction and Memoirs’ sections (79 items returned).  The later section 
contains  materials,  either  fictional  or  autobiographical,  that  have  been 
authored by people on the autism spectrum.  According to JKP these are 
classified together in order to bring together different works by authors on 
the  spectrum,  which  may  be  either  personal  accounts  of  experience  or 
fictional  narratives  (within  this  section  individual  items  are  identified  as 
such). 170 
 
 
 
  Search  of  the  Autism  Asperger’s  Publishing  Co.  (AAPC)  –  this  involved  a 
search  of  the  AAPC  catalogue  section  ‘Personal  Accounts’  subsection 
‘Individuals with ASD’ (18 items returned). 
 
  Search of the Copac catalogue (incorporating over seventy major research 
libraries in the UK and Ireland including the British Library). 
 
  Appointment with a social sciences librarian at the British Library to search 
specialist collections. 
 
  Search of the Google Books online database – Google books is an online 
repository  of  print  materials  –  currently  the  largest  publicly  available 
database. The Google Books search involved the use of an advanced search 
with  the  parameters  ‘include  all  words’  –  Books  (as  type  of  material)  – 
‘autism’  (as  Subject)  Search  strings  ‘autism  autobiography’  (156  items 
returned) and ‘Asperger’s autobiography’ (109 items returned) were used on 
each of these services. 
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  Other  relevant  materials  were  included  after  identification  through 
bibliographies of existing research publications. 
 
The  respective  searches  returned  a  large  number  of  duplicate  items;  however, 
multiple searches were beneficial in identifying relevant items that were missing or 
miscategorised in other databases.  This was notable in the JKP search, where my 
initial plan was to examine only the ‘Fiction and Memoirs’ section of the catalogue; 
speculative exploration of the ‘Asperger’s Syndrome, Autism and other Syndromes’ 
section revealed a number of items which were suitable for inclusion but had not 
been categorised as memoir (and thus the decision was taken to widen the search 
within this catalogue).  This also led to a search of  Google Books system which 
serves as a meta-catalogue of printed materials from a wide range of general and 
specialist  publishers  and  book  sellers  including  JKP,  AAPC,  Amazon,  Barnes  and 
Noble  and  others.    The  Google  Books  search  was  intended  to  provide  a  wider 
literature search beyond the specialist publishers, and through which a number of 
suitable publications were identified which were not revealed by searches of JKP 
and AAPC or other databases.   
 
This led to an initial long list of nineteen monographs, from which a further seven 
were excluded after further investigation revealed that their diagnosis was either of 172 
 
 
classic Autism, or a dual diagnosis of AS with ADD (Attention Deficit Disorder) or 
ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder).  The decision to exclude those with 
a dual diagnosis was taken on the advice of a project advisor, Dr. Tony Brown (a 
consultant  clinical  psychologist  at  the  Autism  Diagnostic  Research  Centre, 
Southampton), in order to preserve a degree of comparability within the group of 
monographs identified.  Dual diagnosis is a complex and contested issue within the 
study  of  AS,  and  while  this  would  certainly  qualify  as  an  additional  area  of 
complexity worthy of investigation, I felt that I would not be able to accommodate 
this within the confines of the present project.   It is important to note that dual 
diagnosis  exclusions  pertained  only  to  those  who,  at  the  time  of  writing,  had 
multiple standing diagnoses in relation to a major neurological or mental health 
issue and did not exclude those who had been misdiagnosed in earlier life with 
another condition (i.e. schizophrenia in the case of Wendy Lawson) 
 
4.3.2 – Selection of final sample. 
 
From the initial long list of nineteen monographs I looked to identify a range of 
cases that would provide adequate material for investigation.  While not in this case 
looking  for  a  representative  sample,  I  was  looking  for  a  range  of  different  life 
experiences within which to explore the general and particular aspects of life in 
relation to the three research questions identified in the previous chapter.  Molloy 173 
 
 
and Vasil’s book-length investigation of the identities of six AS teenagers provided a 
rough guide as to the amount of material that I could analyse in sufficient depth, 
given  the  constraints  of  the  thesis.    I  sought  to  identify  a  range  of  different 
individuals,  experiences  and  life  circumstances  through  which  to  explore 
comparatively different formations of pre-diagnostic identity.  I chose to exclude 
two of the monographs by more well-known authors, these being Temple Grandin 
and  Donna  Williams.  Given  the  restrictions  of  the  thesis,  my  challenge  was  to 
include (as far as possible) a diversity of voices such that could be discussed in detail.  
Grandin and Williams’ accounts have become virtually ubiquitous within the wider 
research literature on autism, and their narratives are already part of the fabric of 
contemporary  AS  research.    Both  of  these  authors’  narratives  are  referenced 
frequently in the life stories of those who published after them (Shore, 2001, 213-
214; Birch, 2003, 208; for example Purkis, 2006, 9-10), and so I took the decision to 
exclude these more well-known authors in favour of those whose narratives had 
received less attention hitherto in research literature. 
 
The  monographs  were  assessed  according  to  three  of  Scott’s  four  criteria  for 
assessing  documentary  sources  –  authenticity,  credibility,  meaning  and 
representativeness (Scott, 1990a).  The authenticity of the sources – ‘whether [they 
are  actually]  what  [they  purport]  to  be’  –  was  ascertained  through  web-based 
research.  My aim here was to find indications that the authors of the works were 174 
 
 
who they claimed to be.  As each case was a formal publication by a recognisable 
publishing house, there were in all cases clear indications, often from a number of 
sources, that the purported authors were identifiable with those of the text.  There 
were also often corroborating observations, such as interviews in print or other 
media, recognition by voluntary agencies (such as the UK National Autistic Society) 
or other indications of authenticity. 
 
In relation to the credibility of the sources, Scott advises that the researcher assess 
documentary sources for evidence of sincerity and accuracy (Scott, 1990b).  One 
limitation  of  autobiographical  materials  is  that  the  former  is  often  easier  to 
ascertain than the latter, as the knowledge gained through autobiographies is often 
involves ‘traces’ of events otherwise lost in time.  For example, it is not possible in 
many cases to detect errors of memory or missing details because there will be no 
‘trace’ of these occurrences, such that they might be intelligible to the researcher.  
Thus accuracy in many cases can only be assessed through constant vigilance as to 
the  status  of  specific  claims  and  by  considering  internal  consistency  and 
concordance with other known details of the authors’ lives.  Certain claims– where 
authors lived, who they worked for, where they studied – could in most cases be 
explored through background research online, although in many cases only in the 
negative sense, i.e. by checking for evidence of falsification or contradiction, rather 
than confirmation.  This was an iterative process that evolved as I became aware of 175 
 
 
details within individual monographs and was able to move through the process of 
checking them. No traces of inaccuracy were found within the sources in the final 
sample; however, there were issues with sincerity in relation to one of the authors 
in the long list. 
 
Dawn  Prince-Hughes’  Songs  of  the  Gorilla  Nation  was  rejected  after  the  initial 
reading, because of concerns regarding the academic and professional credentials 
claimed  by  the  author,  and  doubts  about  the  circumstances  surrounding  their 
award.  These concerns arose after online research into the awarding institution 
(Universitat Herisau) for the author’s doctorate revealed it to be a diploma mill.  In 
addition the circumstances described in the book surrounding her study with this 
institution appear doubtful in light of the institution’s dubious status.  Although this 
did not invalidate her entire narrative, it was felt that significant doubts had been 
cast with respect to the accuracy of the author’s account, such that the monograph 
should be excluded.  To be clear, this not merely a question of inaccuracy, as the 
detail provided by the author appeared in direct contradiction what I was able to 
discern about her awarding institution.  It appeared extremely doubtful that events 
could  have  unfolded  as  she  had  claimed  in  the  book,  and  these  doubts  were 
compounded by a curious absence of external evidence to verify her professional 
history or subsequent activities.  Similar checks were made to explore the sincerity 176 
 
 
of claims made by the remaining authors, with no evidence found to cast doubt on 
their sincerity.  
 
While representativeness was not a major concern in this study due to my stated 
aim of looking to exploring different formations of pre-diagnostic identity in relation 
to the three research questions identified, an important criterion for assessing the 
utility of the monographs was their meaningful content – did the autobiographies 
provide  suitable  material  of  a  sufficient  quantity  to  facilitate  a  detailed 
investigation?  One way of doing this was to identify different categorical aspects of 
author  identity  as  potential  indicators  of  biographical  variation,  for  example 
ensuring that both men and women were represented in order to broaden the 
scope  for  exploration  of  issues  relating  to  different  experiences  of  gender  and 
sexuality.    I  also  looked  to  identify  authors  with  a  range  of  ethnic  and  cultural 
backgrounds,  as  well  as  differing  socio-economic  class  positions,  although  my 
success in these respects was limited by available material.  The sample consists of 
five female and two male authors.  Two of the authors were US nationals, one from 
the UK, one from Sweden, another from New Zealand and the remaining two were 
UK nationals who subsequently migrated to Australia.  The authors were all born 
between 1955 and 1974, while their age at publication ranged from thirty-one to 
forty-six  (mean=41.1  years)  and  their  age  at  diagnosis  ranged  from  nineteen  to 
forty-three (mean=29.1 years).   177 
 
 
Author  Year  
of Birth 
Sex  Nationality  Age  
at diagnosis 
Age at 
Publication 
Education 
Lawson, W  1954  Female  UK/Australia  42  46  Higher Degree 
Birch, J  1955  Female  New Zealand  43  46  Undergraduate  
Degree 
Robison, J.E  1957  Male  USA  39  50  Secondary/ 
High School 
Willey, L.H  1959  Female  USA  37  40  Higher Degree 
Gerland, G  1963  Female  Sweden  29  40  Secondary/ 
High School 
Hadcroft, W  1970  Male  UK  30  35  Secondary/ 
High School 
Purkis, J  1974  Female  UK/Australia  19  31  Higher Degree 
Table 1 - Autobiographical monographs 
All of the authors were of white European ethnicity.  One of the autobiographers 
had been  educated  to undergraduate  level  at the  time  of  publication,  four  had 
obtained higher degrees, while the remaining three had completed secondary/high 
school  education  and  the  remaining  one  had  withdrawn  before  completing 
secondary/high-school education.  In terms of socio-economic status, my approach 
was to assess this through self-identification or markers evident in descriptions of 
lives.  Only one author, Will Hadcroft, self-identified as ‘working class’ (2005, 119) 
while the majority of other authors did not overtly identify with a particular class 
position (excluding Jeanette Purkis, who identified herself as ‘middle class’) (2006, 178 
 
 
162).    Nevertheless,  beyond  categorical  differences  there  remained  a  range  of 
different dispositional, social and environmental as well as biographical narratives 
within the final sample to support a productive discussion.  The qualities of each 
monograph are now discussed. 
 
4.4 - Biographical summaries 
 
 
As Davidson observes, one of the qualities of autobiographies is to offer an insight 
into the subjective experience of life events and behaviours that may seem ‘strange’ 
or ‘bizarre’ to differently disposed (i.e. non-AS) observers.  To this I would add that 
autobiographies offer not only insights into individual behaviours, but as storied 
representations of self offer insights not only into differences but also similarities.  
Many  of  the  themes  and  situations  of  these  life  stories  are  perennially  human 
stories  –  marriage,  friendship,  loneliness,  disappointment  and  fulfilment.    What 
differentiates them in parts from the stories of many non-AS others is the role of 
dispositional  differences,  and  their  interplay  with  the  social  and  cultural 
circumstances of everyday life.   
 
In this section, I introduce each of the autobiographers in order of appearance in 
the coming chapters, and highlight the aspects of their narratives to be discussed.  179 
 
 
As indicated earlier, I do not claim to represent the totality of their stories, and 
what  is  discussed  here  are  specific  themes  relevant  to  each  of  the  questions 
identified.  Furthermore, not all of the autobiographies will be discussed in relation 
to each of the themes, although some narratives appear in two chapters.  Again, 
this is due to the constraints of the project, and my desire to discuss each of the 
autobiographies in detail.  Finally, I would also like to add that although the focus 
will  be  on  the  pre-diagnostic  phase  of  life,  post-diagnostic  experiences  will  be 
discussed  in  places  where  this  serves  to  contextualise  or  otherwise  provide 
evidence of the significance of not having a diagnosis.  It will therefore necessary at 
some points to compare accounts of pre-diagnostic experiences with those that 
came after diagnosis was made, in order to indicate the relative importance of living 
without a diagnosis for different aspects of identity. 
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4.4.1 - Gunilla Gerland (A Real Person) 
 
 
Image 2 – Gunilla Gerland (http://www.tankbart.se/guni.jpg) 
 
Gunilla Gerland was born in Stockholm, Sweden in 1963, the younger of two sisters.  
Her monograph contributes to two of the discussions in the coming chapters, the 
first  of  which  explores  how  she  came  to  understand  her  dispositional  self  in 
childhood.    From  a  young  age,  Gerland’s  experience  of  AS  involved  issues  with 
coordination and motor function, synaesthesia which manifested in her experience 
of  affective  connections  as  ‘colours’,  and  difficulties  understanding  of  others’ 
actions  and  use  of  language  (Gerland,  1997,  11,  14-15,  20,  22).    She  describes 
having to rely in early years on her sister (three years her elder) as a ‘bridge’ to the 
world of others, and a ‘model’ for how one should act in social situations (Gerland, 
1997,  22).  Although  academically  proficient,  she  faced  difficulties  in  her  school 
years,  where  her  spatial  sensitivities  and  social  differences  marked  her  out  for 181 
 
 
bullying by her peers, and led to her being seen as ‘insolent’ by teachers (Gerland, 
1997, 22, 150-151).    In 6.2.1, I will explore how Gerland came to understand her 
dispositions in terms of strengths and limitations, how these were understood as 
differences through comparison with the behaviour of others, and how this related 
to her lifelong feelings of not feeling like a ‘real person’.  At the end of chapter six 
(6.2), this will be discussed in relation to the wider theme of ‘legitimacy’, in terms of 
how  her  experience  of  dispositional  self  as  not  being  ‘real’  was  shaped  by  the 
conditions of habitus and field in early years. 
 
The second point of contribution of Gerland’s monograph is to the discussion of 
managing  insecurity  in  the  workplace,  in  chapter  seven.  After  leaving  school, 
Gerland  moved  through  a  number  of  low-paid  jobs  before  becoming  a  nursery 
worker, an experience which she describes as ‘fulfilling’ but ‘tiring’, not only due to 
the sensory demands of her job but also having to deal with her mother’s ‘psychotic 
break’ (Gerland, 1997, 189-193).  This precipitated a period of depression, during 
which she recalls that ‘the will to live had withered within [her]’ (Gerland, 1997, 
193).  In 7.3.2, I will explore this experience of managing sensory challenges in the 
workplace,  and  how  associated  feelings  of  insecurity  left  her  vulnerable  to  the 
negative effects of unforeseen life events on her physical and mental wellbeing.   
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4.4.2 - Wendy Lawson (Life Behind Glass). 
 
 
Image 3 – Wendy Lawson (http://www.mugsy.org/wendy/wendy2.jpg) 
 
Wendy Lawson was born on the South East Coast of England in 1954, and later 
moved inland to the Avon/Somerset region at age four (Lawson, 1998, 24).   In her 
autobiography, Life Behind Glass, she describes her experience of distance from 
other people, in particular the ‘mystery’ of affective experiences such as ‘love and 
feelings’  (Lawson,  1998,  84).    In  addition,  she  describes  the  challenge  of 
distinguishing between different emotive states such as ‘anger, fear, frustration, 
anxiety or disappointment’, as well as the practical strategies used to mediate these 
challenges in social life.  Lawson’s narrative explores long-held feelings of being 
‘misunderstood  and  alienated’  from  the  world  around  her,  and  her  emotional 
connection  to  the  events  of  her  life  (Lawson,  1998,  i-ii).    Sensory  sensitivities, 
perceptual differences and dispositional differences in understanding interactions 
with non-AS others intertwine in her struggle for a sense of belonging, through 183 
 
 
experiences  of  family  life,  work  and  motherhood  (Lawson, 1998,  75).   This  also 
includes her experience of institutionalisation within a psychiatric hospital following 
a suicide attempt, during which she was diagnosed with schizophrenia (a label that 
would stand for 25 years until her diagnosis of AS in 1994) (Lawson, 1998).  
 
In the coming chapters I will discuss Lawson’s narrative in relation to two of the 
research questions, the first of which will be in chapter six where I focus on the 
relationship between lifeworld, dispositionality and practice.  Lawson’s narrative 
will  be  discussed  (in  6.2.2)  in  terms  of  her  ability  to  experience  dispositionally 
appropriate ways of connecting with the world, and how this was mediated by the 
conditions of habitus and field in the pre-diagnostic phase.  The second use of her 
monograph will appear in chapter eight, in which I explore her management of 
insecurities experienced as a new mother in terms of risks associated with both her 
dispositional ways of being and her label of schizophrenia. 
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4.4.3 - Lianne Holiday Willey (Pretending To Be Normal) 
 
 
Image 4 – Lianne Holiday Willey 
(http://www.aapcpublishing.net/images/authors/edb29e65d137b8b89c95b45d8e3
dcf33e58d5386.jpg) 
 
Lianne Holiday Willey was born in the USA in 1959 and raised as an only child.  
Aware of her differences from an early age, she describes feeling ‘removed’ from 
the domains of others, as well having an attraction to ‘safe spaces’ (for example, a 
‘swimming pool’ and a ‘large tree’) and experiencing social life as something which 
‘…[she] could jump in when [she] felt like it, slip away if that fit, or sit back and 
observe…’ (Willey, 1999, 26-30).  During her school years, Willey found that while 
issues  with  social  interaction,  sensory  sensitivities  and  motor  coordination 
restricted her participation within certain spaces, the social structure of high school 
groups ‘defined by shared interests’ provided accommodating circumstances for her 185 
 
 
differences (Willey, 1999, 32).  However, this would become problematic as she 
moved away to college, where she found it difficult to make friends and to conform 
to ‘expectations of normality’ (Willey, 1999, 51-53).  The dynamics of social events, 
such  as  parties,  were  examples  of  situations  in  which  communicative  aspects 
involving ‘subtext and innuendo’ were problematic and led to feelings of exclusion 
and isolation (Willey, 1999, 54-55).  Willey’s narrative will informs the discussion in 
chapter  six  where  (in  6.2.4)  I  will  explore  how  the  value  of  particular  practical 
strategies varied in different fields across her life, and the implications of this for 
her understanding of dispositional self in pre-diagnostic life.  
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4.4.4 - Will Hadcroft (The Feeling’s Unmutual) 
 
 
Image 5 – Will Hadcroft (http://g-ecx.images-
amazon.com/images/G/01/ciu/07/72/b4e1e03ae7a0a5cd05482210.L._V192188220
_SX200_.jpg) 
Will Hadcroft was born in 1970 and grew up on the Kenyon Way estate in Little 
Hulton,  Greater  Manchester,  England  (Hadcroft,  2005,  19).    While  social  motor 
coordination issues were a problem for Hadcroft in early childhood and primary 
school years, it was not until the second year of high school in 1982 (at age 12) that 
his differences ‘stood out’ socially, making him a target of bullying by his peers.  
After leaving school, Hadcroft’s experiences of work-place fields were marked by 
isolation and ridicule from co-workers, leading to prolonged periods of loneliness 
and depression.  In 1993, he met his future wife Carol who he describes as ‘filling 
the massive chasm of loneliness and despair’ that he had experienced for much of 
his life up to that point, and they were married in August of that year (Hadcroft, 187 
 
 
2005, 171).  Over the next few years he would struggle with anxiety and panic 
attacks that would affect his ability to work, lasting one month in a part time job at 
a retirement home in 1999 (Hadcroft, 2005, 216).  During this time he also began 
psychotherapy sessions, a process that would lead to his eventual diagnosis in 2003.  
He also began developing his skills as a writer, taking classes in creative writing and 
preparing a manuscript that would later be published in 2002 as Anna Droyd and 
Century Lodge.   
 
Hadcroft’s autobiography informs two of discussions in the coming chapters, the 
first (6.1.4) relates to how his understanding of dispositional self developed in the 
pre-diagnostic phase of life.  In particular, I will explore how Hadcroft’s dispositional 
self was configured through his cultural values in relation to problematic relations 
with others in school and the workplace.  I also discuss how the progress of three 
life events – his marriage to Carol, becoming a published author, and his eventual 
diagnosis – changed his understanding of dispositional self in relation to others.  
The  second use of  Hadcroft’s  narrative  will be  in  the  comparative  discussion of 
orientations  to  fatherhood  (in  8.2.1),  which  will  be  contrasted  with  John  Elder 
Robison’s experience.  In this case, Hadcroft’s reflections provide a perspective on 
the decision not to become a father, and how this was informed by understandings 
of risk linked to dispositional and biographical factors. 188 
 
 
4.4.5 - Jeanette Purkis (Finding A Different Kind Of Normal) 
 
 
Image 6 – Jeanette Purkis (http://www.jkp.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/Jeannette-Purkis-300x200.jpg) 
 
Jeanette  Purkis  was  born  in  1974  into  what  she  describes  as  a  ‘middle  class’ 
Christadelphian  (a minority Christian denomination) family in South East England, 
moving to Australia in early childhood (Purkis, 2006, 11;93;162).  Purkis’ narrative 
will  be  the  first  to  be  discussed  in  chapter  six,  where  I  will  explore  how  her 
experience of pre-diagnostic self underwent several changes as she moved through 
different social fields.  I will explore how her dispositions combined with the cultural 
and practical conditions of habitus in the production of her different ‘selves’.  From 
an early age, she experienced spatial sensitivities in the presence of other children, 
as well as issues with social interaction, communication and coordination (Purkis, 
2006, 12-13;16).  Between the ages of seven and eight, she became increasingly 189 
 
 
active in the Christadelphian church, developing an affinity for the ‘rules’ provided 
by  this  organisation  (Purkis,  2006,  17).  While  at  high  school,  Purkis  began  to 
question her Christadelphian faith and became increasingly interested in the politics 
of the far left.  She would go on to become an active member of the Communist 
party in Melbourne, wherein the writings of Marx and the ‘authority of the party’ 
became her new source of ‘rules’ for acting in the world (Purkis, 2006, 43-65).   
 
Her consumption of recreational drugs, particularly amphetamines and marijuana, 
increased during this period, as did her self-described ‘obsession’ with ‘the darker 
side  of  life’,  manifested  most  prominently  in  her  involvement  with  violent 
demonstrations  (Purkis,  2006,  78-81).    This  ‘obsession’  culminated  in  what  she 
describes as ‘inadvertent’ involvement with an armed robbery planned by a then-
friend, leading to her first term of imprisonment (Purkis, 2006, 87).  During this time 
Purkis was first diagnosed, at the age of twenty, with Asperger’s Syndrome by a 
prison psychologist.  Although the diagnosis was vital in the eventual reduction of 
her sentence, she did not accept the diagnosis at this time, and instead took on 
another  identity  based  around  the  rules  of  prison  life  –  ‘Jeanette  the  Criminal’ 
(Purkis, 2006, 101).  The final shift in Purkis’ identity occurred just after her final 
stay in prison, with her enrolment on an undergraduate arts course, and acceptance 
of  the  diagnosis  as  a  valid  description  of  her  differences.    Purkis’  narrative  will 
contribute  to  the  discussion  of  how  self-other  relations  affect  pre-diagnostic 190 
 
 
understandings of self.  In 6.1.1, I will contrast her description of her most recent 
‘self’  with  descriptions  of  her  previous  ‘selves’,  in  terms  of  how  the  former 
incorporated feelings of meaningful connection to the life of the field (in addition to 
practical compatibility and social legitimacy) that hitherto been absent. 
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4.4.6 - Jen Birch (Congratulations! It’s Asperger Syndrome) 
 
 
Image 7 – Jen Birch (http://www.aspergers.co.nz/images/bannerPic.jpg) 
 
Jen Birch was born in 1955, and diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome at the age of 
forty three, an event which she describes as a ‘revelation’.  Birch’s narrative will be 
the discussed in chapter six (6.1.2), where I explore how the intersection of her 
dispositions with different cultural landscapes in relation to gender and sexuality 
shaped her identity. The author describes her experiences of growing up in rural 
New Zealand, and the impact of AS-related differences on her gender identity as a 
child (Birch, 2003, 116).  Married in her early twenties, and divorced five years later, 
Birch discusses the breakup of her marriage in terms of a conflict between her 
dispositions and those qualities that she felt proper to motherhood (the decision 
not to have children was significant in the divorce) (Birch, 2003, 146-149).  Gender 
and  sexuality  issues  also  come  through  as  strong  themes  in  terms  of  her 
experiences  as  a  teenager  and  young  adult,  including  her  explorations  of 
relationships with both men and women, and her ‘lifelong’ feelings of androgyny 192 
 
 
(Birch, 2003, 120).  She also held a number of jobs in which she often came up 
against difficulties in understanding and negotiating the implicit regularities which 
shaped social relations within these fields.  These experiences will be explored in 
chapter  seven  (in  7.2.1)  in  relation  to  how  Birch’s  dispositions  combined  with 
changes in the conditions of habitus and field to shape particular risk conditions 
within  the  world  of  work.    Here,  I  will  explore  her  negotiation  of  the  ‘hidden’ 
regularities  of  workplace  fields,  as  part  of  a  wider  discussion  of  negotiating 
everyday insecurity in the workplace. 
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4.4.7 - John Elder Robison (Look Me In The Eye) 
 
 
Image 8 – John Elder Robison 
(http://blogs.plos.org/neurotribes/files/2011/05/robison.handsome.jpg) 
 
John Elder Robison was born in 1957 into a suburban household in Massachusetts, 
USA (Robison, 2008, 7, 19).  From an early age he describes difficulties in interacting 
with other children, as well as ways coping with different experiences of lifeworld in 
terms  of  how  information  about  other  people  was  organised.    As  a  child,  he 
describes  difficulty  understanding  the  emotional  responses  of  non-AS  people, 
contrasting his ‘logical’ responses with the emotional reactions of others (Robison, 
2008, 38).  He also writes of difficulties with issues such as making inappropriate 
facial  expressions,  and  describes  (in  later  life)  the  development  of  practical 
strategies for managing social exchanges with differently disposed others (Robison, 194 
 
 
2008, 189).  Robison’s narrative contributes to two of the discussions in this thesis.  
The first of these appears in chapter six where (in 6.1.3) I discuss his idea of ‘logical 
empathy’ and how he contrasted this with the affective responses of differently 
disposed others.  I will explore how this concept operated as a form of distinction in 
the formation of his identity through self-other relations.  In contrast to Lawson’s 
account,  this  example  illustrates  how  opportunities  for  renegotiation  of  the 
practical  conditions  of  interactions  can  be  restricted  by  the  cultural  horizons  of 
particular social fields.  The second use of Robison’s narrative will appear in chapter 
eight where (in 7.1.1), I compare and contrast his orientations to fatherhood with 
those of Will Hadcroft, who decided not to become a parent.  In this discussion I will 
explore  how  the  respective  authors  framed  fatherhood  in  terms  of  associated 
insecurities in relation to their dispositional selves. 
 
4.5 - Summary 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to explain and justify my methodological approach 
to exploring formations of pre-diagnostic identity in this thesis.  Existing literature 
(discussed in chapter two) indicates that the relationship between AS and identity is 
subject to change across the life course (Molloy and Vasil, 2004; Bagatell, 2007; 
Davidson  and  Henderson,  2010a),  and  I  have  therefore  chosen  to  adopt  a 
comparative life story approach.  In 4.1, it was argued that this is an appropriate 195 
 
 
approach for exploring formations of pre-diagnostic identity across lives, as well as 
exploring the ‘hidden spheres’ (Thompson, 2008) of phenomenological experience 
and social life that have often been hidden from third party accounts of AS people’s 
experiences  (in  particular,  clinical  descriptions)  (Waltz,  2005).    The  sources  of 
empirical material for this investigation are autobiographies, which as argued in 
4.1.2  may  be  the  only  source  of  available  qualitative  data  for  exploring  pre-
diagnostic experiences.  Epistemological and ethical advantages to the use of these 
sources were also discussed in terms of the degree of control that the AS person 
maintains over the structure and description of their account.  Following on from an 
understanding  of  autobiographies  as  situated  knowledges,  management  of 
interpretive and positional issues was discussed with respect to how these were 
managed in reflexive practice during the research.  In 4.3.2, I explained the process 
of analysis using the NVivo CAQDAS software package, and how this relates to the 
structure  of  the  discussion  in  part  two.    Finally,  I  have  given  an  introductory 
summary of each autobiography in terms of its relevance to my investigation of pre-
diagnostic identities. 
 
This chapter also marks the end of part one of the thesis, in which I have sought to 
frame my investigation, beginning with an exploration of how I understand AS as an 
object of study, drawing on Hacking’s concept of the ‘interactive kind’.  In chapter 196 
 
 
two,  I  established  the  broad  focus  and  specific  research  questions  that  have 
structured my investigation: 
1.  How  do  AS  people  understand  their  dispositional  selves  in  the  pre-
diagnostic phase of life?   
2.  How do self-other relations affect pre-diagnostic understandings of self? 
3.  How does management of everyday insecurities relate to formations of the 
pre-diagnostic self? 
As indicated in 2.2, these questions follow a conceptual progression that moves 
from a focus on formations of dispositional identity, to consider how these relate to 
other aspects of identity as they arise in self-other relations, and finally to explore 
the  interplay  between  management  of  everyday  insecurities  and  pre-diagnostic 
identities.  The literature discussed in this section (2.2), and the questions arising 
from it, point to the importance of social and cultural conditions on formations of 
pre-diagnostic identity, and in chapter three I argued that a Bourdieusian approach 
to  identity  can  help  to  explore  these  issues.    Through  a  discussion  of  how 
assumptions about perceptual functioning inform Bourdieu’s original concepts of 
practice, habitus, field and forms of capital, I have sought to reframe aspects of this 
framework  in  order  to  accommodate  AS  related  differences.    Using  Bottero’s 
schema (augmented by intersectionality theory), I have framed identity in terms of 
a relationship between dispositional, reflexive and collective aspects of self.  Finally, 197 
 
 
I have introduced the idea that the concepts of authenticity, accountability and 
legitimacy can help us to frame specific issues relating to pre-diagnostic formations 
of identity for AS people.  These concepts will be developed further in the analytical 
chapters  that  follow,  beginning  with  my  exploration  of  dispositional  identity 
formation in the pre-diagnostic lives of four of the autobiographers. 
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Part Two – Exploring formations of pre-diagnostic identity 
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5 – How do AS people understand their dispositional selves in the 
pre-diagnostic phase of life? 
 
In this chapter, I will explore how four of the authors – Gunilla Gerland, Wendy 
Lawson,  Lianne  Holliday  Willey  and  Will  Hadcroft  –  came  to  understand  their 
dispositional selves in the pre-diagnostic phase of life.  The discussion will focus on 
each author in turn, exploring a particular theme from their narrative in relation to 
the question above, the order of which also reflects a progression in terms of the 
overall discussion.  Gerland’s narrative will introduce two themes, firstly, in relation 
to early understandings of dispositions in terms of strengths and limitations, and 
secondly, how these may be configured as differences through social encounters in 
different conditions of habitus and field.  The discussion of Lawson’s autobiography 
will take up these themes and explore them in relation to the author’s ability to 
experience dispositionally appropriate ways of being, compatible with the idea of 
‘autistic emotion’ identified by Davidson (2007).  Following on from this, Willey’s 
narrative will be discussed in relation to how her dispositional ways of being shaped 
practical  strategies  and  aptitudes,  how  these  were  valued  in  different  fields 
(positively in the school drama group, less so in college), and the implications of 
these experiences for her understanding of dispositional self.  Finally, I will explore 
Hadcroft’s  experience  of  moving  from  conditions  of  chronic  isolation,  to  those 
within which he could develop a liveable sense of self.  His autobiography will be 
explored  last,  as  it  provides  a  contrasting  example to the  other  narratives  here 200 
 
 
discussed,  in  terms  of  how  Hadcroft  framed  his  dispositional  self  in  relation  to 
others.  For Gerland, Lawson and Willey, problematic encounters in social life led 
them to question the legitimacy of their dispositional ways of being, and also to 
mimic  others  as  a  way  of  negotiating  problematic  exchanges.    In  contrast, 
Hadcroft’s response involved a rejection of what he saw as the illegitimate habitus 
and  cultural  horizons  of  his  later  school  years  and  early  working  life.    This  will 
illustrate the potential variability of responses to problematic encounters in the pre-
diagnostic phase, and their implications for understandings of dispositional self. 
 
Analysis of the autobiographies will inform the discussion (in 5.2) in which I will 
highlight several themes emerging from them: the development of dispositional self 
in relation to strengths and limitations, configuration of these understandings as 
differences,  importance  of  variations  in  habitus  and  field  in  shaping  the 
dispositional self, and the implications of this for a person’s ability to experience 
authentic ways of being.  I propose that these issues point to some more general 
concerns in formations of pre-diagnostic self that can be theorised in terms of the 
relationship  between  authenticity,  accountability  and  legitimacy  as  a  way  of 
exploring issues associated with the ‘double burden’.  These themes will carry over 
into  the  next  chapter,  where  I  will  move  from  exploring  understandings  of 
dispositional self, to examine its relationship to reflexive and collective aspects in 
self-other encounters in pre-diagnostic life.  The findings of this chapter will then be 201 
 
 
considered in terms of their relevance to management of everyday insecurities, in 
chapter eight. 
 
5.1 – Understanding the dispositional self in pre-diagnostic life (Analysis). 
 
5.1.1 – Understanding the dispositional self in childhood (Gunilla Gerland). 
 
In  this  section,  I  will  explore  two  themes  relating  to  the  formation  of  Gunilla 
Gerland’s  sense  of  dispositional  self  in  childhood;  firstly,  her  experience  of 
dispositions as strengths and limitations; secondly, the relationship between her 
dispositional  traits  and  reflexive  understandings  of  self  in  the  development  of 
everyday practical repertoires, and their role in coming to understand dispositions 
as differences through social encounters.  These themes will be discussed in relation 
to an experience of the ‘double burden’ that relates not only to practical difficulties, 
but to issues of ‘legitimacy’ in relation to the dispositional self.   
 
Gerland  frames  her  narrative  in  terms  of  a  lifelong  struggle  to  become  a  ‘real 
person’: an idea of how one should be, linked to aspects of self which she observed 
in the behaviour of others and saw herself as lacking.  The author recalls that, from 202 
 
 
her early childhood, understanding and navigating the everyday world was often a 
bewildering experience: 
 
I  always  felt  that  there  was  something  I  didn’t  really  understand.    That 
feeling was constant and followed me everywhere.  Even when I understood 
quite  a  lot,  there  was  always  something  left  –  the  actual  way  it  hung 
together…Sometimes it was all so incomprehensible, I couldn’t even find an 
end in the tangle to pull at.  Then I would turn in on myself, knowing neither 
the question nor the answer…My state was just one colour inside myself.  I 
was the only one who had the colours: I had an internal colour system which 
became a way of connecting information about different worlds, about the 
nursery world and the garden world.  Everything became a colour inside me 
–  people,  words,  feelings,  atmospheres.    Not  understanding  was  faintly 
orange, a pale orange with sunlight coming through it.  Tiredness, what I 
hadn’t the energy to try to understand, came and laid a dark green on top of 
the orange light and put it out.  The dining-room world, the kitchen world 
and the hall world – none of these had anything to do with each other until a 
colour made me connect.  If my mother said something in a violet coloured 
way in the kitchen and two months later used that violet tone of voice in the 
bathroom,  I  suddenly  realised  that  the  kitchen  and  the  bathroom  had 
something to do with each other, so I could begin to find other similarities 203 
 
 
such as that there was water in both rooms.  But the first connection was 
always via colours (Gerland, 1997, 21). 
 
Gestalt  understanding  (‘the  way  it  all  hung  together’)  was  a  particular  area  of 
difficulty for Gerland, and a cause of significant stress throughout her life.  While 
her  synaesthesia  (‘the  colours)  provided  some  contextual  connections  between 
places, people, emotions and other experiences, this was attended by the feeling 
that there was ‘always something that [she] didn’t really understand’ (an example 
of the chronic unease discussed in chapter two) and an experience of lifeworld 
compatible with the idea of ‘spatial and embodied coherence [being challenged]’ 
(Davidson  and  Henderson,  2010b).    From  earliest  childhood,  Gerland’s  sense  of 
dispositional self involved feelings of insecurity and precariousness, in terms of how 
far her perceptual impressions could be trusted.  Her sense of which experiences 
could  be  relied  upon  in  everyday  situations  developed  as  she  grew  older,  and 
shaped practical strategies, such as theorising what could be observed by sight:    
   
As my visual impressions were very clear and sharp, I connected whatever 
happened with what I could see.  To me, everything boiled down to what I 
saw, and sight was the most reliable of my senses.  It was as if my sight was 
tangible.  I desperately wanted to understand, and this led to theories: if 204 
 
 
everything  looked  in  a  certain  way  in  the  living  room  –  the  sun  shining 
through the curtains, the ash-tray on the table with a newspaper beside it – 
and  if  Kerstin  [her  sister]  then  came  back  from  school…I  thought  that 
everything had to look exactly the same the next day, for her to come back 
from school.  It quite simply had to be like that.  And in fact, it often was 
(Gerland, 1997, 26). 
 
Making theoretical connections between different visual elements of her lifeworld 
provided a route to understanding what was not given to her intuitively; however, 
the  need  to  ‘consciously  sort  [her]  sensory  impressions’  was  something  that, 
although practically necessary, could also be demanding and tiring (Gerland, 1997, 
193). Another important development in understanding her dispositional traits as a 
child, was Gerland’s ‘discovery’ of what she refers to as ‘behind’ and inside’: the 
idea of things existing beyond visible external appearances: 
 
It  was  an  enormous  discovery,  with  equal  parts  of  joy  and  pain,  and  it 
completely took my breath away.  I was seven, maybe eight, and it was 
spring or early summer and fairly warm.  I was out in the garden tickling the 
neighbour’s cat with a piece of grass…The cat, who was called Higgins, was 
lying almost in the hedge on the neighbours garden side.  I had to reach in 205 
 
 
among the leaves and twigs to get him.  I looked up, and I saw the hedge 
separating  our  garden  from  the  neighbours;  then  I  looked  out  over  the 
whole area.  As our house was at the top of the hill, I could see a long way, 
and I glimpsed far off a large handsome house like a palace.  It was an old 
people’s home, I’d heard someone say. I saw the houses and the trees, and 
suddenly light dawned.  There’s something behind everything!  I at once 
knew how things were inside as well, and that this too applied to everything.  
Everything has an inside! (Gerland, 1997, 98). 
 
Her ‘discovery’ of spatial and contextual connections between different places and 
things had a significant impact on how she came to understand her relationship to 
everyday environments.  In light of her sense that certain aspects of experience 
were more ‘reliable’ than others, the idea that ‘everything’ must have a  ‘behind’ 
and ‘inside’ became a rule that was applied globally, as a way of trying to fill gaps in 
intuitive understanding:   
 
I had previously found it difficult to generalise, and to apply an experience 
from one area of life to another.  I now began to generalise exaggeratedly.  I 
deduced that as behind and inside applied to everything, this was sure to be 
where the centre of understanding was.  It was a matter of taking with you 206 
 
 
what you knew.  The compartments were not separate.  Everything went 
together.  What happened here could also happen there.  It was important 
to try to maintain a thread from one situation to another.  This soon became 
more than a theory – it became a truth that would have consequences for 
my way of trying to understand the world in the future (Gerland, 1997, 117-
118). 
 
These  extracts  provide  examples  of  how  understandings  of  dispositional  self  in 
relation to environments can develop and change over time and generate new ways 
of understanding and engaging with the world.  Both dispositional (e.g. her sharp 
vision  and  synaesthesia)  and reflexive  elements  (e.g.  her understanding  of  their 
‘reliability’) shaped her practical orientation to social and environment situations, 
and thereby affected her sense of dispositional strengths and limitations in relation 
to everyday challenges.  This led to the formation of practical repertoires, such as 
her  ‘colour  and  theory’  system  (Gerland,  1997,  27),  where  her  synesthetic 
impressions formed the basis for theoretical understandings of everyday settings.  
This evolved over the course of her life, through childhood and adolescence and 
into  adulthood,  incorporating  new  practical  strategies;  for  example,  as  a  child, 
learning to write provided Gerland with a mode of expression and comprehension 
which she found easier than speech, offering new strategies such as ‘labelling’: 207 
 
 
 
I enjoyed writing and being good at it.  Expressing words in writing was 
much easier for me than taking the long way round, as I experienced it, via 
speech.  I used to write labels for various things.  I wanted everything to be 
orderly, clear and separate.  This was not some way of keeping an inner 
chaos under control, but an attempt to arrange the external world according 
to the same system as the inner world, a way of establishing a slightly better 
accord between me and everything else.  Inside me were already closed 
compartments with labels attached for events, rooms and worlds.  Like a 
computer,  these  did  indeed  have  a  great  many  ramifications  and  sub-
departments,  but  the  cross-connections  were  few.    Clearly,  the  worlds 
outside me would be easier to relate to if I was able to sort them out in a 
similar way.  So I made labels which said what everything was and where it 
belonged  (Gerland, 1997, 53). 
 
‘Labelling’ allowed Gerland to connect her experience of lifeworld (with its clearly 
ordered connections and ‘closed compartments’) with the external world of objects 
and places.  Learning new skills, findings things that one is ‘good at’ and remaking 
space in accordance with one’s own dispositions and preferences are activities that 
are not specific to AS children; however, when viewed in the context of Gerland’s 208 
 
 
terms of engagement with the world, these practices have particular significance in 
terms of learning to cope with everyday situations.   Gerland grew up having to deal 
with social and environmental challenges over and above those typical of non-AS 
children, and this affected the development of her dispositional self in terms of her 
practical relationship with the everyday world.  In addition, she grew up without a 
clear understanding of why these difficulties arose, an example of how the idea of 
the ‘double burden’ may relate to experiences of pre-diagnostic life for AS people.  
As well as aptitudes, Gerland’s experience of using her practical repertoires also 
shaped her understanding of her dispositional limitations, for example, in relation 
to theories, the success of which was dependent upon the stability of what was 
being theorised:  
 
Of course, there were sometimes exceptions that made me doubt my theory.  
That  doubt  was  a  painful  feeling,  and  I  wanted  to  understand.    I  was  a 
mental marionette hanging on strings of theories.  When the theories didn’t 
fit and I could find nothing new to hang on, I was unable to move mentally.  
So I had to create new theories all the time  (Gerland, 1997, 27). 
 
Theorising was thus not experienced as an unproblematic strength, but as fallible 
and  associated  with  feelings  of  precariousness  and  insecurity  (e.g.  ‘a  mental 209 
 
 
marionette’).  Theorising also involved affective experiences, as indicated by the 
‘painful’ doubts which arose when aspects of the world did not fit with her theory.  
Her need to understand a world that was often ‘so incomprehensible’ required a 
great deal of mental exertion, and the stress associated with this activity increased 
as the author began to inhabit more varied and complex social and environmental 
settings  (Gerland,  1997,  21).    As  a  young  child,  strategies  such  as  labelling  had 
allowed Gerland to make sense of the physical world by re-organising it in order to 
fit her dispositional understandings.  However, as she grew older and moved into 
the field of school, the limits of these strategies became apparent: 
 
[W]hat I saw was what happened, neither more nor less.  On these occasions 
when my theory was sabotaged by things not turning out as I’d anticipated, I 
had to start a new one…Strangely enough, my theories quite often fitted, 
although  naturally  they  were  entirely  wrong.    Later  on  when  I  was  an 
adolescent,  and  then  an  adult,  this  ability  to  link  situations  with  visual 
impressions, or arrange them inside my internal colour system, led to my 
being able to discover connections long before I saw them – though without 
being  able  to  explain  them.    So,  of  course,  in  the  world  of  school  they 
became invalid (Gerland, 1997, 27). 
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Here,  Gerland  describes  changes  in  her  experience  of  the  dispositional  self  in 
relation to the everyday world.  From an early age, the author had relied upon her 
‘colour  and  theory  system’  and  associated  practices  as  a  way  of  navigating 
problematic environments.  This shaped her development of practical repertoires, 
such as labelling, through which she sought to remake the surrounding world in 
accordance with her own internally ordered sense of it.  However, the success of 
this  strategy  was  limited  by the  stability of the  environment,  and  her  ability  to 
exercise control over it.  When faced with the ‘the world of school’, with its room 
changes (1997,127-128), different sets of toilets for boys and girls (1997, 117-118), 
and noisy classes in which she could not concentrate, the success of these strategies 
was diminished (1997, 122-123).  What had been functional understandings that 
seemed  to  ‘fit’  with  the  external  world  suddenly  became  ‘invalid’,  and  this 
experience had implications for her understanding of dispositional self.  So long as 
Gerland’s ways of understanding the world functioned adequately, they were not 
questioned  in  terms  of  their  validity;  however,  in  settings  where  her  practical 
strategies  suddenly  became  problematic,  and  where  others  continued  to  cope 
without the social and spatial difficulties that she encountered, Gerland began to 
question not only the strategies themselves but also aspects of her dispositional self.  
She  frames  her  move  into  school,  and  the  feelings  of  confusion  and  ‘invalidity’ 
associated with this experience, as one particular example of not feeling like a ‘real 
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I…made a great effort to get rid of particular characteristics, such as my 
taste for certain clothes.  I wanted to be as little different as possible, so I 
tried to smooth away and bleach out the stronger parts of my personality…I 
became slightly more accepted at school, but unfortunately this signalled 
the beginning of a slow change in my view of myself, a kind of poisoning of 
my self-respect.  Previously, when I hadn’t thought of myself as a real person, 
I’d had some sense of belonging, but to a different species.  Now I didn’t feel 
like a real person – rather a poor imitation of other people, a kind of faulty 
copy (Gerland, 1997, 127). 
 
In the ‘world of school’, Gerland became ‘painfully aware’ of her dispositions not 
only as strengths and limitations but as differences.  Legitimacy thus became an 
issue  in  understanding  her  dispositional  self,  one  that  was  negotiated  with 
reference to the observable norms of non-AS habitus.  The author describes trying 
to rid herself of dispositional traits that were associated with the idea of not being a 
‘real person’, shaped by her observations of others’ behaviour, the ‘logic’ of which 
remained elusive.  This experience points to a tension in the development of self 
between conformity with the demands of habitus (i.e. practical demands of social 
and cultural norms within the world of school) and a sense of an authentic self.  212 
 
 
Here,  Gerland  faced  a  dilemma,  in  terms  of  imitating  or  conforming  to  the 
behaviour of others, or remaining ‘different’ but faithful to her dispositional ways of 
being.  Imitation and conformity also carried the risk of encountering breaches in 
social exchanges with others, especially in situations where she was unable to grasp 
the ‘logic’ of the behaviours she was imitating.  One example of this comes from her 
relationship with her older sister, Kerstin, in early childhood:  
 
Kerstin was one of the good things in my life.  I could play with her, although 
otherwise I found it difficult to play with other children.  I had no clear grasp, 
even, of the fact that other children existed.  Kerstin was older than me, and 
could guide me a little at play as well as in the world.  I could sometimes use 
her as a model.  Out there in the world, I was always half a step behind her 
and trying to do what she did, and in that way I often succeeded in fitting in 
a little better.  Sometimes I really did walk just behind her and did exactly 
what she did (Gerland, 1997, 37). 
 
Having Kerstin as a ‘model’ gave Gerland some practical strategies to hold on to in 
otherwise  confusing  social  situations;  however,  it  also  affected  her  sense  of 
difference through comparison with her sister’s ability to be an ‘ordinary child’:   
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  [A]s I couldn’t be with children I occasionally tried to be with adults. 
  “Run away and play”, they said.  But I could neither run nor play. 
“Run away and play”, they said, as if I were any other child.  So I tried to be 
any other child.  No ‘any other child appeared’, only me pretending to be 
any other child.  I sensed the difference.  Oh how I sensed the difference, 
screeching like chalk against a blackboard inside me…I tried and tried and 
tried.  I tried much harder than I really had the energy for.  I made such an 
effort to be another child, an ordinary child – a Kerstin child…I wanted to so 
very much (Gerland, 1997, 41 - emphasis in the original). 
 
In the ‘world of school’, imitation carried the benefits of greater ‘acceptance’ at the 
cost  of  ‘poison[ed]…self-respect’;  with  Kerstin,  guidance  and  the  ‘model’  she 
provided was weighed against the risk of exposing her dispositional limitations, and 
the painful feeling of difference from her sister as the ‘ordinary child’.  We can only 
speculate about what may have happened if Gerland had grown up at a time when 
the diagnosis was available, in terms of how this would have affected her sense of 
dispositional self.  However, given Ochs et al.’s (2001) work on the importance of 
managed  disclosure  in classroom  inclusion for HFA  children  (discussed  in  2.1.2), 
having a diagnosis may have consequences for both self understanding and the way 
the child is treated by non-AS others. 214 
 
 
 
Gerland’s narrative points to two different ways in which the dispositional self may 
come to be understood in early years for children without a diagnosis.  The first of 
these involves coming to understand dispositions as strengths and limitations, in 
terms of how ‘reliable’ different aspects of experience are for dealing with everyday 
situations.    Developing  a  sense  of  the  body  and  its  aptitudes  is  of  course  not 
something unique to AS children; however, what Gerland’s narrative points to is the 
challenge  of  coming  to  understand  the  dispositional  self  in  relation  to  a  world 
where one often feels ill at ease.  This may be especially relevant for AS people who 
have grown up without a diagnosis, and in particular those who grew up before 
knowledge of AS was widespread.  Developing a practical relationship to the world 
is something that all children can be expected to experience, albeit in different ways 
with  respect  to  variations  in  environment,  culture  and  biology.    However,  AS 
children such as Gerland face additional challenges in terms of practical coping that 
have implications for understanding the dispositional self.  Early formations of self 
understanding, such as those feelings of ‘invalidity’ identified in the worlds of school, 
have consequences for the development of the self in later life (i.e. adolescence and 
adulthood) (Gerland, 1997, 249).  In Gerland’s case, this meant internalising feelings 
of differences as deficiencies which had to be overcome, associated with lifelong 
feelings of not being a ‘real person’.   
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The  second  aspect  involves  a  combination  of  dispositional  traits  and  reflexive 
understandings in the formation of practical strategies for dealing with everyday 
challenges, and the implications of these strategies for understanding dispositions 
as differences.  What was not given to Gerland’s experience, ‘the way it all hung 
together’, had to be approached through conscious organisation of her synesthetic 
impressions, what she calls her ‘colour and theory system’.  The development of 
this strategy in turn shaped her sense of dispositional self, in terms of how that she 
felt able to deal with the surrounding world.  Growing up not knowing why the 
world was ‘so incomprehensible’ meant that her resources for understanding were 
limited to trial and error, or imitation of the ‘model’ provided by others such as her 
sister.    The  success  or  failure  of  practical  repertoires  in  everyday  settings,  and 
comparison  of  these  outcomes  with  the  observable  experiences  of  others,  also 
shaped  Gerland’s understanding  of her  dispositions  as  differences.   Moving  into 
different social fields, with changing environments, as well as cultural norms and 
practical demands of habitus, presented various challenges that could de-stabilise 
previously  successful  ways  of  interacting  with  the  world.    This  was  not  only  a 
practical issue, but one of personal and emotional significance, both in terms of 
how she framed her dispositional self in relation to others, and the type of person 
she wanted to ‘be’.  Here we can see an example of how for AS people, the ‘double 
burden’ of growing up without a diagnosis can involve both practical challenges and 
a struggle for a ‘legitimate’ sense of dispositional self.  The author’s experiences of 216 
 
 
dispositions-as-differences  emerged  as  a  result  of  her  comparisons  with  the 
experiences of others; her sister as the ‘normal child’ who could ‘go and play’ at will, 
and others who ‘fitted in’ with the dominant habitus of school, who could navigate 
its sensory environments seemingly without problem.  In the absence of a diagnosis, 
or  any  other  narrative  through  which  to  understand  her  differences  and  their 
impact on daily life, Gerland internalised her daily struggles as evidence that she 
was  ‘not  a  real  person’,  like  other  people.    This  is  not  to  state  that  Gerland’s 
eventual  diagnosis  removed  her  desire  to  be  a  ‘real  person’;  reflecting  on  her 
diagnosis she describes her ‘ambivalence’ at being diagnosed, indicating that while 
this had practical benefits, there remained ‘at times’ this desire: 
 
I am quite ambivalent when it comes to my handicap.  I’m happy with what 
I’ve got and sad about what I lack.  Though sometimes an ability I’m happy 
to have and which not for the life of me would I want to be without – my 
sharp vision for instance – can also have a dark side that saddens me.  I’m 
capable of feeling ‘I don’t want to be like you’ and of thinking I have the 
right to be different, that I like being otherwise.  And at the same time, I still 
want to be a real person through and through and can wish that I could be 
transformed or that I had been born someone else (Gerland, 1997, 249). 
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While  confusion  and  feelings  of  illegitimacy  may  be  aspects  of  pre-diagnostic 
experience, being diagnosed will not necessarily remove these issues; however, in 
Gerland’s case, it may offer new ways for her to understand her differences from 
others, and their implications for her understanding of dispositional self.    
   
5.1.2 – Negotiating the dispositional self at different stages of life (Wendy Lawson) 
 
Gerland’s narrative points to the potential impact of changes in environment and 
habitus on the success of practical repertoires, and their implications for formations 
of dispositional selfhood in early years.  It also highlights the issue of legitimacy in 
relation to understandings of dispositional self, as indicated by her experiences of 
not feeling like a ‘real person’.  In Wendy Lawson’s autobiography, legitimacy is also 
an issue in relation to her ability to freely experience dispositional ways of being 
that appear highly compatible with notions of ‘autistic emotion’, highlighted in the 
works of Davidson (Davidson, 2007).  The discussion here will focus on the role of 
habitus in mediating opportunities to experience dispositionally appropriate ways 
of being, and the implications of this for understanding the dispositional self in the 
pre-diagnostic phase of life. Writing of her experience just prior to publication of 
her autobiography, Lawson describes her lifeworld in terms of a primacy of sensual 
connection with the physical environment, as well as feelings of removal from the 
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of  distance  from  other  people  in  terms  of  her  meaningful  understanding  of 
everyday environments and social situations: 
 
Much of time life is like a video, a moving film I can observe but cannot 
reach.  The world passes in front of me shielded by glass.  On a good day, I 
can smell the flowers and taste the inviting aromas.  What I cannot do is fully 
participate  in  the  complexities  of  apprehension,  interpretation, 
communication and comprehension (Lawson, 1998, 1). 
 
In common with Gerland, Lawson’s dispositional ways of understanding the world 
involved reflexive as well as dispositional elements, such as her drive to understand 
puzzling aspects of her lifeworld through study and reason:  
 
Being quite academic and possessing a love for books, poetry and study, I 
have an insatiable appetite for knowledge.  This need to understand the 
world around me drives me to interact with people and constantly explore 
their reasoning for what they do, think and feel. (Lawson, 1998, i) 
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This  understanding  of  dispositional  self  involves  a  clear  sense  of  strengths  and 
limitations, and how these aspects of dispositional self made her different from 
others:  
 
I do not see the world as others do.  Most people take the routines of life 
and day-to-day connections for granted.  The fact they can see, hear, smell, 
touch  and  relate  to  others  is  ‘normal’.    For  me  these  things  are  often 
painfully  overwhelming,  non-existent  or  just  confusing,  but  when  an 
experience or emotion is attached to some form of connecting stimuli, such 
as colour and fragrance, I am more likely to relate to it.  My friends tell me 
most people do not stop and take time to notice the bright colours around 
them:  the  colour  of  a  door  they  are  about  to  open,  a  wall  or  sign  that 
happens across their path.  They don’t stop and stare for ages, lost in the 
wonder at the ‘feeling’ the colour evokes (Lawson, 1998, 3). 
 
Here, Lawson describes an experience of the world that is not merely a field within 
which to perceive and act, but a form of affective connection through which the 
author inhabits the world meaningfully.  The distance which Lawson describes in 
social  encounters  with  non-AS  people  is  contrasted  with  the  quality  of  her 
attachment to the physical world, an experience that is valued and defended in the 220 
 
 
narrative.  This is indicative of a struggle throughout her life to freely experience 
these forms of ‘autistic emotion’, and to understand them as legitimate aspects of 
her dispositional self.  Writing of her early years, Lawson describes her feelings of 
perceptual and affective connection to aspects of the physical world: 
 
As  far back  as  I  can  remember,  I  have  been distracted  and  absorbed by 
repetitious sounds and movements.  I remember on my eighth birthday I 
received a new red bicycle with shiny silver mudguards.  I was oblivious to 
the birthday tea and celebrations, nor do I remember being excited about 
my birthday, but I do remember those mudguards. The light gleaming from 
the silver mudguards seemed to go on forever.  It was so intoxicating and I 
felt so alive.  To have that feeling interrupted by so much as a word or an 
action evoked extreme irritation and anger in me.  I hated being disturbed or 
interrupted when I was involved with some repetitive action that gave me 
delight.  I felt a sense of connection as I watched the shiny mudguards.  It 
belonged to me and I to it (Lawson, 1998, 1-2). 
 
This  example  illustrates  how  different perceptual  and  affective  attachments  can 
shape a variety of dispositions towards acting in the world, revealing a ‘different 
logic’  that may  not be obvious  to  non-AS  observers.    In pre-diagnostic  life,  this 221 
 
 
difference in Lawson’s dispositional ways of coping with the world had implications 
for  both  her  practical  orientation  to  social  interactions,  and  for  how  these 
experiences shaped her sense of dispositional self.  For example, in adolescence, 
her ways of connecting and relating to others could often be problematic, as she 
writes: 
 
[S]ometimes at school, especially during my teenage years, I formed strong 
attachments to certain girls, following them everywhere just to be close to 
them.  The tone of someone’s voice or the shape of their smile could lull me.  
Sometimes it was simply the length of their hair that attracted me and how 
it shone when the sun’s light touched it.  Certain people fascinated me, but 
they were few and far between.  Unfortunately, my fascination and need to 
be close to certain people was not shared by the individual concerned and I 
was often asked to go away (Lawson, 1998, 40). 
 
In  these  encounters,  dispositional  differences  shaped  qualitatively  different 
practical  orientations  towards  social  coordination  between  Lawson  and  others.    
The  above  is  one  example  of  what  she  refers  to  as  her  ‘clumsy’  attempts  at 
friendship building, for which she lacked the ‘know how’ (her terms), and which 
often  ‘ended  in  trauma’  (Lawson,  1998,  18).    Lawson’s  way  of  connecting  with 222 
 
 
others,  through  ‘fascinating’  physical  traits,  put  her  at  odds  with  the  dominant 
habitus of her peers.  At this point in her life, her differences marked her out as 
‘weird’ and ‘strange’, and she was often excluded from social life (Lawson, 1998, 40-
42).  Not understanding why this was the case was a source of considerable stress 
for  Lawson  (as  for  Gerland),  and  the  ‘cultural  horizon’  of  what  was  practically 
appropriate within the dominant habitus remained elusive in many such encounters.  
This had implications for both her sense of dispositional self and wellbeing, as her 
growing need for ‘connection and friends’ in adolescence and adulthood contrasted 
with distance she felt from others in terms of her ability to connect with them 
socially. 
 
Lawson’s  growing  sense  of  distance  from  others,  and  increasing  difficulties  in 
dealing  with  the  social  and  environmental  situations  of  everyday  life,  was 
intersected  by  another  important  factor  in  her  pre-diagnostic  experience  of 
dispositional self, which was her diagnosis of schizophrenia as a young adult.  Upon 
leaving school, she found her career choices ‘restricted’ by difficulties with social 
interactions, eventually deciding to become a nurse (Lawson, 1998, 64).  While this 
provided her with a sense of ‘meaningful’ work, Lawson describes problems with 
integrating  into  the  professional  habitus  of  nursing  due  to  practical  issues,  for 
example,  dealing  with  sudden  change,  and  eventually  was  forced  to  leave  the 
profession  (Lawson,  1998,  72).    Having  to  leave  the  nursing  field  was  a  painful 223 
 
 
experience for Lawson, which heralded the onset of her first mental health crisis, 
resulting  in  a  suicide attempt  and hospitalisation  within  a  psychiatric institution 
(Lawson, 1998, 75).   
 
In post-diagnostic life, knowledge of her AS-related differences as such presented 
opportunities for understanding and negotiating breaches in social interactions, an 
example of which comes from her time as a mature student at university, during 
practical role-play exchanges in a communication studies module: 
 
“So, Sheila.  How do you think that session went?”  The words left my mouth 
in a confident manner.  There was a moment’s silence – but it seemed to go 
on forever. 
“Actually, Wendy, it felt like you had no interest in what I was saying at all!”  
Her words startled me. 
  “Oh…ummm…can you please explain to me why you felt that way?” 
“Look, I know we are only practising and this counselling session is not for 
real, but what I shared with you is still a real problem for me and yet you 
seemed not to care.  I am feeling quite hurt at your lack of attention and 
interest!”  I felt surprised because I had tried so hard to listen to her. 224 
 
 
“Why did you think I was not interested in what you were saying to me?”  I 
replied, trying to stay calm and in control. 
“It  was  very  obvious  because  you  did  not  look  at  me  throughout  the 
session.”  Sheila was looking at the ground. 
“So, if I look at you while we talk, you feel I am listening, but because there 
was little eye contact, you felt I was not interested in what you had to say?”  
I was finally beginning to understand what she was saying, although the 
concept was not new. 
“Sheila, I’m really sorry you felt this way.  Please be reassured that I am 
interested in you and in what you have to say.  The problem here is one of 
communication.  I actually hear you better when I am not looking at you!  
However, because this is a problem for you I would like you to be patient 
with me while I learn to work on my lack of eye contact.”  Sheila smiled, 
thanked me for my honesty and said she would not take it personally in the 
future.  She also encouraged me to at least give the appearance of making 
eye contact during counselling sessions.  It was explained that this could be 
done  without  necessarily  looking  at  another  person’s  eyes  but  rather 
attempting to look in their general direction now and then, with occasional 
eye  contact  at  other  times.    This  advice  has  proven  to  be  an  enormous 225 
 
 
advantage to me and has been a great helping strategy (Lawson, 1998, 10-
11) 
 
What  Lawson  was  able  to  do  in  this  situation  was  to  renegotiate  the  practical 
conduct of a problematic exchange, by rendering that which had hitherto passed as 
implicit explicitly, and thus make it a topic for reflexive renegotiation with Sheila.  
While changes in her understanding of dispositional self and associated ways of 
being opened up new ways of approaching social coordination with others, it is 
important to consider the wider conditions in which this exchange took place. Both 
parties appear to have displayed interest in and commitment to amicable resolution 
of a communicative difficulty, and this reciprocal concern was vital in shaping the 
outcome of the encounter.  In addition the cultural horizons of the field appear 
hospitable to reflexive renegotiation, such that both actors were able to pursue this 
as a legitimate form of exchange within this setting.  In most of the settings she had 
inhabited up to this point, this does not appear to have been the case. 
 
Reflecting  on  changes  in  her  understanding  of  self  over  the  course  of  her  life, 
Lawson writes of the impact that understanding her AS differences as such had on 
her orientations to practical activity: 
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I have begun to realise that my outlook on life is vastly different to that of 
most other people.  I had always assumed everyone operated as I did, and 
felt about things as I do.  Intellectually, I realised that people are individual 
and  different,  but  it  has  only  just  occurred  to  me  how  extensive  is  that 
difference.  Over the years, I usually tried to contain my excitement and joy 
over life’s happenings and watched to see what makes other people happy 
or sad.  If they laughed or were unmoved, then this was my signal that it was 
all right for me to do likewise.  This process was hard work and although it 
helped me to be more observant of others, it robbed me of spontaneity and 
enjoyment of the richness of my own experience.  Today recognition of this 
fact has freed me in many ways and I now allow myself the choice (Lawson, 
1998, 116). 
 
In this passage, the author highlights the impact of changes in her perception of 
dispositional  self,  in  relation  to  both  her  practical  orientations  to  everyday 
situations, and to her ability to freely pursue and experience her particular ways of 
connecting with the surrounding world.  Previously, she had sensed her difference 
from others through connections with the physical world and her orientations to 
social life, for example, as she writes of difficulties in family settings as a young 
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I could not explain my world to my family and I could not function in theirs 
(Lawson, 1998, 65). 
 
The role of the diagnosis in this process is difficult to isolate, as while the event is 
referenced it is not discussed in detail, only general reflections on changes in self-
understanding which occurred afterwards are given.  The structure of the narrative 
does provide some indirect evidence of the importance of the diagnosis: examples 
such  as  the  exchange  with  Sheila,  as  well  as  her  reflections  on  changes  in  her 
understanding of dispositional self (1998, 116), all appear chronologically at points 
after Lawson was diagnosed.  Equally however, changes in other aspects of her 
everyday life also appear to have been significant in this regard, such as entering 
the  more  supportive  field  of  the  university  within  which  she  could  renegotiate 
problematic interactions (Lawson, 1998, 10).  Given these circumstances, and the 
fact that she continues to identify as ‘autistic’, it appears that the diagnosis had a 
significant impact on her understanding of self; however, its specific operation in 
terms  of  the  development  of  dispositional  self  relative  to  other  life  events,  is 
difficult to isolate. 
 
Like Gerland, Lawson’s narrative reflects processes of coming to understand one’s 
dispositions, and how these came to be framed as differences in later years.  What 228 
 
 
Lawson’s  narrative  adds  to  the  discussion  is  a  perspective  on  how  a  person’s 
understanding  of  their  dispositional  ways  of  being  can  be  mediated  by  the 
conditions  of  habitus  and  field.    In  particular,  it  illustrates  how  the  resources 
available to differently disposed actors for understanding behaviours that conflict 
with  the  dominant  habitus  can  shape  opportunities  for  social  coordination.    In 
Lawson’s case, her pre-diagnostic experiences in school and the workplace contrast 
with those such as her interaction with Sheila in post-diagnostic life, in terms of the 
author’s ability to overcome practical difficulties in social interactions.  Practical 
issues in social coordination also mediated opportunities for her to experience the 
perceptual and affective forms of connection to the world that appear vital to her 
wellbeing.  While it is difficult to isolate its precise impact, being diagnosed appears 
to have been significant in terms of increased self-acceptance and self-awareness, 
indicated by its positioning within the narrative.  What can be stated is that other 
factors also appear significant, such as her entrance into fields where she was able 
to renegotiate practical social encounters, and could offer herself the ‘choice’ to 
explore the ‘richness’ of her perceptual and affective connections to the world.  For 
AS  people  in  the  pre-diagnostic  phase  of  life,  how  they  come  to  understand 
dispositionally preferred ways of connecting with the world can be mediated by the 
social  context  in  which  one  is  situated.    This  relates  to  both  the  conditions  of 
habitus and field, in terms of whether or not one’s dispositional ways of acting are 
accepted,  and  also  the  resources  that  both  parties  have  to  frame  practical 229 
 
 
difficulties  that  arise  in  everyday  interactions  (e.g.  as  something  that  shapes 
exclusion, as in the example from Lawson’s school days; or as a challenge to be 
addressed together, as with Sheila). 
 
5.1.3 – Practical strategies, fields and the dispositional self (Lianne Holiday Willey) 
 
In both Gerland and Lawson’s narratives, formations of dispositional self involve a 
sense of strengths and weaknesses in relation to the everyday world.  In addition, 
we have seen how related forms of attachment and coping may be understood in 
relation to the dispositional self, in terms of difference and their legitimacy within 
different  social  settings.    Lianne  Holiday  Willey’s  narrative  presents  another 
example of the variable value of dispositional strengths in different settings, and the 
implications of this for understanding the self.  In particular, it shows how changes 
in  the  value  of  different  practical  strategies  within  different  fields  can  affect  a 
person’s understanding of the dispositional self.  For Willey, an important way of 
coping with problematic interactions was imitation, something to which she was 
disposed from a young age: 
   
My mother tells me I was very good at capturing the essence and persona of 
people.  At times,  I  literally  copied  someone’s  look  and their  actions. For 230 
 
 
instance, if a schoolmate began wearing glasses, I would sneak my aunt’s so 
that  I  too  could  wear  glasses,  even  though  they  nearly  blinded  me.  If 
someone broke their arm, I would come home and complain my own arm 
was broken, until my mother finally cast it in flour paste (Willey, 1999, 22). 
 
This  disposition  towards  imitating  other  children  was  attended  by  feelings  of 
distance  and  separation  from  her  peers,  in  addition  to  which  the  effect  of  her 
imitations on other children was not immediately understood by the author: 
 
Until I was somewhere around ten years old, I held myself separate from 
others. I never really compared who I was to who they were. It didn’t dawn 
on me to see myself as a fellow third grader or as a member of a team. I felt 
almost like I was invisible. I was conscious of the fact that other people could 
see me and hear me and talk to me, but still I thought I was removed from 
their domain. I didn’t contemplate that they ostracized me; rather, I chose 
to shut them out. I could stare at them all I liked, never thinking this might 
annoy them. I could take in parts of who they were and never worry that I 
was a copy cat…  (Willey, 1999, 23). 
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Though her early and middle school years were marked by problems in relating to 
others, in high school her experience improved as she discovered new social groups 
‘defined by shared interests’, within which the cultural horizons were clearer (Willey, 
1999, 32).  For Willey, the performing arts groups provided a setting in which she 
could  experience  belonging  and  involvement  with  others  who  accepted  her 
differences.  In this arena, her dispositions towards imitation operated as a form of 
embodied cultural capital, actualised through her talents as an actress, a role which 
was valued by others within the field and provided Willey with an important sense 
of belonging and acceptance: 
 
I think cultural and performing arts types must be Aspies. If not, they are 
surely the next best thing. They are at least amenable friends of Aspies. I 
found  great  acceptance  among  my  drama  peers,  most  of  whom  were 
extremely tolerant and appreciative of diversities and personal visions. I was 
able to flourish in such a warm and supportive environment, finding it to be 
the best place for me to turn many of my AS traits into real and viable assets. 
In those classes I was inspired by other eccentric thinkers who taught me to 
think of language as more than a means for expressing simple needs. Finally, 
I had found a natural place for me to be (Willey, 1999, 35). 
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The positive experience of life within the performing arts group contrasted sharply 
with her later experiences in college, where the cultural horizons of social fields 
again became vague, and her differences marked her out for bullying by peers: 
 
I must have thought the people I would meet in college would fall into my 
life just like those from my hometown did. But what I never included in my 
grasp for understanding was the fact that my hometown was more than a 
group of randomly placed people. It was a group of cohesive friends who 
had learned, over the course of a good many years, to accept one another 
for all our quirks and idiosyncrasies. I gave no thought to the possibility that I 
would move to school and end up any differently than I had ever been, a 
well-received  young  woman  with  some  strong  academic  skills  and  the 
respect of my peers. I had no way of knowing college students would be so 
cruel to those who did not fit in the circle of their normal (Willey, 1999, 42-
43). 
 
What had been accepted and valued within the high school field of performing arts 
was  not  so  within  the  college  environment  and  this  had  implications  for  the 
practical  strategies  that  Willey  adopted  in  social  situations.    For  example,  after 
graduation, Willey describes a growing sense of needing to ‘fit in’ with others’ ways 233 
 
 
of being, and to ‘mask’ her differences (Willey, 1999, 63).  Though beginning to 
develop a grasp some of the ‘rules’ which appeared to govern activities in the non-
AS social world, their ‘logic’ remained elusive and as such she was not always able 
to respond to their demands: 
 
When  I  hit  my  mid-twenties  I  was  somewhere  between  the  bright  new 
college graduate and the slightly off-beat lady who talks to pigeons in the 
park. Truth is, I was both. By then I was fully aware that I would need to 
mask myself, as best I could, according to the set of circumstances that sat 
before me. I knew for instance, that I could not talk to myself during a job 
interview. I knew I would have to dress a certain way in order not to evoke 
long stares. I understood that it was inappropriate around certain circles to 
bring up the fact that my home was a zoo filled with dogs and cats. I was 
beginning to see life more objectively, to realize that though I did not see 
the purpose in most rules, or more important, the harm in my breaking so 
many of them, I needed to follow them as best I could. Occasionally I would 
find someone who would let me make things up as I went along but for the 
most  part  I  knew  people  expected  me  to  merge  with  them  as 
inconspicuously as possible. By my twenties I knew these premises were 
true; trouble is, I still did not have the mechanisms to comply as often as I 
might have (Willey, 1999, 51). 234 
 
 
 
Awareness  of  implicit  regularities  and  demands  for  accountability,  as  well  as 
problems in responding to them intuitively, were major concerns for Willey as she 
entered  the  field  of  the  job  market.    While  the  author  was  confident  in  her 
intellectual  abilities,  the  means  by  which  these  competencies  and  skills  were 
assessed and could be made visible to employers,  was a source of concern.  In 
particular, this was an issue in interviews and meetings with unfamiliar others that 
were often attended by sensory and spatial sensitivities: 
 
People, particularly people I never saw or thought of unless they were sitting 
in front of me, unraveled [sic] me. They unhooked the calm in me and let 
loose too many thoughts, too many images, too many questions. My mind 
would  melt  amid  the  noise  and  the  light  and  the  voices  and  the 
asymmetrical patterns and the smells and the images, as I desperately tried 
to attach meaning to every word every person uttered (Willey, 1999, 56). 
 
The  sensory  and  social  challenges  of  unfamiliar  situations  often  required  great 
mental efforts from Willey, as she attempted to maintain a coherent sense of both 
the physical environment and behaviour of others.  In these situations, the author 235 
 
 
employed a number of strategies in order to maintain her place in an interaction, 
for example, during her time as a teacher at the University of Houston: 
 
[B]ack when I taught, I had to fight with myself to stay on track. I would try 
to keep my eyes very still, concentrating intently on people’s faces, but not 
their  gestures.  Gestures  took  on  dialogues  of  their  own,  making  it  even 
harder for me to keep up with the conversation. I would take notes, hoping 
that if I wrote down everything that was said, I could later piece everything 
together  like  a  puzzle.  Or,  I  would  completely  take  over  the  meeting, 
asserting my own thoughts and ideas, as if I were the self-appointed expert 
(Willey, 1999, 56-57). 
 
In situations where the dominant habitus involved intuitive sense-making, Willey 
relied  on  dispositionally  appropriate  strategies,  such  as  note  taking.  While  as  a 
sense-making practice this helped  her to understand experiences that had been 
confusing in the moment, the value of this particular strategy in terms of her ability 
to  ‘keep up’  with  the  tempo  of  interactions  was  limited.   The  author  was  then 
forced to fall back on her ‘fitting in trick’, as a strategy for holding her space in an 
interaction: 
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[W]hen all else failed, I used to rely on a ‘fitting in’ trick that is nothing more 
than  a  sophisticated  form  of  echolalia.  Like  a  professional  mimic  I  could 
catch someone else’s personality as easily as other people catch a cold. I did 
this by surveying the group of people I was with, then consciously identifying 
the person I was most taken in by. I would watch them intently, carefully 
marking their traits, until almost as easily as if I had turned on a light, I 
would turn their personality on in me. I can change my mannerisms and my 
voice and my thoughts until I am confident they match the person I wanted 
to echo. Of course, I knew what I was doing, and of course, I was somewhat 
embarrassed by it, but it worked to keep me connected and sometimes that 
was all that concerned me. It was simply more efficient for me to use the 
kinds of behaviors other people used, than it was for me to try and create 
some of my own (Willey, 1999, 57). 
 
From the material presented, one cannot be sure of the effect that this strategy had 
on others, and therefore how ‘successful’ it may have been in terms of her being 
able to hold her space or conceal her dispositional differences.  What does appear 
clear is that this was a strategy that Willey used in situations where the social and 
environmental  conditions  made  it  difficult for her to  connect  with  others.   This 
points to a particular understanding of the dispositional self in relation to everyday 
challenges, in which there is an apparent tension between the ability to cope (in the 237 
 
 
sense  of  ‘hold[ing]  her  space’)  and  being  able  to  engage  meaningfully  with  the 
situation at hand.  In these situations, her ‘mimicry’ represented an asset to the 
extent that it allowed her to cope, but the need to use this strategy also points to 
her  vulnerability  to  being  ‘unravelled’  by  problematic  social  and  sensory 
experiences.    In  this  way,  Willey’s  narrative  provides  an  example  of  how 
understandings of dispositional self may vary within as well as between, different 
fields and social settings. 
 
As the author’s earlier experiences in the drama group indicate, there may be areas 
of social life into which AS people can enter (with or without a diagnosis) where 
their dispositional  ways  of being  are  accepted,    valued,  and  integrated  into the 
practical life of the field.  However, there may also be fields where these same 
practical  strategies  and  ways  of  being  are  incompatible  with  dominant 
understandings of habitus, and/or the cultural horizon of fields within which these 
understandings operate.  In such situations, particularly those where the rhythm 
and tempo of interactions overtakes understanding but calls for timely response, AS 
people may fall back on strategies which are deployed out of necessity, rather than 
ideal choice.  Understanding the variable success of different strategies in different 
areas of social life may therefore be a key challenge for AS people, particularly in 
the pre-diagnostic phase of life.  This will have implications for how one comes to 
understand  the  dispositional  self  in  relation  to  different  everyday  settings.    In 238 
 
 
addition, the absence of a diagnosis may restrict the ability of the person to make 
claims for renegotiation of the practical conditions of social exchanges.  This could 
be, for example, in the context of understanding one’s differences and being able to 
actualise the diagnosis as a form of institutional cultural capital, that confers legal 
rights (such as those granted by the UK Autism Act, 2009) (Pellicano and Stears, 
2011). 
 
5.1.4 - From isolation to a liveable sense of dispositional self (Will Hadcroft) 
 
Thus far, we have seen how encounters with different conditions of habitus and 
field have affected understandings of self, in terms of how these are framed as 
differences.  For Gerland, Willey and Lawson, these experiences were bound up 
with issues relating to the legitimacy of the dispositional self, and shaped practical 
strategies aimed at conforming to what were often confusing social and cultural 
regularities.  Will  Hadcroft’s  narrative  provides  a  contrasting  example  of  how 
understanding dispositions as differences shaped his relationship with habitus and 
field.  As the final autobiography to be discussed in this chapter, it indicates the 
possibility of framing the self as a legitimate actor, within a world of illegitimate 
others,  and  the  potential  influence  of  social  and  relational  conditions  on  the 
development of a liveable sense of identity.  The discussion here covers two aspects 
of Hadcroft’s narrative, the first in which he maintained a sense of dispositional self 239 
 
 
in the face of chronic isolation and bullying, and the second in which  three life 
events (including his diagnosis) allowed him to develop a liveable sense of self. 
 
The author writes that as a young child he was ‘perpetually nervous, frightened of 
everything’  (2005,  22),  and  experienced  ‘a  slight  cerebral  pause’  between 
perception and action, which led to him being labelled as ‘slow’ (Hadcroft, 2005, 20; 
67).  In addition, his dispositional need for clarity and consistency in social situations 
was significant in many of his social difficulties: 
 
Instant  change  in  speech  and  behaviour  completely  baffled  me.  I  would 
puzzle over the way my peers could be so polite and helpful in the presence 
of a teacher, and then seconds later be “effing and jeffing” with the best of 
them. I simply could not get over how easily they turned it on and off. One 
minute  they  were  in  primary-school  mode,  the  next  they  had 
metamorphosed into pseudo-teenagers (Hadcroft, 2005, 58). 
 
Hadcroft’s  early  school  days  were,  in  comparison  with  later  life,  relatively 
unproblematic,  as  for  him  ‘[b]eing  eccentric  at  that  age  was  not  a  problem’ 
(Hadcroft, 2005, 29).  However, as he grew older, his dispositional ways of being 240 
 
 
came up against changes in the habitus and cultural horizons of school, leading to 
isolation and bullying in his middle and senior school years.  One important source 
of comfort during this period was his faith as a Jehovah’s Witness, and in particular 
his identification with the figure of Jesus Christ: 
 
The serialized film Jesus of Nazareth… had me spellbound. The personality of 
Jesus as depicted in the series was a potent one. I was struck by his charisma 
and the way he taught. Most of the time he was gentle and loving, but on 
occasion he would get angry and shout, most notably at the hypocritical 
religious leaders…[his] death in this film is depicted in a realistic fashion, and 
the overall message of the story hit home: If you’re going to be different and 
go against the tide, the world will hate and reject you. I took the principle to 
heart because deep down I knew I was different to my peers. It wasn’t just 
my  religious  ideas, but my  interests  and obsessions.  I had  quite  a  lot  of 
friends during this period of my life but sensed I was slightly at odds with 
them. I felt like an alien, as though I had come to earth from somewhere 
else (Hadcroft, 2005, 36-37). 
 
For Hadcroft, the figure of Christ was someone with which he could identify through 
his reflexive understanding of virtue, as well as a life story that resonated with his 241 
 
 
own experiences of isolation, misunderstanding and rejection.  In addition to the 
personal figure of Jesus, the cultural field of the Jehovah’s Witnesses helped him to 
develop  a  sense  of  collective  identity  and  community,  within  which  he  could 
experience a sense of belonging: 
 
[T]he appeal for me at the age of 12 was the pure defiance they showed in 
the face of orthodoxy.  I despised and loathed the system of the world, with 
its  fashions  and  trends  and  flimsy  ideas  and  philosophies,  its  media  and 
social conditioning.  The idea of a heavenly father watching over me was 
also potent.  It put paid to the notion that we were so small in the universe, 
that we were insignificant.  It also helped me cope with the bullies.  [An 
older Witness] encouraged me to pray for the strength to endure, and she 
gave me a Bible text to meditate upon as a means of comfort…I felt at home 
with them.  They were my people.  I was safe with them  (Hadcroft, 2005, 
79). 
 
This is one example of how his dispositional ways of understanding the social world 
combined with the cultural values of his religious and home life, in shaping not only 
his practical sense but also his reflexive understanding of appropriate behaviour.  In 
this way, Hadcroft’s identity developed both in relation to his dispositional sense of 242 
 
 
self and his reflexive identification in both individual and collective terms with the 
religious life of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Notwithstanding episodes of bullying, and 
moments in which his differences were rendered acutely ‘visible’ in interactions 
with his peers (2005, 91), school life also provided positive situations within which 
he could experience a liveable sense of self, such as his friendship with another boy, 
Ian (2005, 90-91).  However, his experience of ‘rowing against the other boats’ in 
everyday social interactions intensified as Hadcroft entered the world of work, as he 
writes of his first job at a local superstore: 
 
I was very conscious of the girls sniggering and pointing. They were in their 
late  teens  or  perhaps  their  early  twenties,  plastered  with  make-up,  hair 
bleached  white,  and  poisoning  the  air  with  their  foul  language.  I  was  a 
laughing stock again, and on that very first day the awful truth dawned on 
me: the working world was actually no different to that of school. I had been 
looking forward to joining the outside world because I thought it was the 
world occupied by my grandparents, my aunts and uncles, and my mum and 
dad: a world where people are responsible and civil, where being “different” 
is readily accepted as part of the tapestry of life. But I had been duped. This 
was definitely not the world where people watched their Ps and Qs, and I 
began to realize, slowly but surely, that the illusion presented by the adults 
in my family was precisely that, an illusion (Hadcroft, 2005, 121). 243 
 
 
 
Hadcroft’s move from school into the world of work marked the beginning of a 
problematic  period  of  life,  during  which  he  experienced  frequent  ridicule  from 
others at work, and also chronic isolation.  While aspects of school life had provided 
a counter to experiences of bullying and his sense of difference from others, few 
such  opportunities  arose  in  working  life,  and  this  experience  needs  to  be 
understood in relation to both his dispositional and cultural aspects of self.  In the 
field  of  the  superstore,  reflexive  (i.e.  his  cultural  beliefs  and  values)  and 
dispositional (i.e. his difficulties with coordination and the slight ‘cerebral pause’) 
elements of self combined both in his distinguishing of himself from his colleagues, 
and how he was framed by others.  These played out in relation to both his practical 
abilities (e.g. he was labelled a ‘balloon’ – someone who ‘holds others up’ due to 
their slow pace of working) and cultural values (e.g. his behaviour he was labelled a 
‘virgin’, and his masculinity and sexuality were questioned and mocked by women 
in the workplace) (Hadcroft, 2005, 121-122) . 
 
Hadcroft’s experiences in the world of work also point to the potential importance 
of class cultures in developing understandings of self.  Hadcroft self-identifies as 
‘working class’, describes having grown up on a council estate, and is writing of his 
experiences in workplaces that typically involve semi or unskilled employment.  In 244 
 
 
addition, the values and interests that were valorised within the cultural field of the 
superstore,  such  as,  drinking,  football,  and  being  ‘quick’  to  grasp  the  hidden 
meanings and double entendres of workplace banter (Hadcroft, 2005, 119-123), are 
consistent with those observed in other working class cultures of work at the time 
(see Willis, 1977).  There is little direct evidence in terms of overt displays of class 
culture (for example, explicit use of class-related language) in Hadcroft’s discussions 
with  colleagues;  however,  this  is  perhaps  unsurprising  given  that,  as  argued  in 
chapter  three,  habitus  can  often  function  through  tacit  understandings  and 
performances,  with  which  Hadcroft  describes  difficulty.    Notwithstanding  these 
limitations,  the  circumstances  of  Hadcroft’s  life  and  the  observations  he  makes 
regarding the processes of distinction and teasing that he experienced, point to the 
potential significance of class culture in this process, not only as a factor in itself but 
also  in  terms  of  its  intersections  with  other  aspects  of  habitus  such  as  gender 
norms: 
 
For the first few weeks I was a subject of idle mockery, with various staff 
members commenting on my crippling shyness, the fact I was still a virgin, 
the fact that I didn’t share any of their interests. A lad not passionate about 
football?  How  strange.  He  still  watches  Doctor  Who  at  his  age?  Even 
stranger. The girls would encircle me and ask me embarrassing questions.  245 
 
 
“Is it true you’re still a virgin?”  
Just look at the floor.  
“Yes, that’s true.”  
“Even though you’re 17?”  
“Yes.”  
“Why?”  
Just look at the floor.  
“Beck’ll let you go with her, won’t you Beck?”  
Beck’s shaking her head in mock denial. Just look at the floor.  
“Haaa! He’s blushing!”  
I wish I were dead (Hadcroft, 2005, 121). 
 
The  nature  of  the  bullying  and  teasing  to  which  he  was  subjected  appears  to 
suggest  transgression  of  cultural  norms  relating  to  heterosexual  masculinity 
(Hadcroft, 2005, 149, 27, 31).  Hadcroft’s identification with the moral and ethical 
life of family and church appears at odds with the embodied performances and 
markers  of  cultural  credibility  that  were  valued  within  the  field  of  school.    In 246 
 
 
addition, performative aspects of his presented identity, such as his self-described 
‘pedantic’ and ‘aloof’ manner of speech, led him to be accused of thinking himself 
‘better’  than  his  co-workers  (Hadcroft,  2005,  60).    This  again  needs  to  be 
understood in terms of the pre-diagnostic phase of life, in which Hadcroft was not 
only baffled at times by the practical ‘logic’ of social life, but was also unable to 
provide a counter-narrative sufficient to overcome or renegotiate the practical and 
cultural regularities of the field (i.e. which may have been available to a person with 
a formal diagnosis). What it indicates is that social position may provide vital clues 
to understanding particular forms of exclusion in differently situated AS people, 
which  have  implications  for  understanding  and  presenting  the  self  in  the  pre-
diagnostic phase of life. 
 
It is not possible to ascertain from this extract the precise causes of the difficulties 
Hadcroft faced, for while he certainly appears to have suffered bullying and teasing 
at the hand of co-workers, he also acknowledges that his ‘aloofness’ and ‘pedantic 
speech’ may have played a role in distancing him from his colleagues  (Hadcroft, 
2005, 122).  In addition, while the nature of the teasing aimed at Hadcroft appears 
to relate to transgression of norms associated with practical aptitude and gender, it 
is clear from the extract that he also operated with his own understandings of what 
constituted  ‘appropriate’  behaviour,  particularly  for  the  young  women  in  the 
superstore.  What the extract does offer is an example of how in the pre-diagnostic 247 
 
 
phase of life, Hadcroft came to understand and experience differences from others 
through a combination of dispositional and reflexive factors. 
 
Hadcroft’s disappointment with the cultural life of the superstore, compounded by 
experiences  of  bullying  and  isolation,  reinforced  a  sense  of  self  defined  in 
opposition to the habitus of workplaces that were seen as both practically alien and 
morally objectionable.  It is also important to consider the impact of Hadcroft’s 
dispositional  attachment  to  express  communication  and  consistent  behaviour  in 
terms of how he understood appropriate or legitimate ways of being.  For Hadcroft, 
clarity  and  consistency  were  not  only  conditions  of  meaningful  connection  with 
others, but of legitimacy in social relations.  Differences in interests from those of 
his peer group, opposition to what he saw as the dishonesty of others, and the 
bullying  co-workers  were  all  persistent  sources  of  stress for  Hadcroft during his 
early working life: 
 
It’s exactly like school, but without the teachers. It’s worse…They’re false. 
They’re all false. The world is one big lie. Two-faced. One thing in one set of 
circumstances, completely different in another. Everyone is acting. I hate it. I 
wish I were dead. For the first few weeks I was a subject of idle mockery, 
with various staff members commenting on my crippling shyness, the fact I 248 
 
 
was still a virgin, the fact that I didn’t share any of their interests (Hadcroft, 
2005, 121 - emphasis added to denote internal monologue). 
 
In the face of chronic isolation and teasing within the workplace, Hadcroft turned to 
a range of cultural resources which, in addition to his spirituality, provided both a 
means of escape and a narrative through which to make sense of his isolation.  One 
such example was in his identification with the plight of the central character in the 
1960s television series, The Prisoner: 
 
It really did seem to be me versus the rest of the world. I confided in my pen 
pal Dominic, and in response he sent me a video to watch. It was of the 1968 
television series The Prisoner, starring Patrick McGoohan. He thought I might 
identify  with  it,  and  boy  was  he  right!  The  Prisoner  tells  the  story  of  a 
government agent who turns his back on the world system and becomes 
resigned to maintaining his individuality. While at home, packing for a much-
needed  holiday,  he  is  rendered  unconscious  and  then  imprisoned  in  a 
strange island community called the Village: a bizarre parody of the world he 
thinks he’s left behind. There are a lot of colourful people in the Village, but 
no  one  is  identified  by  name,  only  by  number…Certainly  I  was  feeling 
trapped, as though I was the poor subject of some sick joke and that the 249 
 
 
whole world was in on it. The more they laughed at me, the more I resisted 
them. The more they tried to make me conform, the more I was determined 
not to crack.  
“I  will  not  be  pushed,  filed,  stamped,  indexed,  briefed,  debriefed  or 
numbered.” I had found a new lifeline (Hadcroft, 2005, 151; 153) 
 
The line quoted in the penultimate sentence comes from the central character’s 
statement at the beginning of every episode, a statement of resistance against the 
oppressive and conformist machinations of the island’s controllers.  In addition to 
The Prisoner, Hadcroft also developed intense interests in the series’ Dr. Who and 
The Tripods, in the latter in which an alien race achieves a clandestine takeover of 
the earth, while the human population are kept from realising the true nature of 
their  fate  by  an  implant  which  prevents  critical  thought.    This  narrative  device, 
known  as  ‘capping’,  provided  Hadcroft  with  another  concept  through  which  to 
make sense of his isolation (Hadcroft, 2005, 152).  The use of fictional narratives as 
cultural resources for understanding reflexively his isolation, and for maintaining a 
personally justifiable sense of self, also appears to have been important in relation 
to his mental wellbeing, as indicated in a recollected exchange between Hadcroft 
and his psychologist in later life: 
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  “Right”, said Stephanie…as I arrived for my second appointment… 
 “First of all, you’re not mentally ill.” Phew, that’s a relief.  
“Second, your attachment to Doctor Who.” Oh no, here we go.  
“If you hadn’t have used Doctor Who and the other sci-fi stuff as a means of 
escape, you almost certainly would have been mentally ill.” This was quite a 
revelation for me, as I’d been struggling with guilt feelings over the way my 
obsessiveness had intruded on the lives of my brothers, and in particular my 
mother. I told that one to Mum, and she accepted it (Hadcroft, 2005, 188). 
 
These ‘obsessions’ were, for Hadcroft, both an expression of his dispositions toward 
focused attention on a particular subject, and at the same time a set of resources 
for  maintaining  a  reflexive  narrative  of  self  in problematic  conditions  (Hadcroft, 
2005, 226-228).  Special interests and detail focused attention are known to be 
common  in  AS  people,  and  are  often  important  both  as  a  source  of  practical 
involvement  and  a  valued  aspect  of  self  (Baron-Cohen  et  al.,  2009).    What 
Hadcroft’s example illustrates is how these interests can also provide resources for 
understanding the dispositional self, particularly in conditions of isolation.  This may 
be of particular importance for those who have grown up without a diagnosis, in 
terms of providing a way of understanding their differences from others. 251 
 
 
While his special interests were important in circumstances where the author had 
little else to turn to, these were not unproblematic, as indicated in the previous 
quote.  Cultural resources provided a means of ‘escape’ and narrative justification 
of isolation; however, they did not provide the author with a sense of belonging, 
acceptance or the resources to maintain a liveable sense of self.  What allowed this 
to emerge was the progressive experience of three life events, the first of which 
was meeting his wife, Carol: 
 
This was completely new for me. I was wanted and loved, not for any other 
reason than for simply being me. Carol had a sense of being whole too. She 
loved my candid honesty, a quality that some had interpreted as bombastic 
and arrogant, but that she viewed as pure. There was no hidden agenda, no 
secrets, no other life going on behind her back. I said what I meant and I 
meant what I said…My girlfriend had filled a massive chasm of loneliness 
and despair. While I still loved those interests, I no longer needed them to 
survive…The  stark  loneliness  which  I  had  experienced  since  puberty  had 
been unbearable, to the point where I had been trying to think of ways to 
commit suicide. Companionship was what I needed more than anything else 
– to be loved for who I was, warts and all, and to give love (Hadcroft, 2005, 
171-172). 252 
 
 
 
Hadcroft and Carol were married in August of 1993, when the author was twenty 
three. While the companionship and love experienced in his relationship with Carol 
appears to have significantly improved the author’s wellbeing, it did not erase the 
difficulties which Hadcroft faced in everyday life.  Social issues at work, exacerbated 
by continuing mental distress in the form of depression and anxiety meant that the 
author continued to experience periods of chronic mental distress (Hadcroft, 2005, 
202).  After being made redundant from his position at a soft drinks factory, an 
event which he greeted with ambivalence (not knowing ‘whether to burst into tears 
or jump for joy’), Hadcroft turned to creative writing with the intention of becoming 
an author (his first novel, Anna Droyd and Century Lodge, was published several 
years  later  in  2002)  (Hadcroft,  2005,  210).    In  addition  to  achieving  one  of  his 
‘dreams’, publication of his novel also appears to have been important in making 
sense of the dispositional self.  Writing provided him with a sense of fulfilment, a 
positive aspect of his identity and a practical means through which to explore his 
experiences of difference.  Becoming a published author and marriage to Carol were 
two of the key events which Hadcroft describes as the ‘pieces falling into place’; the 
last of these being his AS diagnosis.  Although the author does not discuss the event 
itself, he describes the implications of understanding himself as AS as follows: 
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It all made perfect sense and I had an overwhelming feeling of completeness 
and, in a way, a new-found confidence… I set off to see my GP, Dr Tauk 
[Hadcroft’s GP] once again, to set the ball rolling in my quest for an official 
diagnosis. It all made perfect sense and I had an overwhelming feeling of 
completeness  and,  in  a  way,  a  new-found  confidence.  Stephanie  and 
Suzanne had defined the individual traits and had taught me how to combat 
them, but no one had ever come up with a satisfactory explanation as to 
why these problems had existed. But now it was crystal clear. I regressed 
myself back through key moments of my life and suddenly all the pieces fell 
into place. I considered the themes I had explored in my novel Anne Droyd 
and Century Lodge: being different in a world that demands conformity, and 
Anne Droyd’s difficulties in understanding and accepting the things we all 
take for granted.  She is the epitome of the Asperger child. It slowly dawned 
on me that I had been writing about Asperger Syndrome without knowing it.  
Today I am feeling better than ever. Still at odds with what I see going on 
around me, still at odds with myself, but better at dealing with it, better at 
understanding it. The chip has well and truly been knocked off my shoulder 
(he says humbly!), I have learned to respect people and I always try to see 
why they think what they think, even if I can’t agree with it. I’m getting on 
with my life. The job, the people skills, they’re getting easier by the day. I 
have friends. I have my best friend. I have my soul mate. I’m looking to the 254 
 
 
future.  I haven’t had a genuinely suicidal thought for well over a decade. 
You know, I think I’m going to be all right (Hadcroft, 2005, 230-231). 
 
It is difficult to isolate the specific impact of the diagnosis in terms of Hadcroft’s 
development of a liveable sense of self; however, what is apparent from the quote 
above is that it was one among a number of important life events through which he 
was able to overcome the isolation and unhappiness of earlier years.  The difference 
is illustrated by comparison with an event in his later school years, where a girl in 
the playground had  asked  him the question  ‘why  are  you  weird?’, to which  he 
replied, ‘I don’t know’ (Hadcroft, 2005, 92).  This exchange indicates that, although 
the  author  understood  himself  to  be  in  some  way  different  from  others  in 
dispositional  terms  in  the  pre-diagnostic  phase,  the  reasons  for  these  apparent 
differences eluded him.   However, following his marriage, publication, and eventual 
diagnosis  Hadcroft’s  sense  of dispositional  self  was  one  in  which the difficulties 
associated with AS were manageable.  The statement that ‘the chip had been well 
and truly knocked off’ his shoulder, and that he had ‘learned to respect’ people, 
also points to a reflexive realisation of the potential impact of his dispositions and 
cultural values on how he framed others.  In this way, Hadcroft’s narrative provides 
a  contrast  to  the  other  narratives  discussed  in  terms  of  his  understanding  of 
dispositional  self  in  relation  to  others.    For  Gerland,  Lawson  and  Willey,  their 
dispositional ways of understanding and acting in the social world came up against a 255 
 
 
range  of  different  practical  ‘logics’  in  the  dominant  (non-autistic)  habitus  of 
everyday settings, leading them (in various ways) to experience their ways of being 
as illegitimate.  While Hadcroft’s dispositional ways of being also came up against 
the norms of dominant habitus (in school and the workplace), these encounters 
were experienced in the context of himself as a legitimate ‘outsider’, amidst a world 
of illegitimate ‘insiders’.  In Hadcroft’s narrative, his differences and difficulties were 
interpreted through various lenses (such as the biblical account of the life of Jesus, 
and the narratives of science fiction) as a way of justifying and making sense of his 
isolation. 
 
This is important because it points to the potential heterogeneity of pre-diagnostic 
experiences, in terms of how the dispositional self may come to be understood by 
different people in different circumstances.  Hadcroft’s narrative points to several 
factors in which this variation may manifest.  One of these is the importance of 
social  position,  specifically  the  habitus  of  school  and  the  workplace  with  their 
interplay of gender and class-based regularities.  Throughout school and working 
life, Hadcroft’s dispositional differences were interpreted by others as markers of 
‘aloof[ness]’  and  he  was  a  regular  target  of  bullying.    For  his  part,  Hadcroft’s 
response to this was to reinforce his embodied and cultural dispositions, opposing 
them to what he saw as the ‘vulgar’ activities of other  children and colleagues.  
Opposition to the habitus of school and the workplace thus involved a combination 256 
 
 
of  different  dispositional  aspects  of  self  (i.e.  AS  ways  of  being  with  those 
conditioned by family and church) in reflexive negotiation of self-other relations.   
 
Another important theme is the role of Hadcroft’s special interests (both spiritual 
and cultural) not only as forms of personal involvement but as resources for making 
sense of his isolation.  The author’s reflexive identification with the figure of Jesus 
Christ, and later encounters with the narratives of The Prisoner and The Tripods, 
provided him with resources for framing and legitimating his isolation from others.  
Finally, Hadcroft’s experience of the diagnosis was one that, while largely positive 
also  illustrates  the  need  to  understand  its  impact  in  biographical  terms.    While 
having  a  diagnosis  provided  him  with  both  a  narrative  for  understanding  his 
dispositional differences, as well as a resource for re-evaluating previous life events, 
these developments need to be understood in the context of both his marriage and 
becoming a published author.  They are events that had already provided Hadcroft 
with  experiences  of  companionship  and  fulfilment  which  had  helped  mediate 
feelings of isolation and inadequacy, and improve his mental wellbeing. 
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5.2 –Discussion. 
 
Growing up as an AS person, and coming to understand the dispositional self in a 
world  of  others  who  often  behave  in  ways  that  may  be  confusing,  is  often 
challenging for those who are diagnosed in early life; however, for those who live 
for long periods undiagnosed, understanding one’s differences from others and the 
events of life, can be especially difficult without the resources for developing self-
acceptance and biographical coherence that a diagnosis can provide (Molloy and 
Vasil, 2004; Bagatell, 2007).  The discussion of the four cases shows that even within 
what is a small group, there is considerable variation in pre-diagnostic experiences, 
and their implications for how one comes to understand their dispositional self.  
However, there are some general themes that emerge; one of which is how early 
understandings  of  dispositional  self,  that  emerge  in  terms  of  strengths  and 
weaknesses, are configured as differences, with associated feelings of distance and 
illegitimacy,  as  the  person  meets  with  different  forms  of  habitus  and  field  in 
everyday life.   
 
In each of the monographs, disconnection and distance between the self and the 
worlds of others is a strong theme, as reflected in their respective titles (A Real 
Person, Life Behind Glass, The Feeling’s Unmutual, Pretending To Be Normal,).  In 
early  years, dispositions  may  come  to  be  understood  in  terms  of  strengths  and 258 
 
 
limitations  in  dealing  with  everyday  environments  and  social  encounters,  for 
example, Gerland’s ‘sharp vision’ and difficulties with making gestalt connections 
(Gerland,  1997,  249,  50),  Lawson’s  perceptual  and  affective  connection  to  the 
natural  world  and  difficulties  with  ‘apprehension,  interpretation,  communication 
and comprehension’ (Lawson, 1998, 28, 1), and Willey’s ability to ‘captur[e] the 
essence and persona of people’ matched against feelings of ‘remova[al] from [the] 
domain of others’ (Willey, 1999, 22, 27).  As the authors grew older, particularly as 
they moved into wider fields of school and the workplace, and often as a result of 
difficulties in connecting with the demands of the dominant habitus, aspects of 
their  dispositional  selves  became  associated  with  feelings  of  difference  and 
separation from others.  One example in Gerland’s narrative is her move into the 
‘world of school’ as a young child (Gerland, 1997, 146); in Lawson’s writing, this 
emerges in her later school years and early working life (Lawson, 1998, 16, 40).  
Willey experienced this as she moved from the high school and the accepting field 
of the drama group, to college where the regularities of social life were not as 
accommodating (Willey, 1999, 35, 51).   For Hadcroft, ‘being eccentric’ at an early 
age  was  contrasted  with  later  problems  in  school  and  the  workplace,  when  his 
differences marked him out as ‘weird’, and a target for bullying (Hadcroft, 2005, 29, 
91).  The timing of these events, and the quality of the experiences associated with 
them, appear variable; however, what appears consistent is the role of encounters 
with habitus and field in the development of the dispositional self.   259 
 
 
 
This is of course not something unique to AS people who were diagnosed in later 
life, as the importance of these factors has been noted elsewhere in work relating 
to those diagnosed in earlier years (see 2.1.2). The precise impact of the diagnosis 
(and its absence) is often difficult to isolate in these narratives, due both to the 
variability in the degree of reflection provided on the diagnosis specifically, and also 
how it intersects different life events.  However, if we compare the narratives here 
considered  with  existing  literature  on  the  impact  of  the  diagnosis  in  those 
diagnosed  earlier  in  life  (as  discussed  in  2.1.2),  one  can  see  that  issues  of  self 
acceptance and biographical coherence upon which the diagnosis is indicated to 
have a positive affect are especially challenging for those living without a diagnosis.   
 
Beyond the practical difficulties in dealing with everyday environments and social 
situations,  the  authors’  pre-diagnostic  experiences  are  marked  by  feelings  of 
difference and confusion from the worlds of others, and these have implications for 
understanding the dispositional self. One way in which this operates is in restricting 
opportunities for dispositionally appropriate practices and experiences to emerge, 
for  example,  Lawson’s  feelings  of  ‘fascination’  with  the  physical  world  and  the 
problems  this  created  in  relations  with  other  school  girls  (Lawson,  1998,  40).  
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the other girls, and as such renegotiation by both parties appears to have been 
necessary in order to overcome the breach in the interaction that arose.  There are 
indications, for example, in Lawson’s exchange with Sheila (Lawson, 1998, 10-11), 
that the post-diagnostic phase is one in which an understanding of dispositional 
differences from others, in tandem with greater self acceptance, can create space 
for renegotiation of the practical conduct of potentially problematic interactions.  
While  the  potential for  renegotiating  habitus  cannot  be  reduced  to  greater  self 
understanding on the part of the AS person (i.e. it would still require both the actors 
and cultural horizons of an interaction to be amenable to this renegotiation), it does 
appear significant in mediating opportunities for avoiding the kinds of exchange 
associated with social exclusion in the narratives.  One way in which this process 
relates to the dispositional self is in terms of how encounters with habitus and field 
shape understandings in relation to legitimacy.  Here, habitus appears to play a vital 
role through the accountability relationship, where personal feelings of validity are 
mediated by the congruence of dispositional ways of being with accepted norms, 
and the cultural horizons of ‘what one can get away with’ in a given field. 
 
In  Gerland,  Lawson  and  Willey’s  narratives,  pre-diagnostic  understandings  of 
dispositional self are associated with feelings that can be characterised in terms of 
illegitimacy, in the face of problematic encounters with others.  In each case, this 261 
 
 
led to feelings of wanting to be more like others (in opposition to dispositional ways 
of being), but not knowing how to comply with the expectations that would allow 
this to happen, or being able to renegotiate the conditions of interactions in order 
to accommodate their differences.  Hadcroft’s narrative does provide an exception 
to  this,  pointing  to the  possibility  of  seeing  the  dispositional  self  as  ‘legitimate’ 
amidst a world of ‘illegitimate’ others. However, it should be noted that Hadcroft’s 
sense of self was not without tensions, as indicated in his response to the question, 
‘why are you weird?’ (‘I don’t know’)  (Hadcroft, 2005, 91).  He acknowledges a 
sense of difference, but at the same time maintains a sense of self rooted in his own 
expectations of appropriate behaviour, through which he frames both his own ways 
of understanding and acting, and those of others.   In the wake of his marriage, 
publication of his novel, and AS diagnosis, Hadcroft’s understanding and acceptance 
of others also appears to have increased.  This points to the possibility that for some 
AS people, diagnosis may be important in understanding the ways of being of others, 
in addition to their own.   
 
It is important to bear in mind the historical context of these narratives, and the 
implications  of  this  for  the  authors’  experiences  of  coming  to  understand  the 
dispositional self.  In addition to the absence of formal diagnosis, all three authors 
also grew up at a period in history when AS was not widely understood, and so 262 
 
 
opportunities for making claims of difference may have been restricted.  Common 
understandings of autism were focused on children with cognitive impairment, and 
few would have made links between the authors’ behaviour and AS (Attwood, 2007; 
Baron-Cohen, 2008a).  In addition, most of the experiences described take place 
prior to the emergence of autistic communities, particularly those online, which (as 
discussed  in  chapters  one  and  two)  have  been  significant  for  AS  people  in 
developing  a  sense  of  self-acceptance  and  legitimacy  in  relation  to  their  own 
experience.   
 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the themes here discussed do point to some 
wider considerations that may be useful for framing and exploring pre-diagnostic 
understandings of dispositional self for AS people more generally.  The concept of 
the  ‘double-burden’  points  to  two  aspects  of  experience  (practical  issues  and 
biographical coherence) that may arise as a result of living with an undiagnosed 
condition (however, as discussed in 2.1.3 this term should be used with caution, due 
to its origins in relation to conditions more appropriately described as pathological).  
I suggest that the themes emerging from this section can usefully be theorised in 
terms of the relationship between authenticity, accountability and legitimacy: 
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  Authenticity - Particularly in early years, an AS person may develop a sense 
of the dispositional self in terms of particular strengths and limitations.  This 
is not simply a practical issue, but one that can involve affective experiences 
and forms of connection or ‘autistic emotion’.  Often, these are not ‘visible’ 
to  non-autistic  others,  but  are  important  and  valued  aspects  of  the  AS 
person’s experience.  In the pre-diagnostic phase of life, potential resources 
of self-acceptance and the biographical coherence that this may provide, are 
limited  not  only  for  the  AS  person  but  for  others.    This  can  constrain 
opportunities for mutual understanding, and for ‘making space’ for these 
ways of being within the practical life of everyday exchanges.  Thus in the 
pre-diagnostic phase, a person’s ability to experience and express ways of 
being that feel ‘authentic’, and not simply a copying of another person or 
‘pretending to be normal’, may be restricted. 
 
  Accountability - Later experiences of coming up against differences in the 
habitus  and  cultural  horizons  of  fields  (e.g.  what  Hadcroft  calls  ‘rowing 
against  the  other  boats’)  can  involve  difficulties  in  being  able  to  enter 
relations of accountability with others.  Here the ‘logic’ of what goes on in 
problematic interactions may be vague and confusing.  The ability of the AS 
person to understand and respond to ‘calls to order’ can be restricted, in 264 
 
 
terms  of  their  ability  to  provide  the  necessary  ‘commentary’  on  their 
experience, and to grasp the ‘logic’ of the how and why they are being held 
to account by others. 
 
 
  Legitimacy – Problems with the accountability relationship have implications 
for legitimacy.  For some AS people, in the absence of a narrative such as 
formal  diagnosis  by  which  one  can  make  sense  of  and  account  for  their 
differences  in  everyday  exchanges,  feelings  of  difference  and  distance, 
compounded  by  social  isolation,  can  cause  a  person  to  internalise  these 
experiences as evidence of the illegitimacy of their dispositional self.  This 
may lead to attempts to erase their differences, and conform to the ways of 
being of others through imitation.  The success of these strategies may be 
limited, and can have further negative consequences for understandings of 
dispositional  self.    In  other  cases,  a  person  may  come  to  understand 
themselves as a legitimate actor amidst a world of illegitimate others.  This 
may further compound existing experiences of isolation, with implications 
for  social  and  mental  wellbeing.    In  the  narratives  here  considered,  the 
impact of diagnosis on understandings of the dispositional self is variable 
and often difficult to isolate, and so it should not be thought of as something 265 
 
 
that will suddenly resolve all issues relating to legitimacy.  However, it may 
help the person to develop understanding, both of their dispositional selves 
and self in relation to others, such that they are better able to negotiate 
relations  of  accountability,  and  thereby  carve  a  space  of  legitimacy  for 
experiencing authentic ways of being. 
 
As indicated in the introduction, the discussion in this chapter and the next overlap 
in understanding the development of pre-diagnostic selves.  In this chapter, I have 
focused on how four of the authors came to understand their dispositional selves in 
the pre-diagnostic phase of life.  In the next chapter, I will explore on how the 
identities of three other authors were affected by relations with others, where I will 
move from focusing on the dispositional self to explore its interrelation with others 
(reflexive and collective) aspects. 
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6 – How do self-other relations affect pre-diagnostic understandings 
of self? 
 
Having discussed pre-diagnostic formations of dispositional self, in this chapter I 
move to explore how these relate to other aspects of self (reflexive and collective) 
in  negotiation  of  self-other  relations.    Firstly,  I  will  explore  Jeanette  Purkis’ 
experience of moving through a range of different ‘selves’ in different fields of her 
lifeworld.    Her  writing  calls  attention  to  how  dispositional  aspects  of  self  may 
combine with others, such as collective identities, in an overall sense of self, and 
also  the  importance  of  cultural  resources  in  framing  opportunities  for  social 
participation.    Secondly,  I  will  discuss  Jen  Birch’s  experience  of  moving  through 
different iterations of gender and sexual identity, and the significance of finding a 
term (androgeny) to describe her sense of difference from others.  This discussion 
will show how in addition to dispositional aspects of self mediating opportunities 
for  connecting  with  different  social  groups,  understandings  of  dispositions  may 
themselves  be  configured  by  social  participation  within  the  ‘cultural  horizon’  of 
different fields.  Thirdly, I will explore John Elder Robison’s understanding of ‘logical 
empathy’  and  how  this  operated  as  a  form  of  distinction  between  his  way  of 
relating to others with those of differently disposed others.  This will serve as a 
contrast to the discussions of positive identification in the narratives of Purkis and 
Birch, by showing an example of how pre-diagnostic understandings of the self in 
relation  to  others  can  be  shaped  by  reflexive  understandings  of  dispositional 267 
 
 
differences.  Following on from this, I will discuss some more general themes arising 
from the autobiographies in terms of how dispositional aspects of self may combine 
with  reflexive  and  collective  elements  in  formations  of  pre-diagnostic  identities.  
Finally,  I  will  explore  the  implications  of  the  discussion  in  this  chapter  for  the 
concepts of authenticity, accountability and legitimacy introduced in the previous 
chapter. 
 
6.1 – Formations of pre-diagnostic self and self-other relations (Analysis). 
 
6.1.1 - Rules, ‘selves’ and fields (Jeanette Purkis) 
 
Jeanette  Purkis’  autobiography  provides  a  point  of  connection  between  the 
discussion of the dispositional self in the previous chapter, and its relationship to 
reflexive and collective aspects of identity in the context of self-other relations.  It 
illustrates how dispositional aspects of self can mediate participation in different 
collectives,  in  terms  of  their  compatibility  with  the  practical  life  of  the  group.  
However, it also shows how the conditions of habitus and field, and the cultural 
resources available in different settings, are also important in this process, and how 
dispositions may not necessarily override other aspects  of identity.  In addition, 
Purkis’ narrative indicates that forms of reflexive and collective identification can 
play a vital role in shaping how the dispositional self is understood and presented to 268 
 
 
others in pre-diagnostic life, and in particular whether or not these are seen as 
legitimate by others in different fields. 
 
One of the central themes in Purkis’ narrative is what she refers to as a ‘search for 
the  rules’  for  how  one  should  act  in  the  social  world  (Purkis,  2006,  25).    This 
involved a series of different ‘identities’ (her terms) each of which ‘belong[ed] to a 
particular group with its own set of rules’ (Purkis, 2006, 186), framed in terms of 
practical  dispositions  towards  ‘reason  and  logic’  (Purkis,  2006,  191-2)  These 
dispositional tendencies were configured in different ways during her life, often 
with radically different outcomes in terms of her reflexive and collective identity, 
and presentation of self to others.  Writing of her early childhood, Purkis describes 
her life as being split between the ‘world of family and home’, and other fields such 
as school.  The contrasting nature of these fields involved oppositions of safety and 
clear  ‘rules’  (family  and  home),  with  vulnerability  and  vague  social  regularities 
(school).  In childhood, her sense of collective identity was rooted in the ‘world of 
family and home’, which included the Christadelphian church, wherein the rules of 
social life were clear and provided her with a sense of security (Purkis, 2006, 41): 
 
Although some of the expectations of my church seemed a little onerous 
and even illogical, I liked the structure that being a Christadelphian imposed 269 
 
 
on all walks of life. I liked to know that what I believed was right, to not have 
to debate morals, as that had apparently already been done. My absolute 
belief that if I followed the specific set of rules laid down by the church I 
would be guaranteed a better life in the next world was very comforting for 
someone as bound by rules as I. To me, God was the ultimate authority 
figure and I had a direct link to him. I would pray for at least 40 minutes each 
night before going to bed. God became my friend and confidant. I told him 
things no one else knew, knowing that he would understand. As my teachers 
were authority figures I could befriend, to me, so was God. I decided to be 
baptised into the Christadelphian church. After baptism I would be called 
‘sister’,  I  would  be  allowed  to  take  communion  with  the  other  adults,  I 
would no longer be a child in the eyes of God even if I was in the eyes of 
everybody else. I learned all the correct responses to the questions the older 
‘brothers’ of the church asked me. While I knew the rule book backwards, I 
had  little  knowledge  of  the  concepts  the  church  elders  spoke  of: 
commitment,  love,  forgiveness,  mercy.  I  tried  as  hard  as  I  could  to  feel 
something about what I was doing, but the closest I came to understanding 
was to think of myself as a white-board covered in red marks left by my sins 
and then imagine God wiping the board clean the moment I was baptised 
(Purkis, 2006, 40-41). 
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Here, Purkis writes of a dispositional ‘rule-oriented’ self is implicated in a reflexive 
project in which she draws on the cultural resources of the field, and aspects of 
collective identity.  She also highlights some limits in the collective aspect of Purkis’ 
involvement in the church, which appears to have been motivated more by her 
dispositions  towards  ‘rules’  and  the  comfort  provided  by  her  experience  of 
connection to God, than by any shared sense of the meaning in relation to the 
cultural life of the church.  This provides an example of how for some AS people, 
collective  aspects  of  identity  may  be  configured  by  dispositional  aspects  of  self 
which  shape  the  quality  of  practical  connection  to  the  group.  The  passage  is 
indicative of what would, for much of her life until her eventual acceptance of her 
diagnosis, be a constant tension between compliance with the ‘rules of the game’ in 
different  fields,  and  meaningful  connection  with  the  life  of  the  group.    Further 
evidence of this appeared during a period of internal conflict over church doctrine, 
an event which precipitated the first of her major shifts in identity:  
 
My world seemed to have broken in two. I had always known what the rules 
were and that the church I had been raised in, and to which I belonged, 
knew all the answers. Now there seemed to be no certainties and people 
who had once respected each other and seemingly agreed on fundamental 
truths were now arguing with each other. I attended many tense church 
meetings and began to realise that the Christadelphians, who I had once 271 
 
 
thought had the answers to everything, were disappointingly as human as 
everyone else (Purkis, 2006, 42). 
 
The  disruption  of  ‘truths’  which  underpinned  the  rules  of  the  church  also 
undermined the reflexive and collective aspects of her Christadelphian identity; by 
destabilising  what  were  previously  clear  regularities  and  cultural  horizons.    This 
sense  of  disconnection  can  also  be  framed  in  terms  of  a  connection  between 
accountability and legitimacy.  Where the ‘rules’ were clear to Purkis, she was able 
to participate in relations of accountability with others and thereby engage with the 
habitus of the church on the practical level.  In so doing, she could experience a 
sense of legitimacy in relation to her acceptance within the cultural life of the field.  
However, with the breakdown of clear regularities within the church, Purkis sought 
other ‘rules’ within a different field: 
 
My interest in the far left, fostered through my obsession with the Cold War 
from the previous few years, suddenly became urgent. I watched the news 
constantly and started seeing political answers to things I had previously 
explained with Christianity. At the time the Soviet Union collapsed and the 
Berlin Wall fell I found my calling. I left the church and decided to become a 
communist (Purkis, 2006, 42). 272 
 
 
 
Purkis’  transition  from  Christadelphian  to  communist  (the  first  of  her  shifts  in 
identity) also highlights the importance of cultural resources in the development of 
identities, in this case the objectified form of a ‘rulebook’ (as had been the case 
with religious texts in the field of the church).  This took the form of the magazine of 
the Australian Communist Party, which she would join at the age of sixteen: 
 
I started to read it and the more I read, the more I wanted to believe. This 
paper welcomed the end of Eastern European communism and described 
the former communist regimes as ‘state capitalist’. This paper was exactly 
what I had wanted – a new rule book (Purkis, 2006, 46). 
 
Part of what made both the Christadelphian and communist fields suitable arenas 
within which to develop a reflexive and collective sense of self was not only the 
express nature of habitus, but also the resources of the field.  Purkis’ dispositional 
attachment to express rules meant that, where these were objectified in the form 
of texts, she could better participate in the life of the group and thereby develop 
both a personal and collective identity through a reflexive project.  The importance 
of  ‘rulebooks’  therefore  indicates  that  the  availability  of  different  resources  for 
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mediating  opportunities  for  AS  people  to  grasp  and  participate  in  relations  of 
accountability.  While clear regularities may be beneficial to AS people in general 
with respect to being able to engage with differently disposed others, for those 
living without a diagnosis this may be of particular significance with respect to the 
‘double  burden’  of  having  difficulties  that  have  no  obvious  cause.  Another 
important  factor  in  Purkis’  development  of  her  communist  identity  was  the 
acceptance of her dispositional differences within the field of the party: 
 
The best thing about being with my comrades, though, was the fact that 
they all accepted me. No one minded that I was ‘odd’ or different. In a world 
where the only important thing was politics I was always among friends, 
providing I adhered to a few simple rules, and if there was one thing I was 
good at it was following rules. (Purkis, 2006, 48) 
 
For Purkis, the practical conduct of accountability relations provided conditions in 
which  her  ways  of  being  were  accepted  as  legitimate.    However,  there  also 
remained a degree of difference between her meaningful experience of party life 
and that of her ‘comrades’: 
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For my fellow leftists, being involved in political action was about stopping a 
school from being closed, or standing on a picket line alongside wrongfully 
dismissed  workers.  There  was  an  emotional  involvement for  the  average 
socialist;  he  or  she  felt  bad  when  a  perceived  injustice  was  committed. 
Socialists  and  others  on  the  left  are  often  described  as  having  a  ‘social 
conscience’ and to most it’s exactly that. Yet I had joined the left as a sort of 
substitute to the set of rules I had grown up with. I constantly tried to feel 
something for those I was defending, yet I couldn’t… Feeling may have been 
beyond me, but fighting wasn’t. When I first joined the Party the only kind of 
fights I had were verbal ones: arguments with my parents, or someone at 
school, or a church member. However, by 1992 I had been involved in some 
physical  fights  for  political  causes,  too.  I  had  engaged  in  fights  with  the 
police at protests or with right-wing protesters at a march organised against 
the neo-Nazi skinheads…My morals were based solely on following rules and, 
as far as I was concerned, I wasn’t breaking any of them. I was following the 
socialist  rule  book  and  in  that  rule  book  there’s  nothing  wrong  with 
physically attacking the police – they constitute ‘the enemy’ (Purkis, 2006, 
79). 
 
Purkis’ writing points to the possibility that for some AS people, identification with 
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cultural horizons of field, more so than any shared sense of meaningful attachment.  
This observation does not exclude the potential for shared meaningful attachment, 
but  indicates  that  dispositional  aspects  of  self  may  involve  needs  which  find 
fulfilment  in  particular  fields,  thus  mediating  the  collectives  with  which  one 
becomes  involved.  For  those  living  without  a  diagnosis,  this  may  be  especially 
important,  as  particular  fields  may  provide  a  home  for  ways  of  being  that  are 
problematic in other areas of life.  The extract also suggests that, in addition to the 
field of the party providing a compatible arena for her dispositions toward express 
rules and logic, it also provided outlets for different dispositional aspects of self (i.e. 
her  enjoyment  of  the  thrill  of  violent  protest).    This  potential  suggests  that 
dispositional aspects of identity should not be seen as fixed, but may emerge across 
the life course as different sets of social conditions provide bases for contrasting 
patterns of practical activity to emerge.   
 
During her time with the party, Purkis was charged with assaulting a police officer at 
a  demonstration  (Purkis,  2006,  80-81),  and  eventually  sent  to  prison  for  her 
unwitting participation in an armed robbery with a man named Joe, whom she had 
befriended (Purkis, 2006, 87-88).  In prison, Purkis was diagnosed with AS; however, 
while it was to be a vital part of her defence during her trial, she did not at the time 
accept this as a valid description of her differences.    276 
 
 
 
My parents had thought me strange my whole life, but had never known 
why, and even the psychiatrists I had been sent to had been puzzled by my 
apparently inexplicable behaviour. My mum’s work friend said her son had 
been diagnosed  with  something  called  Asperger’s  Syndrome…There  were 
only two professionals in Melbourne at that time who could diagnose it and 
my  parents  contacted  the  psychologist  who  worked  with  adults  with 
Asperger’s Syndrome, Vicki Batista. She agreed to come to the prison and 
conduct the relevant tests. When I heard my parents speak of the possibility 
that I had this condition I was torn between wanting to know why I was 
strange and feeling that my parents were just trying to feel better about 
themselves by finding an explanation for my bad behaviour. I did the tests 
Vicki  gave  me…[and  a]  short  while  later  my  parents  told  me  she  had 
diagnosed me with Asperger’s Syndrome and that it was the reason I felt no 
remorse for bad behaviour and didn’t have any ability to empathise with 
people,  including  the  victim  of  my  crime.  It  was  also  why  I  could  not 
recognise  people’s  faces  or  facial  expressions  and  why  I  found  body 
language and non-verbal communication so hard to fathom. All of a sudden I 
had a reason for all the problems that had made my life so difficult and had 
left me wondering how other people ‘work’ and why I had trouble keeping 
friends.  I  was torn  between  a  sense  of relief and  a  stronger feeling, the 277 
 
 
knowledge that I was fundamentally different from most people and that 
there was nothing I could do to be like others. I had been running from my 
difference all my life and trying to be like other people, something I now 
knew was impossible. Deep down I knew what Vicki had said was true and 
that I did have this thing everyone was telling me I did, but on the surface I 
wanted  to  be  the  same,  to  be  included.  I  refused  to  accept  that  I  had 
Asperger’s Syndrome and went back to my ‘normal’ act. I was a good actress 
and even convinced myself that I was like other people (Purkis, 2006, 100-
101). 
 
Purkis’ initial reaction to being diagnosed indicates that while a diagnosis may be 
important for many people in making sense of the self, there is no guarantee that 
this  will  be  accepted  by  the  person,  even  if  it  appears  to  ‘fit’  with  their 
understandings of dispositional identity.  It also shows that dispositional identities, 
while  fundamental  to  one’s  sense  of  self,  may  not  in  all  cases  override  those 
established through reflexive activity and/or those which arise through collective 
exchange.    The  links  between  dispositional,  reflexive  and  collective  aspects  of 
identity may therefore involve fractious as well as complementary aspects.  For AS 
adults who receive a very late diagnosis, their sense of self may be embedded in 
long-standing and/or complex relationships between different aspects of identity, 278 
 
 
and the time it may take for the diagnosis to be integrated into a sense of self (if 
indeed at all) may therefore vary between individuals. 
 
After rejecting the diagnosis at this stage of her life, Purkis experienced another 
shift in her identity while in prison, drawing on her rule-following dispositions in a 
process of compliance with the practical and cultural regimes of prison life: 
 
I had worked out that I had to fit in or life was going to be very difficult for 
me. Surprisingly I found it very easy to play the role of a criminal. There was 
a  strict  set  of  rules  that  were  very  easy  to  learn  and  prisoners  had  no 
problem accepting someone who was a bit different if they followed the 
rules. Had I been my different self and not worked out what was expected of 
me, I imagine my life would have been hellish, but I’d had plenty of practice 
at doing what was expected of me and playing various roles and I had little 
trouble becoming Jeanette the criminal.  I soon had more friends than I’d 
ever had before, although I was in a constant state of alert, knowing that 
most of my friends would think nothing of attacking me physically should I 
do  something  wrong.  I  became  known  as  a  weird  but  ‘staunch’  girl, 
particularly  after  a  fight  I  started  with  the  sole  intention  of  being 
accepted…Everyone thought that, even though I had a university education 279 
 
 
and came from a decidedly middle-class background, I was a decent sort, a 
‘toff ’ (Purkis, 2006, 93). 
 
This example is one of several in the narrative where Purkis engaged in violent acts 
as a means of maintaining her presented self within a field where not to do so 
would have been highly risky (she would later do this in order to be sent back to 
prison from mental healthcare).  Her disposition towards rule following, coupled 
with the explicit demands of the prison habitus, shaped a reflexive project in which 
her identity as ‘Jeanette the criminal’ was asserted through a number of strategies 
circumscribed by the cultural horizons of prison.  There are also positional aspects 
to  consider  here,  as  Purkis  points  to  her  ‘middle  class,  university  educated’ 
background as a marker of difference from her peers, one which required mediation 
through  explicit  compliance  with  the  demands  of  habitus.    Playing  the  role  of 
‘Jeanette  the  criminal’  was  again  something  that  cannot  be  explained  by 
dispositionality  or  reflexivity  alone,  but  may  be  better  understood  in  terms  of 
relationships  between  these  domains  and  their  interplay  with  the  habitus  and 
cultural horizons of the field.  While the ‘rules for living’ within the prison were clear, 
in terms of how and why she would be held to account by others, this contrasted 
sharply with her experience upon release: 
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The outside world didn’t seem as great as people seemed to think it was. I 
thought my life in prison was much more fun than life outside, where people 
betrayed  me  and  stole  from  me  and  expected  what  seemed  totally 
unreasonable things from me (Purkis, 2006, 105). 
 
Adjustment to life after prison was difficult was difficult for Purkis.  ‘[S]hunned’ by 
her  former  friends  in  the  communist  party  she  entered  a  world  where  the 
regularities  of  daily  life  were  vague  and  unstable  (2006,  104).  Purkis  became  a 
heavy  user  of  recreational  drugs  (2006,  108-113)  and  suffered  from  chronic 
depression, as well as episodes of acute mental distress (Purkis, 2006, 120).  Over 
the next few years, she experienced a number of stays in mental health institutions 
and, finding life in these fields extremely challenging, engaged in violent acts in 
order to be sent back to prison (Purkis, 2006, 138, 146, 153): 
 
I had my mind set on going to prison…I returned to the hospital, my black 
mood returning the moment I stepped inside the door. Two days later I 
attacked another nurse and this time it meant the police arrived instantly 
and charged me with assault. I went to court and was refused bail. I was 
going back to prison. I thought that surely this had to mean I was going to be 
happy again  (Purkis, 2006, 138). 281 
 
 
 
After her final release from prison,  Purkis was able to find a form of life within 
which she could develop a liveable sense of self that was practically compatible with 
her ways of being; however, unlike her previous ‘selves’, this also allowed her a 
more  meaningful  experience  of  self-other  relations.    She  enrolled  in  the 
undergraduate arts programme at Monash University where she was both accepted 
socially and involved in creative activities: 
 
A few weeks into my degree I got used to the dynamics of the class and 
found I had people to talk to most of the time. I was amazed at how popular 
I seemed to have become. Only one person in the Honours class reacted to 
me  badly,  everyone  else  talked  to  me  and  invited  me  to  openings  of 
exhibitions they were putting on or asked me to go to the pub with them for 
beers. My address book, which had three people’s addresses in for about a 
year after I was given it, was now full of phone numbers and addresses of 
people I could call and talk to whenever I liked. I had an exhibition at a 
university gallery and loads of people turned up to the opening – not just 
family members but friends. I couldn’t believe that so many people liked to 
spend their time with me. I’d never been popular before (Purkis, 2006, 138). 
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Here, we can see a difference between Purkis’ experience of connection to and 
identification  with  the  cultural  life  of  the  field  in  comparison  to  her  earlier 
experiences in the church, the party and the prison.  Whereas before her writing 
conveyed  a  tension  between  practical  connection  with  habitus,  and  a  sense  of 
distance from meaningful involvement, here we can begin to see signs of personal 
connection and belonging in her descriptions of relations with others.  However, 
while Purkis’ acceptance of the AS diagnosis was a significant factor in her coming 
to  terms  with  her  dispositional  differences,  at  this  stage  both  her  dispositional 
differences  and  AS  diagnosis  were  still understood  as  potentially problematic  in 
terms of self-other relations: 
 
Just  before  I  moved  into  my  new  flat  [prior  to  studying  at  Monash],  I 
accepted  something  about  myself  that  had  been  threatening  and 
challenging me for years – I now believed, for the first time in my life, that 
what I had been told in 1994 while a prisoner at Fairlea was indeed the case; 
I had Asperger Syndrome. I did not mind as much that I was ‘different’, that I 
moved in another world to most people. I started attending an employment 
service  for  people  with  autism  and  related  conditions  and  felt  more 
comfortable  with  myself  for  knowing  there  was  a  reason  for  the  many 
difficult things I had experienced in my past. I was still quite embarrassed by 
my difference and would keep the fact of my Asperger Syndrome to myself, 283 
 
 
so as to avoid having to ‘confess’ to those I knew… While still uncomfortable 
with the fact that I was a member of an apparently strange minority, I could 
at least accept it to myself. I knew why I liked being alone, why I’d had 
universally bad experiences in relationships and why I was incapable of truly 
knowing how my actions impacted on others (Purkis, 2006, 175). 
 
While a diagnosis may be important in terms of understanding the dispositional self, 
it will not necessarily change the social conditions that shape self-other relations.  
What allowed Purkis to incorporate her AS identity into everyday presentations of 
self were shifts in the conditions of habitus and field, for example, as she describes 
in her developing friendship with Rana, a fellow student on a post-graduate art 
course she undertook after her diagnosis: 
 
Rana put up with my literal interpretation of everything she said, letting me 
know she was ‘only joking’ every time I took offence to something she said 
that  was  meant  in  fun.  While  other  friends  had  laughed  at  me  for  my 
perceived  oddities,  Rana  laughed  with  me.  I  told  her  about  my  having 
Asperger Syndrome and, far from judging me or putting me down, she asked 
questions about my perception of the world and tried to involve me in her 
world (Purkis, 2006, 186). 284 
 
 
 
Rana was also a source of support and encouragement as Purkis encountered other 
AS people through a specialist employment agency, an event which had caused her 
significant anxiety beforehand, but turned out to be a highly positive experience: 
 
The first day I spent at the course run by the autism employment service, I 
was filled with emotion and wonder. There were 25 people in the room and 
it was like looking into a mirror; I saw elements of myself wherever I looked 
– a strange, fascinating, moving and wonderful thing (Purkis, 2006, 187). 
 
Accepting  the  diagnosis  helped  Purkis  to  come  to  terms  with  her  dispositional 
differences, although both they and her AS identity remained sources of anxiety in 
exchanges with others.  The presence of accepting others, and fields within which 
acceptance  of  difference  was  possible,  allowed  Purkis  to  alter  her  reflexive 
management of the presented self, such that her AS status could be a legitimate 
part of her identity.  Finally, encounters with similar others helped her to develop a 
sense of legitimacy in relation to her AS status through identification with the wider 
collective of AS people: 
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The actor I once was is now past. I am almost able to be myself in most 
situations and many of the people who know me now know as close to a 
version of my true self as there is. I can finally say I actually quite like myself. 
It seems strange to be in a position where things seem to work out most of 
the  time.  I  have  to  consciously  remind  myself  that  I  am  no  longer  the 
criminal, the drug addict or the disturbed person I was in the past… I am, 
however,  quite  happy.  I  fit  into  the  world  to  which  I  was  born.  I  am 
comfortable  to  be  a  woman  with  Asperger’s  Syndrome  who  has  had  a 
somewhat dark and bizarre life.  I see my understanding of logic and reason 
and my dedication to whatever I put my mind to as an enormous advantage. 
If I had the choice to see the world the way most people see it and to have 
the understanding and communication skills of the majority, I would not 
take it. I look forward to what lies ahead with great interest and enthusiasm 
(Purkis, 2006, 191-192). 
 
Once again, it is difficult to isolate the precise impact of the diagnosis in terms of 
Purkis development of a liveable sense of self.  What appears clear however, is that 
acceptance  of  her  diagnosis  was  one  of  several  events  (as  with  Hadcroft)  that 
allowed  her  to  develop  a  liveable  sense  of  self  in  relation  to  others.    While 
acceptance  of  the  diagnosis  provided  Purkis  with  a  narrative  with  which  to 
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and field in which these presentations were made were also significant.    Purkis’ 
ability to accept and assert her AS identity as a liveable experience of selfhood 
appears predicated on the practical conditions of life providing the potential for 
meaningful  experiences  of  the  social,  as  well  as  the  conditions  of  participation 
within wider collectives being hospitable to her ways of being.  In the final shift of 
her  identity,  we  can  see  a  move  from  conditions  of  practical  compatibility 
(incorporating accountability and legitimacy), to a situation in which she could also 
experience authentic connection to the life of the field and a liveable sense of self in 
which  her  AS  status  could  be  presented  to  others.    The  combination  of  these 
conditions with the sense-making resources provided by the diagnosis appears to 
have  helped  Purkis  develop  reflexive  understandings  of  self,  within  which  both 
practical and meaningful aspects of life could be accommodated. 
 
Purkis’ narrative draws our attention to two important observations, in terms of 
how  the  conditions  of  self-other  relations  may  affect  the  development  of  pre-
diagnostic identities.  Firstly, orientations to participation in, and identification with, 
the life of the group may have particular qualities for AS people due to dispositional 
differences.  In each of the author’s ‘selves’, we can see a general theme of being 
practically compatible with, and at the same time distant from the meaningful life 
of the groups in which each of her identities was embedded.  This is not something 
that can be shown to result exclusively from not having a diagnosis; however, a 287 
 
 
person’s  ability  to  make  sense  of  and  overcome  these  differences  in  self-other 
relations  may  be  constrained  by  the  lack  of  a  narrative  for  understanding  their 
dispositional  differences  from  others.    In  such  situations,  the  conditions  of 
participation  in  different  social  collectives  may  be  predicated  not  only  on 
dispositional compatibility with the habitus of the group, but also the resources 
available within the social fields which they inhabit.  In both the Christadelphian 
church and the Communist party, Purkis found ‘rule-books’ in religious and political 
texts, which provided practical guidance on social regularities, the horizons of field 
and the economies of symbolic value at play within them.  In the absence of a 
diagnosis, this may be especially important, as resources for understanding self-
other differences may be restricted, an idea which is supported by her experiences 
in the post-diagnostic phase of life.   
 
Secondly, dispositional aspects of self may not in all cases override elements which 
are  constructed  reflexively,  as  evident  in  Purkis’  initial  rejection  of  her  formal 
diagnosis.  While the author appears to have acknowledged the compatibility of the 
diagnostic label with her dispositional sense of self, this was nevertheless rejected 
at the time.  Thus there exists the possibility that the diagnosis may not be accepted, 
even where it is understood in some way to ‘fit’ with one’s understanding of self, 
and this suggests that social and biographical conditions may also play a significant 
role  in  this  process.  When  Purkis  did  eventually  accept  her  diagnosis,  its 288 
 
 
importance related to her coming to terms with her dispositional differences, while 
both her AS status and her dispositional differences remained a source of concern 
in self-other relations.  Encounters with accepting others in fields hospitable to her 
differences  (i.e.  the  post-graduate  art  course),  and  the  possibility  of  collective 
identification helped her reframe her AS as a legitimate aspect of her presented self. 
 
6.1.2 - Gender, sexuality and pre-diagnostic identity (Jen Birch) 
 
Jeanette Purkis’ narrative indicates how the dispositions can interact with reflexive 
and collective aspects of identity, as well as the conditions of habitus and field, in 
shaping understandings and presentations of self.  Her experiences highlight the 
role  of  differential  social  conditions  and  resources  for  negotiating  the  self  in 
different settings, and in particular the idea that while the dispositional self plays a 
vital role in how one negotiates the self in social settings, it does not necessarily 
determine  this.    For  Purkis,  until  her  eventual  acceptance  of  the  diagnosis,  her 
presented self was shaped by the congruence of her dispositions with the practical 
and cultural conditions of habitus and field, in terms of how far she was able to 
develop and present a ‘legitimate’ self.  Jen Birch’s autobiography offers another 
perspective on relations between dispositional, reflexive and collective aspects of 
self, in terms of how the author came to understand her differences in relation to 
gender and sexuality.  In particular, it illustrates how, in the pre-diagnostic phase of 289 
 
 
life differences later associated with AS may be understood and configured through 
other aspects of self. 
 
In common with other authors here discussed, Birch describes a lifelong attachment 
to express rules as a way of understanding the world. 
 
I lived by the rules; rarely disobedient, I liked and needed the security that 
rules provided…I found that each sphere of knowledge had its own set of 
facts, or rules…To find out the facts, the rules, was to achieve mastery over 
life. Alas, the older I became, the more the uneasy feeling grew, that the 
rules for living amongst people were elusive and liquid. This was the only set 
of rules that could not be nailed down and kept down (Birch, 2003, 27-28). 
 
Social interaction was a lifelong challenge for the author, in particular where this 
involved tacit or implicit understandings, and this led to problems in her ability to 
‘keep up with the play’ in exchanges with differently disposed others (Birch, 2003, 
73).    The  author  describes  sensitivity  to  loud  noises,  as  well  as  problems  with 
‘surprising’  images  that  entered  her  visual  field  unexpectedly,  as  examples  of 
everyday sensory issues (Birch, 2003, 34-35).  These dispositional differences were 290 
 
 
also attended by lifelong feelings of difference in relation to gendered aspects of 
her identity:   
 
From early childhood, I had noticed that I did not fit in with the little girls. 
Dolls, dressing up, playing mothers and fathers, playing house, interest in 
make-up and jewellery, pretty clothes, hair-dos, boyfriends – these things 
seemed to fascinate little girls, but not me. In spite of Mum’s considerable 
skills as a tailor, and her natural wish to dress me up in pretty clothes, I 
hated even trying on new attire, and would revert as soon as possible to my 
shirt,  long  trousers  (“longs”)  and  gumboots.  (Jeans  had  not  yet  been 
invented,  or,  at  least,  were  not  yet  known  to  my  rural  family.)  When 
“dressed up,” I felt so uncomfortable and unnatural that I would rather stay 
home in my old clothes than go anywhere; but then, also, there were so 
many  interesting  things  to  do  at  our  farm  home,  and  few  outings  could 
match this. The exception to this, which my family undertook once a year, 
was our trip to Auckland Zoo. Even though this was probably the highlight of 
my year, one year I announced: “If I can’t wear my ‘longs’, I don’t want to 
go!” Such was (and is) the intensity of my need to feel “comfortable” in my 
favourite clothing, rather than dressing up. “Image” based on one’s clothing, 
hairstyle and adornments is a concept which I find puzzling and distasteful. I 
assess others on their personality and behaviour, not on their clothing labels, 291 
 
 
and I find it hard to understand why other people cannot do the same! At 
any rate, I found that this whole area of life was one of difference between 
myself and others, and particularly between myself and little girls. On the 
other hand, neither was I interested in the “macho” activities of the day, 
such as sports and boisterous adventures. I was aware of wondering where I 
fitted in to the scheme of things. Therefore, one of my identity issues was 
“Am I a boy or a girl, or something in between?” (Birch, 2003, 45-6). 
 
Here, Birch contrasts her understanding of what were deemed to be acceptably 
‘feminine’ childhood interests, with the dispositionally conditioned curiosities of her 
childhood (2003, 18-26).  Her experience suggests that for some AS people, their 
terms of engagement with the world may condition interests and ways of being that 
conflict with social regularities within particular fields and/or periods of life (such as 
childhood).    In  this  case,  these  regularities  took  the  form  of  gender  norms, 
negotiation  of  which  would  be  a  significant  issue  for  Birch  throughout  her  life.  
Absence  of  a  formal  diagnosis  may  be  significant  in  the  sense  that  no  other 
narrative may be available to account for these differences, with implications for 
how the person is perceived by others.  In Birch’s case, this is supported by her 
reflections on the impact of her diagnosis, where she indicates that experiences 
such as ‘not knowing how to play with the little girls, therefore mixing with an 
‘inappropriate’ group (‘the little boys’ as a child) (2003, 204), and later in ‘dating’ 292 
 
 
with both men and women (Birch, 2003, 206), may have been easier to deal with, if 
she had been diagnosed earlier. 
 
Birch’s sense of androgeny also relates to her her sensory sensitivities, indicating 
how  dispositional  aspects  of  self  may  intersect  wider  social  conditions  in  the 
presentation of self; for example, her attachment to ‘comfortable’ clothing which 
served as a way of managing sensory issues (i.e. her need to feel “comfortable” in 
her favourite clothing, rather than ‘dressing up’ – a common issue for AS people – 
Attwood, 2007), resulted in a practical (though apparently unintentional) rejection 
of gender norms.  This was not something recognised ‘post-hoc’ but identified as a 
constituent part of her experience of negotiating gender identity as a child.  Gender 
and  sexuality  became  increasingly  important  aspects  of  self  as  she  moved  into 
adulthood; at the age of twenty two, Birch met her first husband (Lindsay) whom 
she married a year later.  Initially, the relationship appears to have been a happy 
one; however, later issues with physical intimacy and the desire for children led to 
their eventual separation. 
 
[a]fter five years, Lindsay and I decided that we had had enough. Lindsay 
now wanted children, and I knew that I was not the right person to provide 
them. Still waiting to become “normal,” I could see that the “instincts” I 293 
 
 
needed and wanted were just as lacking as before. The only instinct I have 
about babies is with feathered and furry ones. Better to let Lindsay find 
someone else and have a new chance, I thought (Birch, 2003, 81). 
 
Disagreements over the desire to have a family (as well as their consequences for 
marriage) are of course not unique to AS people or their partners; however, what is 
significant with respect to self-other relations is the role that understandings of her 
dispositional self appeared to play in mediating the author’s desire to have children.  
Birch opposes her ways of understanding and acting in the world to those which she 
understands as being proper to motherhood (i.e. tacit, ‘instinctive’ ways of being).  
Thus her reflexive understanding of the relationship between the dispositional self 
and the wider category of motherhood is indicative of how this relationship can 
shape orientations to potential future selves.   
 
Birch’s divorce from Lindsay marked the beginning of a period in which she sought 
to explore her sexuality, and following the breakup of her marriage she went to live 
in a shared house with several lesbian friends.  In this environment, she states that 
she was accepted for her differences and began to self-identify as ‘gay’ (Birch, 2003, 
51); however, in spite of her newfound acceptance, Birch describes a lack of ‘close 
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motivated  more  by  sensory  pleasures  at  the  lights  and  ‘crush  of  bodies  on  the 
dancefloor’ than by shared connection to the practical and cultural life of the field 
(echoing Purkis’ experiences in the Church and the party) (Birch, 2003, 51).  The 
‘hidden’ regularities of social relations remained bewildering, leading her eventually 
to question her ‘gay’ identity as a valid narrative of her differences. Reflecting on 
this period of life, she writes: 
 
[l]ooking  back  on  it,  I  can  now  see  that  there  was  an  element  of  wish-
fulfilment – and of trying to convince somebody  – myself – that my gay 
orientation  was  the  reason  for  my  feeling  different.  This  was  no  longer 
convincing  to  me,  however,  as  I  could  perceive  for  myself  that,  having 
entered lesbian society, I was still on the outer! In fact, I was even more of 
an alien in my new milieu, because the “women-only” community prided 
itself  on  such  things  as  “women’s  intuition,”  “the  feminine  mystique,” 
“women’s knowledge;” and these were things which I never understood in 
the first place. Therefore, without men around to balance up the equation, I 
was even more baffled than before as to how to live amongst people (Birch, 
2003, 54). 
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category ‘lesbian’ appears to have been motivated by the support and acceptance 
which she received.  However, her dispositional ways of understanding the social 
world  contrasted  sharply  with  the  dominant  habitus,  where  ‘feminine’  intuition 
prevailed over express rules and explicit negotiation.  This experience led Birch to 
reject  both  the  label  of  ‘gay’  as  well  as  the  wider  lesbian  collective,  and 
subsequently  to  explore  bisexuality  as  an  ‘intellect[ually]’  satisfying  way  of 
understanding her differences: 
 
I came to the conclusion, at one point, that I was Gay. After six or seven 
years identifying this way, I then felt that this was no longer correct, and 
that I was, instead, Bisexual. This unleashed another set of issues, as, at that 
time  at  any  rate,  Lesbians had  a policy  of  strong disapproval  of  Bisexual 
females. As I understood it, Lesbians would not have minded Bisexuals as 
long  as  the  latter  kept  well  away  –  but  Lesbians  became  very  upset  if 
Bisexual women tried to attend Lesbian events. It may have been, however, 
a case of the more radical Lesbian elements having the loudest voice; in 
which case, perhaps the “rank and file” Lesbians did not necessarily feel the 
same way. So, I now entered my Bisexual phase (Birch, 2003, 81). 
 
For  Birch,  bisexuality  was  something  to  be  explored  ‘concept[ually]’  (2003,  81) 296 
 
 
through reflexive consideration and express discussion with interested others, an 
understanding  that  came  up  against  quite  different  notions  as  she  sought  out 
similarly interested others: 
 
I experienced quite a number of other unwanted sexual encounters along 
the way. I was no longer calling myself Bisexual, as it was by now apparent 
that this was getting me unwanted results. Even advertising for a flatmate to 
live in my spare bedroom was enough to get me a lot of unwanted attention 
from males who saw me as something more than a potential flatmate. One 
flatmate frequently harassed me for sex; another potential flatmate tried to 
pressure  me  to  have  sex  on  the  spot;  another,  I  realised  just  in  time, 
intended to run a prostitution business from my spare bedroom; a fellow 
student at university suddenly and unexpectedly grabbed me and tried to 
kiss me, but I managed to pull away before our mouths met; and other men, 
who invited me to their places for “a cup of coffee,” proved sooner rather 
than later to have something more than refreshments on their minds. Other 
people have told me, at various times in my life, “Listen to your feelings 
about  a  situation;  feel  the  vibes;  trust  your  instincts  –  and  thus  be 
forewarned about dubious situations.” But! – I did not have any feelings, 
vibes, or instincts in the sphere of social relating, so I had nothing inside me 
for  guidance.  Therefore,  I  had  no  “alarm  bells”  available  to  warn  me  of 297 
 
 
impending danger – where people were concerned, at any rate (Birch, 2003, 
82). 
 
This extract points to a practical issue in self-other relations with implications for 
identity, in terms of how aspects of ‘normative’ languages of identity negotiation 
within  particular  cultures  –  ‘listen  to  your  feelings,  vibes  etc.’  –  may  reflect 
dominant  dispositional  ways  of  knowing,  rooted  in  different  experiences  of 
lifeworld.    Birch’s  experience  of  social  life  and  the  practical  ways  in  which  she 
sought to make sense of interactions often appear in contrast to the ‘normative’ 
ways in which others did so.  This affected the forms of group participation in which 
she could become involved, as seen within both the lesbian and bi-sexual fields.  
Not only was her way of connecting with others through habitus different, but her 
understanding of what was at stake in both fields appeared at odds with the implicit 
understandings  of  others.    This  exposed  Birch  to  unwanted  sexual  attention, 
something  that  has  been  observed  elsewhere  to  be  a  particular  hazard  for  AS 
women (Faherty, 2006) due to difficulties in understanding the ‘tacit signals’ of such 
situations. 
 
After rejecting the categories of ‘heterosexual’, ‘gay’ and ‘bisexual’, Birch settled on 
a more ambivalent label, after hearing a friend describe her own orientation to 298 
 
 
sexuality.  
 
By now I had discarded all my previous orientations of Heterosexual, Gay 
and  Bisexual…  So,  when  I  heard  a  female  friend  call  her  own  sexual 
orientation “Unlabelled,” I adopted this with delight and relief. With this 
solution, one no longer has to waste time and rack one’s brains trying to 
work out what one is!  (Birch, 2003, 83) 
 
While acceptance of ambivalence provided a relief from the stress of conformity 
with established categories, finding a language with which to discuss the gendered 
aspects of her identity remained important for Birch. 
 
My preference...for male company...was also part of my life-long feeling of 
androgyny...I had never felt like a girl…so how, therefore, could I fit in with 
girl-only groups? Again, in hindsight, it seems to be a matter of the “secret 
language of indirect communication” which was at least one component of 
my deficits in all-female company – I could not decipher the code. Also, I 
have, for a lifetime thus far, lacked the “feminine” desires to dress prettily, 
use make-up, wear jewellery, follow fashion, style my hair, or have babies. 299 
 
 
When, in adulthood, I learned the word “androgyny” – that is, neither male 
nor female, or having equal amounts of both – I was glad to have a word to 
describe how I felt (Birch, 2003, 119-120) 
 
The  concept  of  ‘androgyny’  opened  up  the  potential  for  Birch  to  accept  an 
ambivalent  relationship  with  the  categories  of  sexuality  available  to  her,  and 
communicate this understanding to others.  When viewed in the context of her 
dispositional attachment to reflexive rule-based ways of knowing, this appears to 
have  been  an  important  step  for  Birch  in  understanding  her  differences.    This 
indicates that understanding of dispositional differences may also be shaped by the 
language and cultural resources that AS people have ‘ready to hand’ within the 
fields which they inhabit.  For AS people who receive a very late diagnosis, this may 
mean  that  in  the  pre-diagnostic  phase  of  life  their  differences  are  understood 
through the conditions of individual encounters, and that links between different 
experiences of self in disparate fields and in different periods of life may not be 
‘visible’ as such.  For people in this category, experiences of difference across fields 
or social encounters may involve fractured understandings of dispositional identity 
in  the  absence  of  any  unifying  biographical  narrative.    For  Birch,  while  this  is 
something that the diagnosis helped to provide, other concepts and resources such 
as the idea of ‘androgeny’ remained important.  This points to the wider idea that 
understanding the self in dispositional, reflexive and collective terms may involve 300 
 
 
other important sense-making resources beyond the diagnosis, and that these may 
then interact with the diagnosis in understanding and presenting the self. 
 
Birch’s  narrative  provides  an  example  of  how  AS-related  differences  may  be 
understood in the  pre-diagnostic  phase of  life,  and  how understandings  of  self-
other  differences  may  be  configured  through  other  aspects  of  identity,  such  as 
gender and sexuality.  It indicates that AS people who receive a very late diagnosis 
may  come  to  understand  dispositional  aspects  of  self  and  their  relationship  to 
groups  and  collectives  in  different  ways,  shaped  by  social  and  cultural 
circumstances.  In addition, understandings of dispositional differences can affect 
orientations to other aspects of identity or to potential future selves, for example, 
Birch’s decision not to become a mother.    Finally, understanding and negotiation 
of self-other relations in the pre-diagnostic phase of life may be particularly limited 
limited by the language and forms of expression through which the person is able to 
make sense of and present themselves to others.  Dispositional aspects of self may 
shape possibilities for coordination in habitus, as well as reflexive orientations to 
participation  within  the  cultural  life  of  particular  groups  and  resulting  forms  of 
collective identification. 
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6.1.3 – ‘Logical empathy’ as form of distinction (John Elder Robison) 
 
The  narratives  of  Purkis  and  Birch  have  drawn  our  attention  to  how  social 
encounters, set within different conditions of habitus and field can shape different 
iterations of self.  While discussion thus far has focused primarily on identification 
with  different  collectives,  John  Elder  Robison’s  narrative  presents  a  contrast  to 
these  stories  in  terms of distinction from  others  as  an  aspect of  pre(and post)-
diagnostic identity.  In the introduction to his autobiography, Robison states that an 
important reason for telling his story is to demonstrate to others that ‘however 
robotic…Aspergians might seem, we do have deep emotions’ (Robison, 2008, x).  
This is particularly apparent in relation to what he calls ‘logical empathy’ – a way of 
relating  to  others  based  upon  formal  understanding,  that  also  served  to  frame 
differences between himself and non-AS others, with respect to affective responses.  
Robison describes a sense from a young age of differences in his understanding and 
negotiation of social situations.  For example, as he writes of an experience in early 
childhood: 
   
People with Asperger’s or autism often lack the feelings of empathy that 
naturally guide most people in their interactions with others.  That’s why it 
never occurred to me that Chuckie [another child] might not respond to 
petting  in  the  same  way  a  dog  would.    The  difference  between  a  small 302 
 
 
person and a medium-sized dog was not really clear to me.  And it never 
occurred to me that there might be more than one way to play with a toy 
truck, so I could not understand why she objected to me showing her.  The 
worst of it was, my teachers and most other people saw my behaviour as 
bad when I was actually trying to be kind.  My good intentions made the 
rejection by Chuckie all the more painful.  I’d watched my parents talk to 
other grown-ups and I figured I could talk to Chuckie.  But I had overlooked 
one key thing:  Successful conversations require a give and take between 
both people.  Being Aspergian, I missed that.  Totally (Robison, 2008, 11 - 
emphasis in the original). 
 
Robison’s description reveals the practical as well as emotional consequences of 
early difficulties, where the ‘pain’ of problematic encounters was attended by a lack 
of understanding as to the reasons for them.  Once again, although not aware of AS 
at this stage of life, the sense of his dispositions as differences seems to have been 
apparent: 
 
Even at five, I was beginning to understand the world of things better than 
the world of people (Robison, 2008, 18). 
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As he grew older, this difficulty in understanding the ‘world of people’ was framed 
in  terms  of  dispositions  towards  ‘logical’  ways  of  relating  to  others,  which  also 
served to distinguish his experiences of affective connection and response from 
those of others.  For example, he describes issues in terms of his reactions to pre-
diagnostic  events  involving  unknown  people  which  elicited  emotional  reactions 
from others, but were seen as having little relevance to him personally: 
 
I have what you might call ‘logical empathy’ for people I don’t know.  That is, 
I can understand that it’s a shame that those people died in the plane crash.  
And I understand they have families and they are sad.  But I don’t have any 
physical reaction to the news.  And there’s no reason I should…I feel I must 
put things like this in perspective and save my worry for things that truly 
matter to me.  As a logical thinker, I cannot help thinking, based on evidence, 
that  many  people  who  exhibit  dramatic  reactions  to  bad  news  involving 
strangers are hypocrites…Often these same people will turn to me and say 
things like, ‘What’s wrong with you?  You’re not saying anything.  Don’t you 
care  that  all  those  people  got  killed?’…As  I  got  older,  I  found  myself  in 
trouble more and more for saying things that were true, but people didn’t 
want to hear (Robison, 2008, 32-33). 
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This way of framing differences in empathising also applied to practical difficulties, 
such as making socially inappropriate expressions, which he states led to him being 
seen as a ‘weird, screwed-up kid’ by others (Robison, 2008, 29).  One example of 
this involved being chastised by another parent for grinning uncontrollably upon 
hearing of the death of a local (though unfamiliar) boy: 
 
Betsy said, “Did you hear about Eleanor Parker’s son?  Last Saturday he got 
hit by a train and killed.  He was playing on the tracks.” 
I smiled at her words.  She turned to me with a shocked expression on her 
face.  “What! Do you think that’s funny?” 
I felt embarrassed and a little humiliated.  “No, I guess not”, I said as I slunk 
away.  I didn’t know what to say.  I knew they thought it was bad for me to 
be smiling, but I didn’t know why I was grinning, and I couldn’t help it.  I 
didn’t really know Eleanor.  And I had never met her kid.  So there was no 
reason to feel joy or sorrow on account of anything that might happen to 
them.  Here is what went through my mind that summer day: 
  Someone got killed. 
  Damn! I’m glad I didn’t get killed. 305 
 
 
I’m glad Varmint [Robison’s younger brother] or my parents didn’t 
get killed. 
I’m glad all my friends are ok. 
He must have been a pretty dumb kid, playing on the train tracks. 
I would never get run over by a train like that. 
I’m glad I’m OK. 
And at the end, I smiled with relief.  Whatever killed that kid was not going 
to get me.  I didn’t even know him.  It was all going to be ok, at least for me.  
Today, my feelings would be exactly the same in that situation.  The only 
difference is, now I have better control over my facial expressions… The fact 
is, from an evolutionary standpoint, people have an inbred tendency to care 
about  and  protect  themselves  and  their  immediate  family.    We  do  not 
naturally care about people we do not know…But then I see people making a 
big deal over it and it puzzles and troubles me because I don’t seem to be 
acting in the same way.  For much of my life, being different equated to 
being bad, even though I never thought of myself that way…Some people 
will cry and carry on, and I wonder…Do they really feel that?  Or is it just a 
play for attention?  As I’ve gotten older, I have taught myself to act “normal”.  
I can do it well enough to fool the average person for a whole evening, 
maybe longer.  But it all falls apart if I hear something that elicits a strong 306 
 
 
emotional  reaction  from  me  that  is  different  from  what  people  expect 
(Robison, 2008, 31 - emphasis in the original). 
  
Despite  his  apparent  disconnection  from  the  accountability  relationship  (i.e.  not 
being able to describe the practical ‘logic’ of how he would be held to account), 
Robison’s form of empathic connection was framed in terms that suggest a sense of 
both  authenticity  (in  the  sense  of  being  dispositionally  agreeable  to  him)  and 
legitimacy (as opposed to the ‘hypocritical’ reactions of some others upon hearing 
of  remote  tragedies).    This  indicates  that  internalisation  of  the  feelings  of 
illegitimacy  stemming  from  problematic  encounters  with  others  is  by  no  means 
inevitable in pre-diagnostic life. 
 
For Robison, the fact that his reactions appear to have come up against expected 
norms was not a concern in relation to legitimacy.  Rather, this was framed as a 
challenge of maintaining practical contact with the dominant habitus through, for 
example, being able to control his facial expressions in conformity with the norms 
of others.  His concern was with being able to ‘pass’ in accountability relations with 
differently disposed others, but this does not mean that he necessarily accepted the 
‘logic’ or legitimacy of their reactions.  Robison’s characterisation of empathy does 
not concern me here; what is of interest in terms of self-other relations is that he 307 
 
 
does not appear to have internalised the negative responses of others in the same 
way as, for example, Gerland and Lawson, nor depended on accountability relations 
as  a  way  of  experiencing  an  authentic  or  legitimate  sense  of  dispositional  self.  
Rather, the ‘puzzling and troubling’ reactions of others are here framed as practical 
issues with affective consequences (i.e. the ‘embarrass[ment]’ and ‘humiliation’ he 
felt after being chastised by his mother’s friend).  In pre-diagnostic life, while being 
seen as ‘weird’ and ‘messed up’ was associated with negative feelings, Robison (in a 
similar  way  to  Hadcroft)  nevertheless framed himself as  the  ‘logical’ actor,  in  a 
world of less logical others.   
 
This continued into the post-diagnostic phase of life, where his diagnosis served to 
validate ‘logical empathy’ and connect it with a wider sense of collective identity in 
terms of being ‘Aspergian’. Reflecting on his reaction to encountering AS for the 
first time (just prior his formal diagnosis), Robison writes: 
 
It was like a revelation…As a child, I had been told I was smart but I was lazy.  
Reading the pages, I realized I wasn’t lazy, just different.  I knew that I did 
not look up at people when I talked to them.  Hell, I had been beaten up and 
criticized for that all through my childhood.  But until I read that book I had 
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seemed so mean, so unfair.  It had never occurred to me that other people 
might find what I did (or did not do) naturally disconcerting…The realization 
was staggering.  There are other people like me.  So many, in fact, that they 
have a name for us…I had spent most of my life listening to people tell me 
how  I  was  arrogant,  aloof,  or  unfriendly.    Now  I  read  that  people  with 
Asperger’s display inappropriate facial expressions.  Well, I certainly knew 
about that.  When I was a child, I was told my aunt had died, and I grinned 
even though I was sad.  And I got smacked.  Just reading those pages was a 
tremendous relief.  All my life, I had felt like a sociopath waiting to be found 
out.  But the book told a very different story…I was normal, for what I am 
(Robison, 2008, 238 - emphasis in the original). 
 
For Robison, the ‘revelation’ of the diagnosis was not to dispel internalised feelings 
of illegitimacy, but rather to validate his dispositional and reflexive aversion to the 
reactions of others which he had found ‘puzzling’.  In addition, knowledge of AS 
helped him to situate both his dispositional traits and difficulties in relations with 
others within the framework of a wider collective identity (‘there are people like 
me’).    The  relief  felt  by  Robison  can  be  framed  in  terms  of  providing  the 
biographical coherence it provided for his experiences of difficulty; however, while 
the diagnosis helped him to develop a more coherent understanding of self-other 
differences,  there  remained  limits  in  terms  of  how  far  he  was  able  to  manage 309 
 
 
practical difficulties in exchanges with others.  As he makes clear, through both his 
practical  efforts  and  reflections  on  the  desire  to  be  ‘liked’,  connection  with 
differently disposed others remained important despite their (at times) ‘troubling’ 
behaviour:   
 
I’m a very logical guy.  Psychologists say that’s an Aspergian trait.  This can 
lead to trouble in common social situations because ordinary conversation 
doesn’t  always  proceed  logically.    In  an  effort  to  improve  my  own 
interpersonal  skills,  I  have  studied  computer  programs  that  engage  in 
conversation with people.  The best programs follow logical pathways to 
arrive  at  suitable  responses.    The  results,  however,  don’t  always  sound 
natural, and I am not sure that I do much better than the machines (Robison, 
2008, 189). 
 
Here,  Robison  indicates  a  reflexive  understanding  of  differences  between  his 
(logical)  dispositional  orientation  to  conversational  exchange,  and  contrasts  this 
with the less formal ways in which non-AS interactions may develop.  While at no 
point does he frame his difficulties in terms that might be described as illegitimate, 
in post-diagnostic life he does identify ‘interpersonal skills’ as an area for potential 
improvement.    His  reflection  on  the  ‘results’  of  his  ‘logical’  approach  to 310 
 
 
communicative exchange also point to an implicit acknowledgement of the limits of 
this dispositional  way  of  seeing the  world,  in terms  of how  it frames self-other 
relations.  Robison gives a detailed example of how this played out in practice, 
through a recollected exchange with a co-worker at around the time the book was 
written: 
 
[L]ast week my friend Laurie said, “One of my girlfriends is having an affair.  
And the guy rides a motorcycle just like yours!”.  Laurie’s statement posed a 
problem.  Unlike most interactions, ours had not started with a question.  
Should I respond with an opinion about the statement?  Or should I ask a 
question myself?  I considered what I had just heard: Laurie has a girlfriend.  
Yes, Laurie has lots of girlfriends.  Which  one  is she talking about?  The 
girlfriend’s having an affair.  Why tell me?  Do I know her?  Do I know the 
guy?  Is this a convoluted way of suggesting I should have an affair, since I 
have a motorcycle?  The boyfriend has a motorcycle.  Well, that narrows it 
down.  Most potential boyfriends had cars, not bikes.  So this boyfriend is one 
of 5 percent, as opposed to 95 per cent of the motoring public.  Do I know 
him?...I was not able to deduce a suitable response to her statements.  What 
did she mean by them?  There was no logical connection between Laurie’s 
sentences.  I stared at the floor and pondered my next move.  I knew I had 
to think fast.  If I think too long, people say, “Did you hear me?” or “Are you 311 
 
 
paying attention?”.  I knew she wanted a relevant response  – something 
connected to what she had just said, more than just “Oh.” I also knew from 
experience and observation that a statement like “I went to Newport to see 
the  Jazz  festival  last  weekend”  would  not  be  an  appropriate  answer.    It 
occurred to me that what I needed to do was to keep gathering information 
until I could frame an intelligent conversation.  The successful conversational 
computer programs did that.  So I asked a question. 
“Which girlfriend is that?”.  Laurie looked surprised.   
“Why  would  you  want  to  know  that?”  she  said.    I  hadn’t  expected  a 
challenge.  She sounded suspicious.  I wiggled my ears and wondered a little 
at that.  The fact that she had responded that way told me she had been 
expecting some other response.  What did she expect me to say?...When I 
asked Laurie why she was suspicious, she had a couple of questions for me:   
“Why do you need to know?  Nothing good will come of me telling you.  
What if it got back to her husband?”  I figured out what I should have said by 
chance, observing two women talking at a restaurant a short while later: 
“Jenny in accounting is having an affair, and the guy drives a Corvette”.  The 
opening line is strikingly similar, so I paid attention. 
“How cool is that!  Is he married?” 312 
 
 
Listening to that exchange, it was obvious that this was the correct response.  
When I heard them talk, I suddenly understood that Laurie’s statement had 
been meant to entertain or impress me, and that my response should have 
been  an  expression  of  admiration  or  excitement.    However,  that  never 
occurred  to  me  at  the  time…I  suspect  normal  people  are  hardwired  to 
develop the ability to read social cues in a way that I am not (Robison, 2008, 
189-191). 
 
Robison’s is aware that the other speaker is making an implicit ‘call to order’ not 
covered  by  his  express  understanding  of  the  parameters  of  the  conversation 
(Bottero, 2010); however, what eludes him is the ability to make sense of it in an 
intuitive  manner  such  that  he  is  able  to  produce  a  timely  response.    What  is 
significant here is that (as Bourdieusian theory suggests) the social ‘breach’ arises as 
a result of disruption to the rhythm and tempo of the interaction as well as issues in 
meaningful understanding.  This exchange also provoked a reflection (that ‘normal 
people are hardwired to develop the ability to read social cues in a way that [he is] 
not’)  on  both  his  dispositional  aptitudes  and  the  ability  of  his  reflexive  (logical) 
strategy for coordinating with others. 
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It is worth noting that in contrast to, for example, Lawson’s exchange with Sheila 
(6.1.2), Robison’s interaction with Laurie involves him attempting to comply with 
the  problematic  demands  of  non-AS  habitus  rather  than  seeking  to  renegotiate 
them, despite this occurring in the post-diagnostic phase of life.  From what is given 
in the text, we cannot be sure of the reasons for this; it may be that Robison felt 
uncomfortable disclosing his AS identity to this particular person (given previous 
work on disclosure discussed in 2.1.2), or perhaps he wished to ‘fit in’ with others 
without being seen as ‘different’ (as was the case for Ryan and Raisanen’s (2008) 
participants).  Whatever the reason, it illustrates that while his ‘logical’ ways of 
being  were  framed  as  legitimate,  Robison’s  sense  of  self  in  relation  to  others 
incorporated  understandings  of  his  limitations.    It  is  notable  that  when  one 
compares statements from before and after the diagnosis, his sense of dispositional 
limitations is defined more clearly post-diagnosis.  What this indicates is that one 
effect of the diagnosis on self-other relations in the post-diagnostic phase may be 
that  problems  that  were  previously  ill-defined  (i.e.  ‘puzzling’  experiences)  in 
everyday exchanges with differently disposed others may be interpreted in more 
precise  terms  as  limitations,  and  these  limitations  then  become  integral  to  the 
person’s identity. 
 
Robison’s narrative presents another perspective on how self-other relations shape 
pre-diagnostic formations of identity.  In contrast to Purkis and Birch, his sense of 314 
 
 
dispositional self remained relatively stable in terms of authenticity and legitimacy 
through his life.  When the diagnosis came, its effect was to validate his existing 
understandings  of  self,  and  connect  them  with  the  wider  category  of  being 
Aspergian.    For  Purkis  and  Birch,  the  ‘revelation’  of  the  diagnosis  offered  new 
resources for understanding and presenting the self to others; however, while  it 
was  undoubtedly  a  positive  experience  for  Robison,  knowledge  of  his  diagnosis 
meant  that  subsequent  encounters  with  others  also  served  to  sharpen  his 
perception of his limitations (echoing the sentiments of Singh’s (2011) participant 
‘Helen’, discussed in 2.1.2).  As the encounter with Laurie shows, relations with 
others  remained  difficult  in  post-diagnostic  life,  and  despite  the  confusion  and 
scepticism  he  associated  with  the  behaviour  of  differently  disposed  others  (for 
example, in empathic connections), he nevertheless retained the desire for contact 
with them. 
 
Robison’s account of ‘logical empathy’ provides an example of how distinction (in 
addition  to  positive  identification)  may  function  as  an  important  process  in  the 
formation of both pre-and-post-diagnostic identities.  In pre-diagnostic life, while he 
appears  to  have  experienced  his  way  of  empathising  as  both  authentic  and 
legitimate,  he  did  experience  negative  emotions  in  response  to  problematic 
interactions  with  others,  which  shaped  a  desire  to  maintain  contact  with  them 
through the accountability relationship.  The significance of the diagnosis in terms 315 
 
 
of how ‘logical empathy’ figured in his overall sense of identity appears to have 
been two slightly contradictory ways.  On the one hand it, validated his existing 
feelings  of  authenticity  and  legitimacy  in  terms  of  how  he  related  to  others 
empathetically.   This  is  suggestive  of  different  types  of  legitimacy  in relation to 
identity, in this case what one might call a personal sense of legitimacy (beginning in 
pre-diagnostic life) which was then reinforced by a collective sense of legitimacy 
stemming from identification with the category ‘Aspergian’.  On the other hand, 
understanding  his dispositional differences  in  light  of  the diagnosis  also  opened 
another aspect of identity in terms of self other encounters, where he began to see 
his dispositional differences in terms of limitations associated with being Aspergian.  
This extract therefore also supports provides further support for the idea (discussed 
in 2.1.2) of the diagnosis having multiple effects on a sense of self.  
 
6.2 – Discussion. 
 
The focus of the previous chapter was on understanding of the dispositional self in 
the pre-diagnostic phase of life.  In this chapter, the focus has been on how self-
other  relations  affect  the  pre-diagnostic  self,  with  particular  attention  to  the 
reflexive and collective aspects of identity.  Once again, while the three narratives 
here considered show considerable variation, there are several themes that arise.  
In the previous chapter, it was observed that dispositions can shape orientations to 316 
 
 
the life of the group in terms of their congruence with the dominant habitus.  In this 
chapter, we have seen that reflexive and collective aspects of self can also shape 
understandings of dispositions, by contextualising dispositional differences through 
particular  cultural  lenses.    In  Purkis’  narrative,  we  saw  how  her  rule-oriented 
dispositions  were  filtered  through  the  cultural  context  of  practically  hospitable 
fields, such as the church, the party, and the prison.  Her initial rejection of the 
diagnosis also shows that even where this is believed to ‘fit’ with a dispositional 
sense  of  self  it  may  not  override  reflexive  or  collective  aspects  of  identity.  
Elsewhere, Birch’s sense of dispositional difference was shaped by regularities of 
gender  and  sexuality,  for  example,  in  her  coming  up  against  gender  norms  in 
childhood, and negotiating the practical conduct of relations within the majority-
lesbian household.  Her discovery of androgeny also indicates the importance of 
other sense-making resources in the formation of a liveable sense of self. 
 
The narratives also show how the meeting of dispositions and habitus can result in 
different  degrees  of  identification  with  different  collectives.    Purkis’  sense  of 
security in knowing the ‘rules’ of church and the party, was contrasted with her 
sense of distance from meaningful involvement in the cultural life of either field.  
For  Birch,  acceptance  of  her  differences  was  juxtaposed  with  her  feelings  of 
exclusion  from  the  intuitive  habitus  (‘the  feminine  mystique’)  of  the  lesbian 
household.    Both  narratives  show  that  involvement  in  and  identification  with 317 
 
 
different  collectives  may  involve  degrees  of  contact  in  both  practical  and 
meaningful  contexts.    Robison’s  story  meanwhile  offers  a  contrast  to  these 
experiences, by showing how pre-diagnostic identities may also involve processes of 
distinction,  in  terms  of  how  a  person  comes  to  understand  reflexively  their 
differences from others.  In a similar way to Hadcroft, discussed in the previous 
chapter, Robison came to define his ‘logical empathy’ against the dispositional ways 
of  empathising  exhibited  by  others.    While  in  pre-diagnostic  life  this  sense  of 
difference was often ill-defined, in post-diagnostic life familiarity with the idea of 
being  ‘Aspergian’  served  to  validate  this  sense    of  self  by  connecting  it  with  a 
collective identity.  Taken together, the narratives here discussed indicates how 
variations in the social and cultural conditions of life can shape different formations 
of pre-diagnostic self. 
 
Finally, the three narratives also show how different kinds of social and cultural 
resource can mediate opportunities for identification with different collectives, and 
thus  the  formation  of  pre-diagnostic  identities.    In  the  church  and  party,  the 
presence  of  ‘rulebooks’  was  an  important  factor  in  Purkis’  ability  to  enter  the 
accountability  relationship,  and  thus  to  participate  in  the  cultural  life  of  these 
groups.    For  Birch,  encountering  the  notion  of  ‘androgeny’  helped  her  to 
understand  those  aspects  of  her  gendered  self  that  had  hitherto  been  filtered 
through available categories of gender and sexual identity.  Again, Robison provides 318 
 
 
a  contrast  to  this  by  showing  that  available  resources  can  also  constrain 
opportunities  for  social  coordination,  even  where  the  person  understands  their 
differences through the diagnosis.  His description of the limited success provided 
by imitation of computer speech software also shows how a lack of opportunities 
for renegotiation of habitus may also limit the ability of the person to connect with 
differently  disposed  others.    Thus  both  how  far  one  is  able  to  coordinate  with 
others in practical terms, and to experience similar forms of cultural attachment 
within a given setting, can also be mediated by the resources that the person has to 
make sense of particular situations. 
 
Building on the discussion at the end of the previous chapter, we can see from the 
analysis  undertaken  here  that  the  interrelated  concepts  of  authenticity, 
accountability and legitimacy are also useful for theorising the relationship between 
self-other relations and formations of pre-diagnostic identity. 
 
  Authenticity – In the previous chapter, authenticity was framed in terms of a 
person’s  ability  to  engage  in  activities  and  ways  of  being  that  were 
dispositionally appropriate, and to avoid feelings of inauthenticity associated 
with  copying  others  or  ‘pretending  to  be  normal’(Willey,  1999).    In  this 
chapter, we can see how authenticity is involved in the relationship between 319 
 
 
self-other relations and identity, in terms of the degree to which practical 
and  meaningful  participation  with  the  cultural  life  of  different  groups  is 
possible.  Purkis and Birch both point to a degree of meaningful distance in 
fields  where  they  appear  to  have  been  accepted  and  able to participate 
practically;  in  Purkis  narrative  this  is  also  contrasted  with  her  later 
experiences in the field of post-graduate study, where she felt a sense of 
belonging  and  connection  to  the  life  of  the  group.    Birch’s  difficulties  in 
finding a language to describe her sense of difference in terms of gender and 
sexuality also points to the fact that opportunities for presenting a sense of 
self  that  feels  authentic  may  be  mediated  by  the  availability  of  social 
resources.    
 
  Accountability  –  In  the  previous  chapter,  the  ability  to  understand  and 
participate in relations of accountability were discussed in terms of how they 
were  mediated  by  the  compatibility  of  a  person’s  dispositions  with  the 
regularities of habitus.  In this chapter, we have seen how accountability 
relations can involve degrees of connection in both practical and meaningful 
contexts, and how this shapes identification with different collectives.  The 
degree to which one can be accountable, and hold others to account, in 
different fields, may therefore involve inequality in terms of an AS person’s 320 
 
 
ability to participate in a given field.  For Purkis and Birch, conformity with 
the  practical  life  of  fields  that  were  hospitable  to  their  differences  was 
central to their identification with the church/party and lesbian household 
respectively.  However, in both cases, this was primarily about rule-following, 
with no indication that either party was in a position to renegotiate the 
conduct  of  interactions  in  such  a  way  that  would  allow  them  a  more 
meaningful (and equitable) experience of participation. 
 
 
  Legitimacy – In the previous chapter, I discussed legitimacy in relation to the 
dispositional  self,  and  how  the  pressure  of  conformity  with  the  wider 
cultural  horizons  of  habitus  can  mediate  opportunities  for  experiencing 
authentic ways of being, and for experiencing the dispositional self.  The 
discussion here suggests two different but related senses in which legitimacy 
relates to pre-diagnostic identity formation: 
o  Social legitimacy – This refers to forms of legitimacy that arise from 
relations of accountability with others, through exchanges signalling 
that a person’s ways of being are accepted by the wider collective.  
However, this does not automatically imply that those ways of being 
are experienced as authentic by the person.  Social legitimacy can 321 
 
 
therefore be conferred on ways of being that the person may be able 
to  enact  on  the  practical  level,  but  of  which  their  meaningful 
experience  may  be  different  (e.g.  Purkis’  participation  in  the 
Christadelphian  church).    Conversely  (as  Robison’s  narrative 
indicates),  ways  of  being  that  are  experienced  as  authentic  and 
legitimate  at  the  personal  level  may  be  seen  as  illegitimate  in 
different  fields.    Thus  while  social  legitimacy  may  constrain  or 
facilitate a person’s ability to experience and enact authentic and 
personally  legitimate  ways  of  being,  this  is  not  necessarily  a 
requirement. 
o  Personal legitimacy – This form of legitimacy describes feelings that 
particular  ways  of  being  are  justifiable  and  defensible.    While 
authenticity  refers  to  those  ways  of  being  that  are  dispositionally 
appropriate (i.e. what ‘feels right’ to the person), personal legitimacy 
speaks  to  a  reflexive  understanding  or  narrative  of  one’s  ways  of 
being in relation to others.  This may operate in a number of ways, 
for  example,  Robison’s  account  of  ‘logical  empathy’  provides  an 
example of maintaining a sense of personal legitimacy in the face of 
problematic encounters with others (and a lack of social legitimacy).  
Elsewhere,  Purkis  initial  rejection  of  the  diagnosis  contrasts  an 
understanding of self that appeared authentic in terms of fitting with 322 
 
 
her  dispositional  sense  of  self,  but  was  nevertheless  rejected  as 
illegitimate (in spite of the ‘social legitimacy’ this provided in terms 
of  it  accounting  for  her  actions  to  the  court).    Both  types  of 
legitimacy  may  interact  with  the  other  (e.g.  as  seen  in  Birch’s 
negotiation of gender identity within the majority lesbian household), 
however they are not synonymous. 
I now turn to the final question addressed in this thesis.  As indicated in chapter two 
(2.2.3), the combination of dispositional differences with problematic environments 
and social situations can mean that AS people face a range of everyday insecurities.  
My task in the next section will therefore be to explore, in light of the discussion 
here and in the previous chapter, how management of these insecurities relates to 
formations of pre-diagnostic identities. 
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7 - How does management of everyday insecurities relate to 
formations of the pre-diagnostic self? 
 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  explore  how  management  of  everyday  insecurities  is 
implicated in pre-diagnostic formations of self.  The structure of discussion in this 
chapter  will  differ  from  the  two  previous  chapters,  as  I  will  explore  five  of  the 
autobiographies  in  relation to  two  themes  (i.e.  parenthood  and the  workplace).  
Parenthood  emerged  as  a  significant  theme  through  engagement  with  the 
narratives discussed in this thesis, while as indicated in chapter two (2.1.1) gaining 
and  maintaining  employment  is often highly  challenging  for  AS  adults.    Both  of 
themes  were  selected  are  examples  through  which  to  discuss  comparatively, 
different experiences of negotiating everyday insecurities.  In 7.1.1, I will explore 
insecurities relating to parenthood, firstly by comparing how Will Hadcroft and John 
Elder Robison’s dispositional identities shaped their orientations to fatherhood, and 
secondly by exploring Wendy Lawson’s experience of being a new mother labelled 
as  schizophrenic.    In  7.1.2  I  will  discuss  management  of  social  and  sensory 
insecurities  in  the  workplace,  and  their  relationship  to  pre-diagnostic  identities.  
Here,  the  importance  of  social  resources  in  the  form  of  supportive  collegial 
relationships will be explored through Jen Birch’s writing, before I turn to Gunilla 
Gerland’s  account  of  dealing  with  sensorily  challenging  environments  as  a  day 
nursery worker.  Gerland’s narrative will serve as an illustration of how the stress of 
dealing with everyday insecurities, as well as not understanding the reasons for 324 
 
 
them, can leave AS people particularly vulnerable to destabilisation by unforeseen 
events (in this case, her mother’s mental health crisis).  In conclusion, I will discuss 
how findings of this chapter can relate to the conceptual framework of authenticity, 
accountability  and  legitimacy  developed  in  previous  chapters,  as  a  way  of 
understanding pre-diagnostic formations of identity. 
 
7.1 – Insecurity and parenthood (Will Hadcroft, John Elder Robison, 
Wendy Lawson) 
 
 
7.1.1 – Negotiating dispositionality and fatherhood (Will Hadcroft and John Elder 
Robison) 
 
In the previous chapter I noted Jen Birch’s opposition of her dispositional self to 
what she understood as the personal qualities proper to the role of motherhood.  
Similar  sentiments  appear  in  Will  Hadcroft’s  narrative,  where  he  discusses  his 
aversion to fatherhood, after learning that his wife could no longer bear children: 
 
This was fine by me, in fact it was more than fine. I’d observed the stress 
experienced by new parents at the Kingdom Hall and did not fancy it one bit. 
Because of my personality, I knew I would find fathering a child emotionally 325 
 
 
challenging. I would expect my child to have the same values as me, which 
would either bring a life of persecution and bullying or would make him or 
her want to live a double life, compromising at school. Either way, I would 
be severely troubled. Then there was the issue of my anxiety attacks and my 
depressions – and my anger – I still battled deep-seated negative feelings. 
While they were always internalized, I believed no child should grow up in 
that environment (Hadcroft, 2005, 172). 
 
Hadcroft frames his suitability as a parent in terms of the traits and expectations 
that he imagined would be conferred upon his children, and also the ‘persecution 
and bullying’ that they might encounter.  Here, dispositional understandings of self 
were brought to bear in reflexive consideration of potential fatherhood, in terms of 
potential hazards for both himself and the child.  Hadcroft believed that, as a parent, 
he would demand compliance with his own values and dispositional ways of being, 
and that this could cause difficulties both for himself (in terms of relating to his 
offspring) and the child (i.e. either suffering the exclusion that Hadcroft himself has 
endured, or having to live a ‘double life’ split between the worlds of school and the 
home).  In this way, Hadcroft’s rejection of parenthood was framed by a sense of 
dispositional self rooted in imaginations stemming from biographical experiences. 
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In contrast, John Elder Robison did choose to become a father (in pre-diagnostic 
life),  and  his  narrative  contains  no  indication  that  negative  understandings  of 
dispositional self were associated with this decision.  Rather, it was in the post-
diagnostic phase that his dispositions became a concern: 
 
There’s quite a bit of evidence that suggests Asperger’s can be inherited.  
When I learned about my own Asperger’s, Cubby [Robison’s son] was six, 
and I was immediately concerned that Cubby might be that way too.  And he 
is, but to a much lesser extent than me.  As he grew, I watched him carefully 
and remembered the times that I had struggled as a child.  Sometimes I’d 
watch  him  make  the  same  mistakes  I  did,  and  I  would  cringe.    I  tried 
explaining what was happening to him, and it seemed to work.  Cubby began 
making friends, and he grew up without the worst of my Aspergian traits.  
Now he’s a teenager, the difference between Cubby and me is staggering.  
He’s the life of the party – something I dreamed about but never attained.  
In  other  ways,  we  are  very  much  alike.    He’s  blessed  with  my  gift  for 
mathematics  and  imagination…I  am  quite  sure  that  he  will  accomplish 
another of my childhood dreams: to graduate from high school and go on to 
finish college (Robison, 2008, 232). 
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In the previous chapter (6.1.3), I noted that for Robison, diagnosis served to not 
only  legitimate  aspects  of  his  dispositional  self  (i.e.  his  ‘logical  empathy’)  by 
connecting them with a wider ‘Aspergian’ identity, but also to sharpen his sense of 
limitations.    In  the  above  quote,  we  can  also  see  how  these  relate  to  his 
understanding of hazards pertaining to both his son and himself as a parent. Here, 
Robison’s  post-diagnostic  reflections  served  to  reframe  both  his  sense  of 
connection to ‘Cubby’, and how he framed his son’s dispositional strengths and 
exposure to  potential hazards.   Understanding his dispositional  self  through  the 
diagnosis also appears to have functioned as a resource for Robison to develop 
practical strategies for supporting his son (i.e. ‘explaining’ the mistakes to ‘Cubby’ 
and helping him to overcome them in future).  
 
These  contrasting  examples  indicate  that  differences  in  life  experiences  and 
understandings of  self can  shape  a  range  of orientations to framing  insecurities 
relating to parenthood.  For Hadcroft, the personal and social hazards experienced 
in his own life shaped his aversion to becoming a father, both in relation to the 
potential  hazards  to  the  child  and  his  own  wellbeing.    By  contrast,  Robison’s 
understanding of how his son might grow up involved not only difficulties but also 
dispositional strengths.  What is particularly interesting is that Hadcroft’s decision 
not  to  become  a  father  was  taken  in  the  pre-diagnostic  phase  of  life,  and  the 
experiences which shaped this decision do not appear to have been affected by his 328 
 
 
diagnosis (i.e. there are no indications that his attitude to parenthood changed in 
his account of post-diagnostic life).  By contrast, for Robison, hazards associated 
with his dispositional differences only appeared after his own diagnosis.  Whether 
these would have been recognised in a different way had he not been diagnosed is 
open to speculation; however, what is clear is that it was significant in how Robison 
framed being a father.  This suggests that while the diagnosis may play a role in 
shaping  a  person’s  understandings  insecurities  in  relation  to  parenthood,  its 
significance again appears variable and difficult to isolate from other aspects of self 
and  life  events.    Understandings  of  dispositional  self  may  therefore  shape 
orientations towards possible futures, such as parenting, in terms of the potential 
hazards  involved,  and  this  can  vary  in  relation  to  how  biographical  experiences 
shape pre-diagnostic identity. 
 
7.1.2 - Labelling, insecurity and new motherhood (Wendy Lawson) 
 
Hadcroft  and  Robison  present  contrasting  examples  of  how  understandings  of 
dispositional self can affect orientations to parenthood.  In Wendy Lawson’s writing, 
we can see how aspects of identity conferred by others, in  this case psychiatric 
labels,  can  interact  with  understandings  of  the  dispositional  self  in  framing 
insecurities relating to new motherhood.  Some AS people, in particular those who 
grew up prior to the entrance of AS into the DSM and the ICD, may have been 329 
 
 
misdiagnosed or had their differences attributed to other conditions (Beardon and 
Worton, 2011).  People in this category may therefore have been forced to contend 
with the consequences of mis-diagnosis, as was the case for Lawson.  She became 
pregnant at a very difficult time having recently left her job as a nurse, and then 
experienced a period of mental distress for which she was twice hospitalised at the 
age of twenty two (Lawson, 1998, 74).  During her second stay, Lawson learned of 
her pregnancy, and her son James was born six months later, after she had left the 
hospital (Lawson, 1998, 76). She writes of her fear immediately after James’ birth 
that she might ‘misread’ her son and not be able to attend to his needs, framed 
through her sense of dispositional self as someone who had difficulties with social 
interaction.  However, Lawson’s fears diminished after the birth, as she found that 
her ways of relating were compatible with his own (James would later be diagnosed 
with an ASC) (Lawson, 2012): 
 
In spite of my fears, we made a very good team and I soon learned what he 
needed and how to respond to him (Lawson, 1998). 
 
Anxiety  over  the  ability  to  care  for  children  may  be  thought  of  as  a  common 
experience for new mothers (Priel and Besser, 2000; Wilkins, 2006); however, what 
is significant here is how these concerns were shaped by her sense of dispositional 330 
 
 
self,  as  well  as  reflexive  understanding  of  her  schizophrenia  label.    Despite  her 
growing confidence in being able to care for ‘James’, what remained were concerns 
around how her activities in the role of mother would be interpreted by others 
within the fields of medical and social care: 
 
After the delivery, I withdrew.  I curled up into a ball and tried to comfort 
myself by sucking the roof of my mouth.  The nursing staff left me alone and 
I  slept  on  until  the  early  hours  of  the  next  morning.    When  I  awoke,  I 
remembered I had a baby and I knew I needed to act like a mother or else I 
might lose him.  I wanted to be able to for my son and I felt determined that 
I would do so.  I went onto automatic pilot, trying to copy other mums 
(Lawson, 1998, 80). 
 
For  Lawson,  being  a  new  mother  with  a  label  of  schizophrenia  involved  the 
potential  hazard  that  her  son  might  be  taken  away  by  those  in  authority.    Her 
response  involved  careful  compliance  with  what  were  often  dispositionally 
challenging demands, an example of which was her attendance at weekly ‘therapy’ 
sessions prescribed by doctors for her perceived ‘emotional disturbance’ (Lawson, 
1998,  81-83).    Though  intended  as  a  forum  in  which  she  could  ‘explore’  her 331 
 
 
‘feelings’  in  a  ‘therapeutic’  context,  Lawson’s  (hitherto  unrecognised)  AS-related 
differences meant that participation was in fact a highly distressing experience:  
 
The idea was that we should get in touch with our emotions, but the whole 
idea terrified me and I could feel a big black nothingness coming up from the 
pit of my stomach.  The thought of not being able to be normal, of having 
my  baby  taken  away  from  me  and  losing  all  that  I  had  fought  to  find, 
motivated me to keep attending therapy.  We were told to join hands with 
the  person  next  to  us  and  walk  around  in  a  circle.    The  emotions  I 
experienced  made  me  feel  sick,  not  connected  and  secure,  as  intended 
(Lawson, 1998, 82-83). 
 
For  Lawson,  being  a  new  mother  involved  coping  with  the  insecurities  of  the 
schizophrenia label in combination with the practical and emotional challenges she 
faced  as  an  undiagnosed  AS  person  forced  into  dispositionally  inappropriate 
performances and settings.  Exposure to additional sensory hazards thus became a 
necessary condition of negotiating those associated with parenting.  It is important 
to note the historical dimension to this experience, as her schizophrenia label would 
be overturned twenty-five years later following her AS diagnosis, something that 
was not available at the time.  Lawson’s writing is thus indicative of a particular 332 
 
 
generation of AS people whose differences may not only have gone unrecognised 
but been understood through other labels such as schizophrenia (it is worth noting, 
however, that misdiagnosis and negotiation of psychiatric labels remains an issue 
for AS adults) (Beardon and Worton, 2011).  Her narrative stands as an example of 
how  risks  associated  with  parenting  can  be  exacerbated  by  mis-labelling,  the 
demands that may accompany such labels, and their implications for configuring 
everyday insecurities. 
 
7.1.3 - Discussion 
 
The  narratives  discussed  in  this  section  show  different  ways  in  which 
understandings  and  presentations  of  self  may  relate  to  the  negotiation  of 
insecurities  relating  to  parenthood.        For  Hadcroft,  although  his  pre-diagnostic 
sense  of  dispositional  self  was  understood  as  legitimate,  he  had  clear  concerns 
about  the  compatibility  of  his  dispositions  with  what  he  understood  to  be  the 
demands of being a father.  In framing his insecurities around parenthood, Hadcroft 
draws on his own life experiences in imagining the hazards faced by himself as a 
parent and also by potential children.  In contrast, Robison’s account of becoming a 
parent is not linked to any sense of dispositional self until after his diagnosis.  While 
Hadcroft  used  his  biography  exclusively  as  a  reference  for  potential  problems, 
Robison draws on his experience as a way of understanding both advantages and 333 
 
 
potential problems that might relate to his son, and also to himself as a care-giver.  
Robison’s account thus also shows how connection with a collective category, such 
as  being  ‘Aspergian’  interacts  with  his  parental  identity,  and  how  this  shapes 
understandings  of  and  practical  responses  to,  insecurities  associated  with  care-
giving. 
 
Whereas Hadcroft and Robison speak mainly to the dispositional self in terms of its 
relevance  in  negotiating  everyday  insecurities,  Wendy  Lawson’s  experience 
illustrates the role that reflexive understanding of self as seen by others can have 
on  this  process.    For  Lawson,  despite  the  growing  sense  of  dispositional 
compatibility which she describes in becoming a new mother, negotiation of the 
schizophrenia label compelled her to act in ways that went against ‘authentic’ ways 
of being.  Here, her understanding of self in relation to others within the medical 
field conditioned a sense of insecurity that came not from her ability to care for her 
son, but to do so in ways that were seen as ‘legitimate’ by those in authority.  The 
conditions  of  accountability  here  involved  unequal  relations  of  power,  where 
Lawson was accountable to medical professionals, but was unable to hold them to 
account or challenge the practical ‘logic’ of their demands.  Thus what Lawson’s 
account indicates is that understandings of and responses to insecurities around 
parenthood  can  involve  a  conflict  between  dispositionally  appropriate  ways  of 334 
 
 
presenting the self, and those shaped by the demands of those who hold greater 
power within the accountability relationship. 
 
7.2 - Insecurity and the workplace (Jen Birch and Gunilla Gerland) 
 
 
As  noted  in  chapters  one  and  two,  gaining  and  maintaining  employment  is  a 
significant  issue  for  AS  people,  and  insecurities  associated  with  everyday 
experiences  of  the  workplace  were  also  a  prominent  theme  within  the 
autobiographies.  In this section, I will discuss two related examples; firstly, Jen 
Birch’s experience of managing insecurities in the workplace, and how having (and 
then not having) supportive relationships affected both her ability to cope and her 
sense of identity; secondly, I will explore Gunilla Gerland’s account of how the daily 
challenge of negotiating problematic sensory environments left her vulnerable to 
destabilisation, both emotionally and in relation to her sense of self. 
 
7.2.1 – The importance of supportive relations for negotiating everyday 
insecurities in workplace fields (Jen Birch) 
 
As discussed in chapter five (6.1.2) Jen Birch’s dispositional sense of self involved a 
preference  for  reflexive  ways  of  knowing  over  intuitive,  and  in  particular  an 
aversion to sudden changes in social interactions: 335 
 
 
 
Thinking  on  the  spot  was  difficult  for  me  –  hence,  I  can  see  now,  my 
dependence on knowing the rules.  Knowing what to do beforehand was, 
and still is, very important for me.  I have been told, and in fact reprimanded 
and ridiculed at times, for not being able to act spontaneously.  My lack in 
this area is, I know now, at least partly due to my mental processing speed 
being  too  slow  for  fast  moving  situations…On  the  other  hand,  if  given 
sufficient data and time with which to think matters through, I can reason 
things out as well as, if not better than, other people (Birch, 2003, 27). 
 
Problems  with  ‘keep[ing]  up  with  the  play’  in  ‘fast  moving’  (2003,  73)  social 
situations were a factor in shaping the hazards faced by the author, in relation to 
the regularities and cultural horizons of her workplace (the admissions department 
of a local hospital) (Birch, 2003, 136, 141).  Initially, the hospital provided Birch with 
a  ‘meaningful’  (2003,  145)  and  practically  suitable  experience  of  work,  with 
supportive others (Birch, 2003, 137) who helped her negotiate hazards relating to 
overwhelming social or sensory experiences (what she describes as ‘losing the plot’) 
(Birch, 2003, 138-139).  Birch was aware that working in the admissions department 
environment  involved  the  risk  of  becoming  overwhelmed  during  busy  periods; 336 
 
 
however,  support  from  colleagues  meant  that  these  were  for  the  most  part 
manageable, if not entirely unproblematic.    
 
The importance of supportive relationships as resources for negotiating workplace 
risks was illustrated in her later experience of working the hospital, as her familiar 
colleagues moved on and were replaced with less sympathetic others.  The author 
states that up until this point she had been able to manage risks relating to her 
dispositional differences; however, changes in the ‘hidden’ regularities of the office 
meant  that  she  was  now  more  vulnerable  to  difficulties  in  interactions  with 
colleagues.  One example of this was a situation that arose shortly after the arrival 
of new staff, where the misuse of a metaphorical phrase created problems with her 
new manager and another colleague: 
 
Back in the booking office, without Nell [a supportive colleague], the clerk 
on the other side underwent a personality change.  When I continued to talk 
to her in the same way as before, she responded grumpily and critically.  At 
a time when this co-worker was out of the room, the new manager came in 
and told the rest of us something about how we should and shouldn’t do our 
work…Reporting this information back to my colleague on her return, I made 
the bad judgement call of using a phrase which I did not fully understand: I 337 
 
 
said that we (in the Booking Office) had been “hauled over the coals.” Little 
did I expect, however, that my colleague would go immediately to the new 
Manager and tell her exactly this! About five seconds later, the Manager was 
standing in front of me, demanding to know whether I had said these words. 
I replied “Yes.” My boss was furious, and I was in trouble with her already…I 
was usually a careful person in what I said and did, but this slip-up made me 
even more cautious about anything which came out of my mouth from then 
on. My “new-style” colleague also made a fascinating study in something I 
had previously heard of only in my sixth-form history lessons: the Balance of 
Power. Mr Fletcher had spoken of it with regard to the countries in Europe 
before the First World War. Now I could see it operating for myself: with 
Nell  gone,  the  whole  balance  of  the  Booking  Office  had  been  upset;  for 
example,  my  previously  cheery  co-worker  was  now  unpleasant  to  work 
with…From that moment on, I had a new tool with which to study group 
dynamics (Birch, 2003, 139-140). 
 
This  extract  highlights  a  tension  between  Birch’s  reflexive  understanding  of  the 
situation and her ability to respond to it in situ, meaning that some of her actions 
within the field were undertaken without her being able to get a timely grasp of 
their potential consequences.  This would be an increasing problem in the ‘new 
style’  office,  as  Birch  writes  of  a  later  situation  in  which  a  colleague  reported 338 
 
 
experiencing racial discrimination, leading her to intervene by writing to her local 
trades union: 
 
I felt very friendly towards some of my Admitting Office workmates, and our 
Samoan  colleague  sometimes  brought  us  taro  with  coconut  cream  to 
share…One day she told me that she was being subjected to racism in the 
workplace, and from our superiors at that…I didn’t hesitate in writing to our 
workers’ union, asking for help with this matter. I had never contacted a 
union before, so I did not know the procedure. I thought that the issue of 
racism was the important part, and did not give my name, just “a concerned 
colleague.”…When  the  management  brought  the  matter  to  everyone’s 
attention,  the  only  important  point  was  “Who  wrote  the  letter?”  The 
existence or absence of racism in the workplace was never mentioned – the 
hot topic was now the letter-writer’s identity. As usual, the new situation 
took  me  by  surprise.  Always  needing  to  assess  a  situation  slowly  and 
thoroughly in order to come to a decision, I waited whilst I thought what I 
should do…I asked a colleague for her opinion; she replied “You could always 
apologise!” This told me that no one, not even my equals, supported the 
letter-writing action, so I was on my own…I ended up going to the Deputy 
Manager and “owning up,” in a flood of tears…My reputation now in tatters, 
I struggled on in my job for a while longer. I did not want to have to admit 339 
 
 
“defeat” and “failure.” I now feel that this was rather misplaced heroics, but, 
at the time, I had no way of knowing what to do (Birch, 2003, 144). 
 
What is significant in terms of the discussion here is not that Birch undertook this 
action in defence of her friend, but how her prior understanding of the situation 
informed her actions (Birch, 2003, 143).  Birch’s reflexive understanding of what 
needed to be done was not connected to an understanding of how this might play 
out in relation to the habitus and cultural horizons of the office.  Had she been in 
possession  of  this  knowledge,  she  may  well  have  reported  the  discriminatory 
behaviour, but chosen to do so in a different way.  This interpretation is supported 
by the characterisation of her involvement in this episode as ‘mis-placed heroics’, 
undertaken in conditions where she had ‘no way of knowing what to do’ (Birch, 
2003, 162).  Whether or not understanding her differences through the lens of a 
diagnosis  would  have  helped  prevent  such  difficulties  is  open  to  speculation; 
however, given Birch’s reflections elsewhere on the impact of being diagnosed, it 
may have been relevant in shaping how she came to understand such difficulties in 
relation to her sense of self:  
 
To say that this discovery was a bombshell would not be an exaggeration: it 
was  a  life-changing  event.  It  reinterpreted  most  of  my  life  in  a  new, 340 
 
 
understandable,  and  logical  way.  As  with  everything  else  in  life,  I  would 
rather know the truth about things, the reason why something is happening 
in a certain way: and now, for the first time, I could understand why things 
had  happened  in  certain  ways.  Even  though  I  still  have  some  of  the 
difficulties  associated  with  Asperger  Syndrome,  it  helps  100  per  cent  to 
know why I am different – instead of having to think… that I was “crazy,” 
“stupid,” “not able to get it all together.” (Birch, 2003, 199). 
 
It cannot be expected that having a diagnosis would have given Birch the intuitive 
understanding of the potential consequences of her actions within the ‘new style’ 
office, nor made her co-workers more supportive.  However, given her comments 
about the significance of ‘not ‘having to think…that I was “crazy,” “stupid,” “not 
able to get it all together.”’ when encountering difficulties in post-diagnostic phase, 
it may have played a role in mediating the feelings of ‘failure’ and ‘defeat’ that she 
associated with the last months of her job.   
 
Birch’s experience in the office provides an example of how changes in habitus and 
access to supportive relationships can shape understandings of self in relation to 
the workplace fields, as well as associated insecurities.  Initially, when surrounded 
by  supportive  colleagues  such  as  Nell,  Birch  frames  herself  as  one  who  faced 341 
 
 
difficulties but was often able to cope with the help of others. However, changes in 
the cultural horizon of the office, and the ‘new style’ colleagues she encountered 
meant that she then had to face everyday insecurities without this support network.  
This meant that difficult situations became harder to manage, and were attended 
by increasing feelings of ‘defeat’ and ‘failure’ which ultimately led her to quit a job 
that had been ‘so meaningful’ to her (Birch, 2003, 145).  These feelings speak to an 
internalisation and configuration of these difficulties not only as confusing, but also 
as illegitimate – the feeling that she should be able to cope in the same way as 
others around her.  Birch’s experiences in the old and ‘new style’ offices point to the 
idea that in addition to providing practical assistance, support from others can also 
provide a sense of social legitimacy that may help guard against the internalisation 
of everyday insecurities as personal failings. 
 
7.2.2 - Sensory issues, stress and vulnerability (Gunilla Gerland) 
 
Birch’s  narrative  illustrates  the  impact  that  having/not  having  supportive 
relationships  in  the  workplace  can  have  on  a  person’s  ability  to  negotiation 
everyday insecurities, and the implications of this for pre-diagnostic understandings 
of self.  Gunilla Gerland’s experience of working in a busy nursery presents another 
perspective  on  this  theme,  by  indicating  how  coping  with  everyday  insecurities 
linked to sensory sensitivities over long periods can leave AS people particularly 342 
 
 
vulnerable to destabilisation by unforeseen events. In chapter six (6.1.1), I noted 
Gerland’s experience having to consciously sort her sensory impressions in order to 
understand the world around her.  Elsewhere in the narrative, she describes how 
this  affected  her  experience  of  working  in  a  day  nursery,  and  in  particular  the 
challenges of sensory overload and physical exhaustion to which she was exposed.  
Initially, she found herself practically suited to working within this environment: 
 
I hadn’t chosen the job for any special reason.  Anyone could get work in day 
nurseries.  But I found out that I worked well with children and that I had an 
innate talent with them.  I was concrete, clear and calm.  I had endless 
patience.  I never felt personally attacked by any child and I never got cross.  
I found it easy to set clear limits and be the same person without changing 
from one day to the next.  I had no shifts of mood or days when I was easily 
irritated.  On the whole, I was evenly the same.  I was as if made for insecure 
children, so it turned out that I mostly worked with them (Gerland, 1997, 
144). 
 
Gerland  frames  her  attachment  to  the  field  of  the  nursery  in  terms  of  its 
congruence with her dispositional ways of being with the children (i.e. ‘concrete, 
clear and calm’), particularly the ‘insecure’ children. Working in the nursery also 343 
 
 
gave  Gerland  the  kind  of  activity  that  was  both  meaningful  (1997,  144)  and 
consistent (i.e. ‘I…found it easy to be the same person without changing one day to 
the  next’).    However,  these favourable  conditions  were  attended by what  were 
often demanding sensory experiences, compounded by a lack of understanding as 
to their cause: 
 
[T]he environment was terribly demanding.  I had no good explanation to 
offer for why it exhausted me so, but there was always noise and movement, 
a mass of people, and I found it muddling and tiring.  Being there sucked all 
the strength out of me, although I liked being with the children so much…I 
just tried to arrange life in such a way that I wouldn’t have to face things I 
couldn’t bear.  I felt peculiar in an obscure way – all my evasions took up so 
much  of  my  energy.    Why  couldn’t  I  have  an  ordinary  job,  an  ordinary 
apartment, an ordinary life? (Gerland, 1997, 144-145). 
 
While working in a nursery was in many ways dispositionally agreeable to Gerland, 
it  also  involved  insecurities  around  the  need  to  manage  sensory  issues.    The 
‘double-burden’  of  having  to  deal  with  these  challenges,  combined  with 
bewilderment  as  to  their  cause,  left  Gerland  vulnerable  to  destabilisation  by 
unforeseen events, specifically her mother’s mental health crisis.   344 
 
 
 
While walking to work one day, Gerland found her mother in a dishevelled and 
distressed  state  in  the  street,  shouting  and  ‘hallucinating’  (Gerland,  1997,  190).  
After trying (and failing) to have her admitted to a local psychiatric clinic, Gerland 
took her back to the family home which she had left two years before.  At this stage, 
everyday  life  was  already  highly  stressful,  and  the  re-emergence  of  her  mother 
eroded further Gerland’s ability to cope: 
 
Before this incident, I had had no contact with my mother for a long time.  
But now she started telephoning me saying she was going to kill herself, or 
she would pour out a whole stream of invective about how awful I was.  
Those phone calls took up all my remaining energies…Life was not for me.  I 
had no strength left, not for anything.  I could hardly cope with work any 
longer  –  I  hadn’t  the  energy  to  sort  my  sensory  impressions  in  those 
surroundings.   It  became  too  much  for me  to attempt to  keep  all those 
people apart and concentrate on whatever I was doing in a room full of 
children running about, jumping and yelling.  Everyday day I’d finished work, 
I went home, closed the door behind me, and slept.  I was totally finished.  I 
did the best I could at work, then there was nothing left (Gerland, 1997, 193). 
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Having  to  deal  with  chronic  conditions  of  chronic  environmental  stress, 
compounded by the feelings of confusion and frustration led to a gradual decline in 
both her physical and mental wellbeing, as well as her resignation from the nursery 
(Gerland, 1997, 193): 
 
I was often ill and had minor accidents.  I cut myself.  I twisted my ankles and 
cracked a bone in one of them.  My body kept saying it couldn’t cope, but I 
didn’t understand why it couldn’t.  I was young.  I ought to be able to work, 
like anyone else.  It had to be because I was lazy, just as everyone had 
always said.  It had to be my own fault that I failed at everything, that I had 
no life.  The will to live withered in me.  I hadn’t the strength to wish for 
anything any longer, except possibly to be away from everything  (Gerland, 
1997, 193). 
 
For Gerland, negotiating the sensory environments of the workplace not only risked 
exhaustion  and  overload,  but  also  left  her  vulnerable  to  destabilisation  by 
unforeseen events.  This was attended by feelings of inadequacy and inferiority 
when compared to others, and guilt at her difficulties in coping with daily life.  The 
erosion of her coping resources also led to an internalisation of her difficulties as 
personal failings, and the feeling (compounded by comments received from others 346 
 
 
in the past) that her struggles were illegitimate in both personal (e.g. ‘I ought to be 
able to work, like anyone else) and social contexts (e.g. ‘It had to be because I was 
lazy,  just  as  everyone  had  always  said’).    Gerland’s  writing  thus  illustrates  the 
consequences  of having  to deal  with  problematic  environments  and unforeseen 
events, in conditions where understanding of and support for negotiation of these 
insecurities may not be available.    
 
7.2.3 - Discussion 
 
As indicated in chapter two (2.1.1), gaining and maintaining employment can be 
difficult for many AS people due to social and sensory issues, as well as inadequate 
support  and  understanding  of  their  needs  as  employees.    The  two  narratives 
discussed in this section are indicative of the additional challenges that may be 
faced by those living without a diagnosis, and how these everyday insecurities can 
impact on pre-diagnostic formations of identity.  Access to social resources in the 
form of supportive relationships may be especially important in the pre-diagnostic 
phase of life, given the confusion that accompanies such difficulties.   
 
The discussion in this section is illustrative of the significance of having/not having 
social  support,  as  well  as  the  confusion  and  vulnerability  and  internalisation  of 347 
 
 
difficulties as personal failings that this may entail.  On a practical level, having 
supportive  colleagues  can  help  negotiate  social  regularities  which  may  not  be 
immediately  ‘given’  to  the  person,  or  to  cope  with  problems  linked  to  sensory 
overload.  In  addition  to  practical  resources,  supportive  relationships  may  shape 
relations between everyday insecurities and pre-diagnostic identity.  For Birch, prior 
to the  changes in  the field of  the office, her writing  conveys  the  experience  of 
someone  who  faced  difficulties  but  could  cope,  and  differs  markedly  from  the 
internalised feelings of ‘defeat’ and ‘failure’ that she experienced in the latter part 
of her time there.  Thus supportive relationships may also be important in helping 
guard against internalised feelings of illegitimacy, in particular where the person 
faces negative comments from others in relation to their difficulties (as was the 
case for Gerland, in whose narrative there is no evidence of support from nursery 
colleagues).    For  both  authors,  the  stress  associated  with  managing  everyday 
insecurities eventually led them to withdraw from employment, within significant 
consequences for their wellbeing. 
 
7.3 - Summary 
 
In chapters five and six, I sought to explore how different aspects of self developed 
in the pre-diagnostic lives of the seven autobiographers here considered.  In this 
chapter, my aim has been to explore how these aspects of identity formation relate 348 
 
 
to  understanding  and  negotiation  of  everyday  insecurities.    In  so  doing,  I  have 
sought to demonstrate further how the approach to identity that I have taken is 
useful for understanding aspects of pre-diagnostic life.  For this reason, two themes 
(parenthood and employment) were chosen that, while often highly personal, can 
also be seen as having general relevance to the wider AS population (see discussion 
in 2.1.1 and at the beginning of this chapter).   
 
Negotiation  of  everyday  insecurities  is  bound  up  with  understanding  and 
presentation of self in dispositional, collective and reflexive contexts.  For Hadcroft, 
his  sense  of  dispositional  self  shaped  an  aversion  to  fatherhood,  whereas  for 
Robison his dispositional differences were not considered in this context until after 
his diagnosis (when they were also connected with the collective category of being 
‘Aspergian’, as a way of framing strengths and difficulties that his son might face).  
Lawson’s  account  of  her  reflexive  self  also  points  to  the  impact  of  externally 
conferred labels in terms of how they shaped her understanding of self in relation 
to others and behaviour.  Finally, Birch and Gerland present different perspectives 
on how having/not having access to social support as well as understanding of one’s 
difficulties,  can  leave  AS  people  vulnerable  to  destabilisation  and  the  harmful 
internalisation of difficulties as personal failings in pre-diagnostic life.   
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The concepts of authenticity, accountability and legitimacy have also been helpful in 
understanding  aspects  of  the  experiences.    For  example,  Hadcroft’s  aversion  to 
parenthood  indicates  concerns  about the  freedom  of his  children  to experience 
authentic ways of being, given the demands that he felt he might impose on them 
as a father (this also links back to his view of actions that were ‘legitimate’ for the 
role of parenting).  In Lawson’s account of negotiating her schizophrenia label as a 
new mother, we see how unequal relations of power played out in the practical 
negotiation of accountability relations within the healthcare field.  Finally, in the 
writings  of  Birch  and  Gerland,  we  see  the  importance  of  personal  and  social 
legitimacy  in  understanding  everyday  difficulties,  both  in  terms  of  how  support 
from others can help prevent internalisation of difficulties as personal failings, while 
isolation and the confusion of not understanding one’s difficulties may have the 
opposite effect. 
 
Even within a very small sample group, and despite common experiences in social 
and sensory contexts, considerable variation exists in terms of both the quality of 
everyday  insecurities  and  their  implications for  pre-diagnostic understandings  of 
self.  The  relationship  between  these  two  domains  is  reciprocal;  how  one 
understands  and  presents  oneself  shapes  orientations  to  understanding  and 
negotiating  insecurity,  and  vice  versa  (this  echoes  theoretical  arguments  made 
elsewhere  in  the  sociological  literature  linking  identity  formation  and  risk 350 
 
 
negotiation (Tulloch and Lupton, 2005).  Once again, while it is difficult to isolate the 
impact of the diagnosis from other factors in life, the narratives indicate that the 
absence of the sense-making resources provided by a diagnosis are significant in 
this relationship. 
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8 – Understanding formations of pre-diagnostic identities 
(Conclusion).  
 
This thesis project began with the general assumption that the diagnosis would be 
the most important event in the lives of the writers.  The results of this investigation 
reveal that, while diagnosis is undoubtedly an important event, as an event it is one 
among many factors that influence how knowledge of one’s differences through the 
lens  of  AS  affect  understandings  and  presentations  of  self.    Discussion  of  the 
narratives has indicated that it is often very difficult to isolate the specific impact of 
diagnosis, outside of the wider social and biographical context into which it enters 
as a life event.  Even within what is a small set of life stories, we see considerable 
variation in terms of experiences and circumstances, and thus significant differences 
in formations of pre-diagnostic identities.  Exploring lives biographically has allowed 
us to see how different aspects of self interact with others in the formation of 
different pre-diagnostic ‘selves’.  Just as it is difficult to isolate the impact of the 
diagnosis, is it often not possible to understand how aspects of self later associated 
with AS are understood in pre-diagnostic life, without reference to other aspects of 
a person’s identity.  In this concluding chapter, I will summarise the main findings of 
the project, and discuss their implications for future research. 
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8.1 – Summary of findings 
 
8.1.1 – Question summaries 
 
8.1.1.1 - Understanding the dispositional self in the pre-diagnostic phase of life. 
 
For those who grow up without a diagnosis, feelings of confusion and distance in 
terms  of  relating  to  dispositional  ways  of  being  appear  common.    Early 
understandings  of  dispositional  self  can  involve  strengths  and  limitations,  that 
develop  through  encounters  with  everyday  situations.    For  example,  Gerland’s 
‘sharp vision’ and difficulties with making gestalt connections (Gerland, 1997, 249, 
50),  Lawson’s  perceptual  and  affective  connection  to  the  natural  world  and 
difficulties with ‘apprehension, interpretation, communication and comprehension’ 
(Lawson, 1998, 28, 1), and Willey’s ability to ‘captur[e] the essence and persona of 
people’  matched  against  feelings  of  ‘remova[al]  from  [the]  domain  of  others’ 
(Willey,  1999,  22,  27).    As  the  person  grows  older  and  moves  into  wider  fields 
outside the family home, and often as a result of difficulties in connecting with the 
demands of the dominant habitus, aspects of their dispositional selves may become 
associated  with  feelings  of  difference  and  separation  from  others.    Feelings  of 
difference  and  separation  from  others  may  lead  the  person  to  view  their 
dispositions as illegitimate, they may therefore seek to minimise these behaviours 
and/or imitate the actions of others, which can have implications for wellbeing by 
restricting opportunities to enact and experience dispositionally appropriate ways 353 
 
 
of being (e.g. Willey’s ‘fitting in trick’ and Gerland’s attempt to ‘bleach out’ her 
differences) (Gerland, 1997, 127; Willey, 1999, 57).    However, for some (such as 
Will  Hadcroft)  feelings  of  difference  may  have  the  opposite  effect,  in  that  the 
person comes to see their ways of being as legitimate, and opposes them to the 
dominant habitus. 
 
8.1.1.2 – Impact of self-other relations on formations of pre-diagnostic identities. 
 
Reflexive  and  collective  aspects  of  self  can  also  shape  understandings  of 
dispositions, by contextualising dispositional differences through particular cultural 
lenses, for example, in 6.1.1, we saw how Purkis’ rule-oriented dispositions were 
filtered through the  cultural  context  of practically  hospitable fields,  such  as  the 
church, the party, and the prison.  Her initial rejection of the diagnosis also indicates 
that even where this is believed to ‘fit’ with a dispositional sense of self, it may not 
override reflexive or collective aspects of identity.  Elsewhere, in Birch’s story (6.1.2), 
we  see  how  her  sense of  dispositional difference  was  shaped  by  regularities  of 
gender  and  sexuality,  for  example,  in  her  coming  up  against  gender  norms  in 
childhood, and negotiating the practical conduct of relations within the majority-
lesbian  household.    Meeting  of  dispositions  and  habitus  can  result  in  different 
degrees of identification with different collectives, for example, Purkis’ sense of 354 
 
 
security  in  knowing the  ‘rules’  of  church  and  the party  (discussed  in 6.1.2)  was 
contrasted with her sense of distance from meaningful involvement in the cultural 
life of either field.  In contrast, Robison distinguished his ‘logical empathy’ from the 
dispositional ways of empathising exhibited by others (as we saw in 6.1.3).   
 
Coming up against difficult aspects of habitus and the cultural horizons of field can 
mean that it is sometimes difficult to enter relations of accountability, grasp tacit 
calls  to  order,  and  to  provide  the  commentary  expected  by  others  within  a 
particular  field.    Participation  in  social  life  (and  therefore  its  implications  for 
formations  of  pre-diagnostic  identity)  can  also  be  mediated  by  the  social  and 
cultural  resources  to  which  one  has  access.  For  example,  the  presence  of 
‘rulebooks’  was  a  significant  factor  in  enabling  Purkis’  participation  within  the 
church and party, by helping her to grasp some of the regularities at play within 
these  fields.    In  contrast,  Robison’s  description  of  his  limited  success  in  social 
interactions by relying on models provided by computer speech software indicates 
that available resources can also constrain opportunities for social coordination.  
Given the feelings of confusion and distance that appear in the autobiographies, 
access to social and cultural resources may be especially important in providing 
opportunities for connection and identification with others. 
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8.1.1.3 - Everyday insecurities and pre-diagnostic identities. 
 
Understanding  and  presenting  the  self  is  also  bound  up  with  how  a  person 
understands and negotiates everyday insecurities.  This can relate to how a person 
understands their dispositional self relative to potential future events, for example, 
fatherhood.  In 7.1.1, we saw how Hadcroft opposed his dispositional self to the 
attributes that he felt proper to fatherhood; in contrast, Robison chose to become a 
father and later framed insecurities around parenting in terms of both strengths 
and limitations associated with AS in the post-diagnostic phase of life.  Lawson’s 
narrative (discussed in 7.1.2) shows how the intersection of dispositions with labels 
conferred  by  powerful  others  (in  this  case  her  schizophrenia  diagnosis  and 
positioning as a new mother within institutional mental healthcare) can condition 
understandings of and responses to insecurity.  As observed in chapter two, gaining 
and maintaining employment is a challenge faced by many AS people, and those 
living without a diagnosis may face a particular set of challenges stemming from 
confusion  associated  with  differences  from  others  and  everyday  difficulties.    As 
Birch’s narrative (discussed in in 7.2.1) indicates, access to social resources in the 
form  of  supportive  relationships  can  help  mediate  practical  difficulties,  but  also 
mitigate internalisation of those difficulties as personal failings.  Gerland’s account 
of how her capacity to cope eroded in the face of everyday sensory challenges and 
confusion  surrounding  them,  and  the  subsequent  re-emergence  of  her  mother 356 
 
 
following her mental health crisis, provides an example of how in the absence of 
understanding  and  support,  internalised  feelings  of  failure  can  have  significant 
implications for wellbeing. 
 
8.1.2 – General findings 
 
8.1.1.1 – Authenticity, accountability and legitimacy 
 
In the work of Nettleton (2006 – see 2.1.3) accountability was introduced as an 
important aspect of the ‘double burden’ of living with an undiagnosed condition, 
where additional stress is caused to the person due to their inability to account for 
the difficulties created by their illness. While Nettleton’s work dealt with conditions 
that can be more readily described as illnesses, her concept of the ‘double burden’ 
is relevant to AS people in the pre-diagnostic phase of life to the extent that they 
face difficulties arising from the interaction of their dispositions with problematic 
environments and situations, and confusion as to why these may be the case.  In 
this thesis, I have suggested that issues relating specifically to formations of pre-
diagnostic  identities  in AS  people  can be framed  as  involving relations  between 
authenticity, accountability and legitimacy.  These ‘thinking tools’ (Bourdieu, 1990b) 
cut  across  the  dispositional,  intersubjective  and  wider  cultural  domains  to  help 
explore their intersection in the formations of pre-diagnostic identities.  They are 357 
 
 
not proposed as a predictive framework, but rather a way of getting a grip on issues 
that are neither separate from, nor reducible to, individuals or wider social factors. 
 
Authenticity, as I have argued, relates to ways of being that are experienced as 
being dispositionally appropriate to the person – ways of being that ‘feel right’ and 
through which the person is able to feel at home in the world.  The ability of an AS 
person to pursue these ways of being can be mediated by whether or not these are 
accepted as legitimate within the dominant habitus (social legitimacy), and whether 
the  person  themselves  then  comes  to  understand  them  as  legitimate  (personal 
legitimacy).   These opportunities are mediated by the practical conditions of the 
accountability relationship, in particular how calls to order are enacted, the degree 
to  which  these  are  intelligible  to  the  AS  person,  their  ability  to  respond 
appropriately, and/or whether they are able to renegotiate the practical conduct of 
interactions if necessary.  Making space for authentic ways of being can be highly 
significant  in  terms  of  wellbeing,  while  conversely  not  having  to  fit  into 
dispositionally  inappropriate  performances  can  also  not  only  reduce  stress  but 
develop a liveable sense of self.  In the pre-diagnostic phase of life, when a person 
may come to understand their dispositions as differences, the impact of this on 
formations of identity appears linked to the social and biographical conditions in 
which  the  person  is  situated,  and  the  resources  to  which  they  have  access.  
Therefore,  while  diagnosis  may  help  the  person  to  develop  a  more  coherent 358 
 
 
understanding  of  themselves  and  their  life  events,  it  is  neither  a  necessary  nor 
sufficient condition for the development of a liveable sense of self. 
 
8.1.1.2 – The contingency of the diagnosis. 
 
 
While the impact of the diagnosis has not been the main focus of this thesis, the 
investigation  has  indicated  that  this  needs  to  be  understood  in  relation  to  the 
specific social and biographical context into which it enters.  As we have seen, from 
the material given in the autobiographies, it is often extremely difficult to isolate 
the impact of the diagnosis from other events and experiences.  While there are 
clear indications that diagnosis is significant in terms of how the person comes to 
understand and present themselves, it often appears as one among a number of 
developments in the formation of a liveable sense of self (which is by no means 
inevitable  in  post-diagnostic  life,  as  indicated  in  Gerland’s  post-diagnostic 
reflections discussed in 5.1.1).  What this means is that understanding formations of 
pre-diagnostic  identities,  and  engaging  with  the  life  stories  of  AS  people  who 
receive a late diagnosis, is crucial to understanding the impact of the diagnosis on 
particular people.   
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8.2 – Implications for further research. 
 
 
8.2.1 - The value of textual communication 
 
The monographs here discussed reflect the findings of existing sociological research 
in that, for many AS people, textual communication can be a particularly suitable 
medium  for  exploring  and  communicating  life  experiences.    Dispositional  issues 
with more ad-hoc, iterative forms of communication (for example, semi-structured 
interviews)  can  be  avoided,  and  the  person  may  have  more  time  and  space  to 
consider and formulate responses, rather than feeling compelled to comply with 
the demands of the social/research situation.  For AS adults who receive a very late 
diagnosis, autobiographical writing can be also be a practical tool for sense-making 
in the light of profound changes to aspects of self that arise in light of the diagnosis, 
something that is supported explicitly by several of the autobiographers (Lawson, 
1998,  3;  Birch,  2003,  9;  Robison,  2008,  ix-x;  Hadcroft,  2005,  17-18).    Thus,  in 
exploring the experiences of those who receive a very late diagnosis, the use of 
textual communication over more conventional forms of co-present qualitative data 
collection may be of benefit.  Those who have the time, resources and inclination to 
write and publish autobiographies may well be a select group, for example, four of 
the seven autobiographers discussed here had been educated to undergraduate 
level, with three having higher degrees (see table 1 in 4.3.2).  Therefore, other 360 
 
 
forms of textual communication, such as online forums, text based chat, private or 
public blogs, or handwritten diaries may also be helpful in allowing others to tell 
their story. 
8.2.2 - Development of qualitative data collection methods as an iterative and 
participatory process. 
 
While  text-based  communication  appears  a  useful  medium  for  exploring 
experiences for many AS people, we should also consider other possible ways in 
which to explore life experiences.  Multiple perceptual and dispositional profiles are 
known to be present in the population of AS people (Bogdashina, 2003; Jones et al., 
2003;  Baron-Cohen  et al.,  2009),  in addition  to  variations  in  social position and 
biographical situation, and therefore there may be a range of different orientations 
to engagement and communication with which qualitative researchers will need to 
engage.  Given this range of possible sensory experiences, exploring different ways 
of engaging with life experiences could open up new avenues for representation of 
life experiences to research audiences, as well as uncovering aspects of experience 
hitherto unrecognised in research.   
One  potential  avenue  could  the  use  of  video  technology  as  a  way  of  exploring 
experiences of sensory environments, an example of which was produced as an 
adjunct  project  during  my  time  as  a  researcher  on  this  PhD.    David  Howell  (a 
colleague who has a diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome) and I collaborated on a 361 
 
 
short  film  in  which  we  explored  his  use  of  mobile  technologies  for  mediating 
sensory difficulties in work-based travel, the abstract for which appears below. 
 
Image 9 – David waiting for a train on a busy concourse at Kings Cross Station (still 
from ‘Commuting Under Pressure’) 
 
For  many  people  on  the  Autism  Spectrum,  sensory  sensitivities  and 
perceptual  differences  can  present  issues  in  navigating  everyday  public 
spaces. Crowds, noise and sudden changes to environment or scheduling are 
just some of the potential hazards faced by travellers on the spectrum, and 
this can have significant implications for access to employment. However, 
mobile technologies increasingly provide tools for addressing many of these 
challenges. In this film, David (who has a diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome) 362 
 
 
retraces his journey from Southampton to Leeds (via London) in order to 
illustrate  the  use  of  mobile  technology  to  assist  with  travel.  This  was  a 
journey that he made for work while an employee of the National Audit 
Office Graduate Scheme (Howell and Bracher, 2012).  
 
This film was produced using commonly available consumer electronic and home 
computers, involving an initial day of shooting and a further month of collaborative 
editing and voice-over work conducted through online exchange.  This flexible and 
low-cost (c.£300) process allowed us not only to explore Howell’s experience of 
commuting but to do so in a way that brings to the attention of audiences aspects 
of experience that may be neglected in text.  For example, it was noted that the 
camera gives a reasonably faithful representation of Howell’s issues with sensory 
gating and overload.  This is because the device captures visual and auditory stimuli 
en bloc, without the context-specific and interest-relative processing that shapes 
many non-AS people’s experiences of lifeworld.  As Howell notes in the introduction 
to the video ‘it is very hard to describe what sensory overload feels like, and much 
easier to show it through sound and vision’ (Howell and Bracher, 2012). 
 
This is only one way in which researchers may work with AS people and help enable 
them to tell their stories.  The wider point is that whatever the medium, it appears 363 
 
 
advisable  for  the  process  of  data  collection  to  be  collaborative  and  evolve  in 
response to the person’s experience of participation.  Beginning with a range of 
potential  methods,  a  ‘toolkit’,  rather than  a  fixed  medium  may  be beneficial  in 
engaging and maintaining the participation of AS people, as well as overcoming the 
limitations of particular methodologies. 
 
 
Image 10 – David describes his reaction to the noise of a tube train beginning to 
move (still from ‘Commuting Under Pressure’). 
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8.2.3 – Future research directions. 
 
While the focus of this thesis has been on formations of pre-diagnostic identity, the 
discussion  here  undertaken  raises  a  number  of  questions  in  relation  to  peri-
diagnostic experience more generally. 
8.2.3.1 – What happens next?  Exploring formations of post-diagnostic identity. 
 
It has been necessary at certain points in this thesis to compare pre-diagnostic life 
with post-diagnostic in order to explore formations of identity in the latter phase.  
Although the precise impact of the diagnosis is often difficult to isolate, it appears 
significant and variable in terms of the qualitative experience of different people 
diagnosed.    Given  the  variability  in  individual  biographies,  pre-diagnostic 
experiences and experiences of the diagnosis, one area for future research could 
therefore be to explore how a diagnosis relates to the longer term development of 
identity.  One potential direction of this could be to explore how the diagnosis as a 
form  of  knowledge  is  operationalized  in  different  circumstances  and  settings,  it 
terms of its variable value as a form of cultural capital (i.e. one that gives access to, 
for example, affordances and accommodations, and/or allows the person to make 
claims  for  renegotiation  of  problematic  social  and  environmental  situations).  
During the latter stages of my PhD project, I was recruited (on the basis of an early 
draft) by the Autism Diagnostic Research Centre Southampton as a Research Fellow, 
to explore peri-diagnostic experiences. Part of this has involved examining items of 365 
 
 
unsolicited  feedback  (e.g.  emails,  letters  and  cards)  for  the  purposes  of  service 
evaluation, and to inform an on-going project exploring post-diagnostic experiences.  
In these materials, there are indications that the diagnosis plays a significant role 
not only in how the person comes to understand their dispositional selves, but also 
how  they  understand  their  relationship  to  the  habitus  and  cultural  horizons  of 
everyday situations. 
  
Diagnostic reports provided by the ADRC contain information for the person being 
diagnosed (such as data from neuropsychological assessments) as well as guidance 
for employers and others who may work with the person.  Early indications from 
this material are that for some people, the diagnosis (and the resources objectified 
in  the  diagnostic  report)  can  shape  post-diagnostic  understandings  and 
presentations of the self in a variety of ways.   The conditions of pre-diagnostic life 
and formations of identity in this phase may be significant in understanding how a 
diagnosis affects different people who go through this process in adulthood. 
 
8.2.3.2 – Aging and AS 
 
As indicated in 2.1.1, understanding of the needs of autistic adults on the part of 
service providers is known to be patchy (Rosenblatt, 2008), and far less attention 366 
 
 
has been paid by researchers to this group compared with children (Lawrence et al., 
2010).  For older adults, the picture is even less clear, with virtually no specific 
research attention paid to questions of autism and ageing (Happé and Charlton, 
2012), despite long-standing calls for further inquiry (Perry et al., 2009).  There are 
also likely to be significant numbers of people within the ageing population who 
would meet the criteria for AS but are living without a diagnosis, due to the fact that 
the diagnostic recognition has only been widely available since the 1992 (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2007).  Undiagnosed adults may face a ‘double burden’ in terms of 
living  with  the  everyday  challenges  associated  with  their  condition,  as  well  as 
confusion and distress associated with difficulties that often have no obvious cause 
and  may  mark  them  out  for  discrimination  and  ill-treatment  by  others  (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2007; Juuso et al., 2011).  These aspects may combine to produce 
particular challenges/profiles of difficulty – for example, late-life redundancy could 
precipitate  changes  in  the  routines  of  everyday  life  which  increase  problematic 
encounters with unfamiliar and socially/sensorily challenging environments.  This 
could then reduce mobility and physical activity, with implications for social, mental 
and physical wellbeing (Phillips et al., 2010). 
 
Apart from the ethical and legal responsibilities which society has to people in this 
population, this is a cohort that will increasingly be making use of services that put 
pressure on the public purse as they age.  The National Autistic Society estimate, 367 
 
 
based on the 2001 Census, that the number of adults with an Autism spectrum 
condition may be in excess of 500,000, over 50% of which may have an average or 
above average IQ (NAS, 2013).   Understanding their needs and assisting them in 
coping with the challenges of ageing may not only have ethical significance, but also 
cost saving implications in terms of reducing take up of services for acute or chronic 
mental and physical issues associated poor support (Rosenblatt, 2008; Allard, 2009).  
These savings are not limited to take up of services, but as Lawson observes (in Hill, 
2000), in the preventing waste of socio-economic contributions that AS people as 
fellow citizens make to wider society. 
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Epilogue – The Missing Centre. 
 
My aim throughout this project has been to pay close attention to the experiences 
of AS people, and for that reason the closing comments of this thesis reflect what I 
have  come  to  understand  as  an  important  yet  under-appreciated  concern  in 
research relating to AS people.  In the middle and later stages of my project, I came 
into contact with the academic work of researchers and activists on the spectrum, 
and have been lucky enough to correspond, discuss and share ideas.  Through these 
discussions, I have become aware of a number of issues that researchers on the 
spectrum have identified over the state of AS voices in contemporary research – 
and  this  includes  social  scientific  investigations.    The  different  groups  and 
individuals that are subsumed under the category of ‘autistic self advocacy’ are not 
homogenous; however, there does appear to be a general level of agreement with 
the idea that research should be inclusive of people on the spectrum not merely as 
‘subjects’ of research but as active participants in the creation of knowledge.  This is 
encapsulated in the slogan ‘nothing about us, without us’, a phrase first used by 
South African disability campaigners and later adopted as an official slogan of the 
US-based Autism Self-Advocacy Network (ASAN) (Charlton, 1998; ASAN, 2013). In 
contemporary  social  science  and  allied  disciplines,  participant  involvement  and 
reflexive  practice  on  the  part  of  the  researcher  are  cornerstones  of 
epistemologically  and  ethically  sound  research  practice  (Wiles  et  al.,  2004). 369 
 
 
Unfortunately, there are indications that in some cases practice has failed to live up 
to  these  standards,  whether  intentionally  or  through  ignorance,  and  this  has 
resulted in distrust among some researchers and activists on the spectrum that I 
have encountered.  
AS  researchers  and  activists  with  whom  I  have  spoken  describe  being  wary  of 
discussions with unfamiliar academics, in part because they feel that their AS status 
excludes them from the professional considerations that would automatically be 
afforded to other colleagues.  Far from participating in an intellectual discussion or 
exchange,  they  feel  that  their  thoughts  and  reflections  are  being  ‘mined’  and 
‘plundered’ for the advancement of other researchers.  Claims have been made of 
blog posts and discussions in online forums appearing in peer-reviewed publications 
by  non-AS  academics,  who  were  known  to  be  frequenting  these  environments.  
Elsewhere arguments have been made regarding the exclusion of autistic voices in 
research  by  non-AS  academics  (sometimes  referred  to  as  ‘colonisation’);  for 
example, in his review of Stuart Murray’s (a non-AS author) 2011 book  Autism, 
Arnold argues: 
It is an irony that this book (apart from its minor errors) says nothing wrong, 
but is wrong by being there, although one wonders what would be there if it 
was not. Murray and kindred academics are unfortunately squeezing out the 
authentic and autochthonous autistic strain that ought to be giving voice to 
the particular perspectives that he does (Arnold, 2012, 730). 370 
 
 
 
Arnold’s  comments  point  to  the  danger  that  even  well-meaning  research  that 
speaks for AS people, may itself serve to reinforce existing inequalities in knowledge 
production.   
 
Two concepts originating from within the AS research community, have been used 
to  describe  the  disabling  and  limiting  features  of  framing  AS  researchers  and 
contributors  as  mere  objects  of  research  rather  than  active  participants  in  the 
creation of knowledge.  ‘Fish-bowling’ denotes the process of framing an AS person 
who contributes to a conference or an edited collection, in such a way as to isolate 
them from wider intellectual consideration.  Like a fish swimming in a bowl, they 
are separated from the audience and become an object to be observed rather than 
a person or colleague contributing to an investigation or discussion.  This idea is 
compatible with the idea (discussed in 4.2.1) the ‘self-narrating zoo exhibit’ – one 
who is framed in such a way as to present an ‘interesting case’ for consideration 
and inspection by others (Sinclair, 2005).   
 
The  emergence  of  these  concepts  is  indicative  of  two  wider  problems  beyond 
plagiarism and attribution which appear in contemporary academic discussion of AS 
issues.  The first of these is the issue of ‘tokenism’, where an event or publication on 371 
 
 
AS, organised and framed by non-AS people, involves an AS speaker or writer who is 
invited to discuss ‘their life’ or ‘their experience’.  Often, this will be the extent of 
their  involvement,  and  may  be  the  limit  of  what  some  non-AS  researchers  and 
professionals expect them to either be capable of.  Rarely are AS people invited to 
participate in organisational or agenda-setting aspects of such endeavours.  This is 
problematic not only for the practice of research but for the quality of what is 
produced;  for  example,  that  which  makes  ‘good  life’  or  promotes  wellbeing  for 
different  AS  people  may  not  be  immediately  visible  or  generalizable  to  non-AS 
people and may vary across the different people in the AS category.  The second 
issue  has  to  do  with  what  I  call  the  ‘glass  sub-heading’,  where  the  normative 
structure  of  research  publications  quarantines  the  ideas  and  reflections  of  AS 
people  as  ‘data’  within  a  discussion  section  in  an  academic  paper.    The 
consequences of this are that AS people are often exiled from the theoretical space 
which remains the preserve of non-AS academics.   
 
To dismiss this as part of the inevitable development of an ‘emerging’ field in social 
scientific research would in my view be a mistake – AS people have been writing 
and theorising in this area for over fifteen years (Sinclair, 1993; Bovee, 2000; Shore, 
2001; Sinclair, 2005; Sinclair, 2007; Baggs, 2008; Murray et al., 2005; Lawson, 2009; 
Arnold, 2010; Milton, 2011; Milton et al., 2012; Milton and Moon, 2012; Milton, 
2012; Arnold, 2012).  Moreover, this is clearly something recognised by parts of the 372 
 
 
wider academic community who have made use of AS authored texts, websites and 
forums as sources of data for more than ten years.  Researchers (AS and non-AS) in 
this area refer to the ‘classics’ and foundational texts of AS writing, such as the work 
of Jim Sinclair and others who helped establish some of the core concepts of the 
neurodiversity movement (many of which have been cited in academic publications).  
It is perhaps telling therefore that these core texts, the influence of which is clear in 
contemporary discourse of mainstream research, have yet to appear in a recognised 
academic volume. 
 
It is important to clarify the context in which I highlight these points.  Firstly, I am 
not suggesting any kind of conscious academic conspiracy against AS people; indeed 
such a situation might actually be easier to address, than what I believe to be the 
case.    This  is  that  despite  rhetorical  commitment  to  emancipatory  ethics  and 
reflexive  practice,  too  often  the  demands  and  temptations  of  publication  and 
prestige  condition  how  people’s  experiences  are  used  in  research.    I  am  not 
suggesting that the demands on researchers are not often arduous, intersecting 
other pressures, for example, to publish and generate impact.  No one is perfect, 
and this is a question of degrees rather than absolutes.  What might be beneficial 
therefore is to make conscious effort to bring those whom Bogdashina, now more 
than ten years ago, called the ‘native experts’ (Bogdashina, 2001, 1) into a central 
position in theorising AS experiences.  Indications of more epistemologically and 373 
 
 
ethically sound models of knowledge production, for example, in the work of the 
Academic  Autism  Spectrum  Partnership  in  Research  and  Education  (AASIPRE) 
(Kidney  et  al.,  2010;  Raymaker  and  Nicolaidis,  2010;  McDonald  et  al.,  2011; 
Nicolaidis et al., 2011).  Future researchers in this area may therefore reflect on 
what opportunities for reflexive consideration of research findings are provided by 
the practical process of participation in the projects that they design and implement  
 
Secondly, this is not an argument for standpoint epistemology or the homogeneity 
of opinions within the diverse community of AS authors.  If my experience at the 
Theorising Autism conference (a majority-AS one day seminar organised by and for 
researchers  and  activists  on  the  spectrum)  is  any  guide,  the  community  of  AS 
contributors have, unsurprisingly, different experiences and perspectives (as have 
the autobiographers whose experiences are explored in this thesis).  They disagree, 
argue and engage in debate, just like most other social groups.  The issue is not 
about privileging the subaltern or a particular standpoint – it is about addressing the 
interrelated  epistemological  and  ethical  issues  of  AS  people  not  being  able  to 
contribute to theoretical knowledge due to artificial constraints.   
 
Thirdly, I do not wish to denigrate the current and potential future contributions of 
social  scientific  perspectives,  nor  the  work  done  by  social  scientists  to  enrich 374 
 
 
understandings  of  AS  and provide opportunities  for  participatory  research.   The 
theoretical  resources  of  social  science  have  been  important  for  AS  writers  in  a 
variety  of  contexts,  not  least  for  contestation  of  clinical  narratives  of  their 
experiences  (Shore,  2001;  Arnold,  2010;  Arnold,  2012;  Milton  and  Moon,  2012; 
Milton, 2012).  This is, again, not in any way to minimise the work of conscientious 
clinicians, many of whom may already be practising the kind of participatory ways 
of supporting and working with AS people that are suggested by the present thesis 
(indeed I am aware of examples of this).  Rather, it is to recognise that one of the 
key intellectual struggles faced by AS people has been to counter overly general 
theoretical accounts of what they can and cannot do, that have been imposed by 
non-AS authors.  In my own theoretical approach, I have attempted to avoid this by 
exploring the interdependence and contingency of dispositionality, social conditions 
and biography in the production of pre-diagnostic identities. 
 
Finally, the points I have made here stem from discussions with a particular group 
of  AS  people;  academically  trained,  engaged  with  contemporary  research  and 
personally  invested  in  the types  of issues  here  discussed.   This does not  mean, 
therefore, that these concerns are relevant to all AS people; there may be those 
who, upon receiving the diagnosis, may simply wish to concern themselves with 
making a liveable life, or conversely use this as a springboard to become involved in 
wider debates.  Whatever the case, the points I have raised reflect what I believe to 375 
 
 
be important issues for contemporary sociological research, attention to which can 
help develop future research programmes on more ethically and epistemologically 
sound bases, and thus contribute to the production of knowledge that is useful in 
promoting wellbeing. 
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